Research Handbook on Representative Shareholder Litigation
Edited by Sean Griffith, Jessica Erickson, David H. Webber and Verity Winship
Abstract
The chapter interrogates recent efforts by the Delaware Chancery Court to rein in disclosure-only settlements. Under the author’s analysis, such suits might constitute a “necessary evil” in service of another goal: “Delaware’s ability to stay at the forefront of corporate law.” Much depends on whether plaintiff law firms know the strength of their cases at filing, or whether they only develop that understanding over time. If the latter, rational firms might bring cases outside of Delaware—even strong cases—for fear that the lack of ability to obtain a disclosure-only settlement would leave them unable to recover costs in Delaware if the case turned out to be weak. The author raises the possibility that Delaware’s crackdown on such settlements may be incompatible with its commitment to remain the leading forum for corporate litigation.
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