Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I
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Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I

Theory

Edited by Luis C. Corchón and Marco A. Marini

The first volume of this wide-ranging Handbook contains original contributions by world-class specialists. It provides up-to-date surveys of the main game-theoretic tools commonly used to model industrial organization topics. The Handbook covers numerous subjects in detail including, among others, the tools of lattice programming, supermodular and aggregative games, monopolistic competition, horizontal and vertically differentiated good models, dynamic and Stackelberg games, entry games, evolutionary games with adaptive players, asymmetric information, moral hazard, learning and information sharing models.
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Chapter 18: Information sharing in oligopoly

Sergio Currarini and Francesco Feri

Abstract

This chapter reviews the theoretical literature on information sharing in oligopoly, and discusses recent contributions that extend the traditional multilateral model to encompass the possibility of bilateral sharing agreements. In the first part of the survey we revisit the early insights of the literature, stressing the role of demand vs price competition and of common vs private values; then, following more recent contributions, we reinterpret the most celebrated results in terms of the properties of the informational structure. Then, in the second part of the survey, we discuss in some detail the bilateral model of information sharing, stressing the role of signals’ correlation for the emergence of information sharing in equilibrium and its effect on the architecture of sharing networks. We finally discuss the emergence of core–periphery networks when firms possess asymmetric information.

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