Edited by Herwig C.H. Hofmann, Katerina Pantazatou and Giovanni Zaccaroni
Chapter 2: The Faustian bargain. How evolving economic and political beliefs have redefined the European economic constitution
This chapter is built on the assumption that every constitution is based on certain convictions, a concept as to how a good society should be organized in its various dimensions and how to arrange public institutions towards that goal. Based upon this premise, the contribution makes three points. The first is that the history of the last decade has demonstrated quite painfully that the original economic beliefs behind some of the most important tenets of the European Economic Constitution have proven largely wrong or at least have become very contestable. Second, the European Economic Constitution has been pliable to adjustments, even if the adjustments occurring in the last decade have largely taken a very specific form of EU institutions gradually redefining their mandate. And third, the most serious recent adaptations are time-inconsistent, in the sense that they produce short-term benefits, at the expense, however, of long-term costs. Arguably a viable European economic constitution requires a different kind of metamorphosis.
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