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Economic Analysis and International Law

Marco Arnone and Leonardo S. Borlini

Corruption presents many legal and regulatory challenges, but these challenges cannot be met by the law in isolation. This book presents economic analysis of crime as an essential tool for shaping an effective legal apparatus. The authors contend that in order to assess whether and how to regulate corruption, it is necessary to start with a thorough inquiry into the causes, institutional and social effects, and most of all, actual and potential economic and financial consequences of crimes. This, they argue, should inform and help shape a balanced legal and regulatory approach to corruption.
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Chapter 16: Follow-up procedures as specific cases of international supervision

Marco Arnone and Leonardo S. Borlini


Whether one assumes the traditional dualistic theoretical construct, or accepts the monistic conception advocating the primacy of international law, or maintains that "international law no longer constitutes a sphere of law tightly separate and distinct (subject to one or two exceptions) from that of national law systems" (Cassese 2008: 217), the fact remains that one of the crucial issues of contemporary as well as modern international law concerns the mechanisms for monitoring and guaranteeing compliance with international rules by States to which they are addressed. International treaties against transnational crimes are no exception. It might well be argued that one of the distinguishing features of contemporary international law is that States have gradually realized that, in many spheres, dispute settlement should be replaced by the establishment and running of mechanisms designed to monitor compliance with international legal standards on a permanent or quasi-permanent basis, and, thus "prevent or deter as much as possible deviation from those standards" (Cassese 2008: 283; emphasis added). The monitoring mechanisms established by some of the international anti-bribery treaties are a paradigmatic case of the mechanisms just sketched out. What is more, the effective operation of such mechanisms and their relative strength or weakness represents a key disparity among the various treaties we have described.

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