Competition Law and Economics
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Competition Law and Economics

Developments, Policies and Enforcement Trends in the US and Korea

Edited by Jay P. Choi, Wonhyuk Lim and Sang-Hyop Lee

In this exciting new book, an international team of experts compare market structures, in both global and Korean contexts, particularly focusing on the impact of foreign competition on market concentration and ways to improve market structure. It thoroughly investigates core competition problems, including international abuses of dominance, mergers and collusion, and vertical restraints. Contributions move beyond explaining the laws and practices of enforcement agencies, offering readers an insight into the trend of an ever-increasing interdependence among national economies, complemented by analyses of recent developments in the US and Canada.
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Chapter 7: What next? Cartel strategy after getting caught

Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx and Claudio Mezzetti


Once firms are prosecuted for collusion, strategies remain available that have the potential to reduce the penalties they face. Settlement negotiations offer opportunities to negotiate restricted pleas that limit penalties from follow-on litigation, and leniency programs such as Amnesty Plus offer opportunities to reduce fines associated with collusion in one product by revealing collusion in another. The authors offer implications for antitrust policy and consider firms’ strategies during settlement negotiations and leniency applications while these firms are being prosecuted for collusion. They discuss the effects of settlement negotiations on deterrence through such settlement negotiations on follow-on litigation and suggest that limited criminal pleas can handicap the ability of civil litigants to pursue damages and, hence, reduce deterrence. They show how leniency programs can affect incentives for multiproduct colluders, potentially decreasing deterrence in the main product market and creating incentives for the formation of sacrificial cartels in secondary product markets.

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