Edited by Gareth Davies and Matej Avbelj
Chapter 17: Constitutional pluralism and judicial adjudication: on legal reasoning, minimalism and silence by the Court of Justice
For decades, the Court of Justice of the European Union has relatively successfully negotiated its way under circumstances which the theory of constitutional pluralism adequately portrays. In part, this achievement is due to the Court’s warranted minimalist approach to adjudication, its way of legal reasoning in interpreting EU law and the techniques with which it reserves space for communication, interaction and even conflict between legal orders. Building on existing accounts of both the Court’s practice and constitutional pluralism, this chapter concentrates on the prerequisite that the members of the community of judicial discourse understand the Court’s established patterns of legal interpretation and reasoning, as well as their role in maintaining the pluralist European legal order.
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