Ideal and Normative Dimensions
Edited by Massimo La Torre, Leone Niglia and Mart Susi
Chapter 4: The practice-independency of human rights
It is inadequate to transfer the logic of practice-dependency, as applied to legal rights, to human rights. Legal rights are practice-dependent - i.e. dependent on the practice of law or on ‘law as practice’ - since their logic is still the authoritative logic of political sovereignty. On the contrary, the idea of human rights is antithetical to that logic. Human rights constitute a critical and reactive standard to authoritative practices on which, therefore, they cannot depend.
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