Edited by Rosalind Dixon and Tom Ginsburg
Chapter 12: Between power and submissiveness: constitutional adjudication in Latin America
This chapter reflects on the different experiences that Latin America’s constitutional courts have had in their attempt to control political action, influence policy, and secure the rights of citizens in the past two decades. After providing a brief introduction to the topic, relying on the growing literature on comparative constitutionalism and judicial politics in the region, the chapter discusses and contrasts the very dissimilar experiences of two constitutional courts in Latin America: the Sala Cuarta of the Costa Rican Supreme Court, and the Constitutional Chamber of the Venezuelan Supreme Tribunal. The former provides a good example of a powerful, influential court, whilst the latter exemplifies a weak, submissive, constitutional adjudication body. Venezuela, Costa Rica, constitutional courts, judicial power, judicial independence, judicial review
You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.
Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.
Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.
Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.