Reformation or Deformation of the EU Public Procurement Rules
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Reformation or Deformation of the EU Public Procurement Rules

Edited by Grith S. Ølykke and Albert Sanchez-Graells

Using an innovative ‘law and political science’ methodology, this timely book carries out a critical assessment of the reform of the EU public procurement rules. It provides a rich account of the policy directions and the spaces for national regulatory decisions in the transposition of the 2014 Public Procurement Package, as well as areas of uncertainty and indications on how to interpret the rules in order to make them operational in practice.
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Chapter 6: The provision on abnormally low tenders: a safeguard for fair competition?

Grith Skovgaard Ølykke

Abstract

Two new requirements are introduced in the provision on abnormally low tenders: a requirement to verify all apparently abnormally low tenders and a requirement to reject tenders that are verified to be abnormally low because they are based on non-compliance with applicable social, environmental or labour law obligations. These requirements were part of the Commission’s 2011 Proposal but were developed and refined in particular by the Parliament during the negotiations. It is argued that the purpose of the requirements to verify and to reject together with other possibilities of ensuring adherence to the mentioned rules is to obtain fair competition for public contracts. Moreover, the analysis predicts that the CJEU’s interpretation of the concept of ‘applicable obligations’ will not result in homogeneous obligations for all potential tenderers, but rather that fair competition only requires all tenderers to adhere to the obligations which apply to them individually.

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