The Elgar Companion to Public Choice, Second Edition
Show Less

The Elgar Companion to Public Choice, Second Edition

Edited by William F. Shughart II, Laura Razzolini and Michael Reksulak

The Companion lays out a comprehensive history of the field and, in five additional parts, it explores public choice contributions to the study of the origins of the state, the organization of political activity, the analysis of decision-making in non-market institutions, the examination of tribal governance and to modeling and predicting the behavior of international organizations and transnational terrorism.
Buy Book in Print
Show Summary Details
You do not have access to this content

Chapter 13: The politics of elections and congressional oversight

Russell S. Sobel and Adam Pellillo


A key insight from economics is that individuals respond to the incentives they face. Public choice postulates that this logic applies not only to individuals in their private actions, but also in their actions as public sector employees or elected representatives. In both the private marketplace and in the public sector, the incentives individuals face are sometimes aligned with actions that are in the best interest of society, leading to efficient and socially beneficial outcomes. In other cases, however, certain incentives can lead individuals to pursue actions that are personally beneficial but socially unproductive and inefficient. In this chapter, we examine two such cases where existing political incentives distort the behavior of public sector agents. In the first case, we assess how the behavior of decision-makers within public sector agencies is shaped by the process of congressional oversight (which is part of the literature on ‘congressional dominance theory’), and in the second we discuss how the behavior of elected officials is shaped by the timing of elections.

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.

Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.

Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

Further information

or login to access all content.