Edited by Luis C. Corchón and Marco A. Marini
Chapter 14: TU oligopoly games and industrial cooperation
This chapter surveys existing results and lists nine future areas in the field of transferable utility (TU) oligopoly games, which are both theoretically interesting and empirically important. On the theory side, they make advances on the refinements and applications of the core, one of the most important solutions in cooperative game theory. On the empirical side, TU oligopoly games allow one to model and analyze industrial cooperation and help understand the forces behind industrial changes as well as the effects of regulatory policies.
You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.
Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.
Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.
Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.