Walking a Labyrinth
Edited by Eljalill Tauschinsky and Wolfgang Weiß
Chapter 6: EU delegation of powers in the field of financial markets regulation
This chapter addresses the issue of flexibility in the EU constitutional regime governing the delegation of powers. The issue is first studied from a judicial perspective, by analysing some fundamental judgments of the CJEU, and second from the perspective of the EU legislature, focusing on financial markets regulation. The chapter will argue that the EU financial rule-making process confirms that the legislative choice between Article 290 and Article 291 TFEU is mostly made on the basis of political and practical considerations, and not on the basis of the evanescent conceptual distinction between ‘supplementing’ and ‘implementing’ measures. This political discretion is supported by EU Treaty rules and their judicial interpretation. From a wider perspective, the chapter will also show that the field of EU financial markets regulation offers an interesting case study of the EU legislators’ ingenuity in devising the most – politically and practically – convenient institutional set up to delegate rule- and decision-making powers.
You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.
Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.
Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.
Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.