Edited by Gareth Davies and Matej Avbelj
Chapter 14: Of politics and pluralism: governmentality and the EU legal order
This chapter begins from the premise that pluralism is not just a descriptive term, but a normative one. As a normative label, pluralism does more than simply claim that unresolved systems are desirable; it also marks certain subjects as the legitimate targets of a centralized legal or political order, and others as legitimately governed through decentralized systems of legal or political control. In doing so, it defines what things “we” have in common, and what things we do not. Framing systemic conflict as an example of legal pluralism (rather than simply as illegitimate or illegal according to a centralized norm) thereby justifies particular allocations of power and authority. And these claims about who “we” are and what forms of government are “legitimate” are in turn related to our underlying ideas about human behavior, the purpose of government, and the appropriate means and ends of power.
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