Edited by Gordon Crawford and Abdul-Gafaru Abdulai
Chapter 17: Consociational democracy: compromise or collapse?
Does consociational democracy exacerbate or alleviate divisions in deeply divided societies? This chapter assesses the mixed performance record of consociational democracy in delivering peace, political stability, and democracy. It explains that consociationalism is characterized by two sets of countervailing incentives, one that encourages cooperation and compromise amongst political elites and one that emboldens brinkmanship, ethnic outbidding and collapse. Drawing examples from a range of deeply divided societies, including Burundi, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lebanon and Northern Ireland, the chapter outlines four criteria for predicting which set of incentives will be activated: the conditions under which consociational rules are adopted, the fit between institutions and the context in which they are applied, the inclusivity of consociational rules, especially for communities beyond the ethnopolitical divide ,and the flexibility of such rules in responding to societal and political change.
You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.
Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.
Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.
Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.