Edited by Susan M. Sterett and Lee D. Walker
Chapter 7: Independence in judicial hierarchies: civil law systems
Whereas much of the literature on judicial independence focuses on the selection of high court judges and their independence from the other branches of government (aka external independence), this chapter focuses on lower court judges’ independence from their superiors in the judicial hierarchy. The chapter argues that internal judicial independence, as is commonly known, is relevant for the kinds of outcomes that we believe the judiciary can produce, such as corruption control or the peaceful solution of conflicts. Providing a conceptually clear account of internal judicial independence, the chapter discusses the conditions, processes, and institutions that the scholarly literature has suggested as relevant to produce and protect it. Many of the arguments are illustrated with examples from the countries with bureaucratic or civil service judiciaries, where internal judicial independence tends to be more relevant, such as Latin American and other countries in Europe and Asia.
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