Edited by Jorge L. Fabra-Zamora
Chapter 5: Normative legal pluralism: a critique
Normative Legal Pluralism is based on the observation that there is more than one legal or, more generally, normative order in one social field, e.g., a nation-state. Recently, this observation has been transferred to the current condition of legal orders in a globalized world. On a global scale we are confronted with the fact of a plurality of legal and hybrid normative orders, which overlap or collide. Normative legal pluralism claims that this condition shall not be overcome, that one should not argue for a legal centralism as it happened in the formation of nation-states. Legal pluralism is considered as a justified norm in itself. The chapter will argue that legal pluralism as a norm presupposes and requires some kind of meta-law, which enables participants to deal with norm conflicts and collisions. There already exists a social practice, a “management of hybridity,” executed by jurists (Schiff Berman), which could be used as a starting point to develop and justify something like a meta-law.
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