Edited by Robert W. Dimand and Harald Hagemann
Chapter 10: G.E. Moore
Moore’s early role in Cambridge philosophy and connections to Russell, Wittgenstein, and Keynes are described. His influence on Keynes’s early views is associated with Moore’s naturalistic fallacy idea and his open-question argument method of analysis. Moore and Keynes disagreed about how duty was to be explained owing to their differences over how the concept of probability was to be understood. Moore held a frequency view and Keynes believed probability was a matter of rational judgement. In his later “My early beliefs” memoir Keynes affirmed his attachment to Moore’s understanding of the good as what is intrinsically valuable and demurred from his view of duty and as conduct. Conventions were seen as central to the latter.
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