Abstract
This article analyses the question of Indigenous peoples’ identity through the lens of Martha Fineman’s theory of vulnerability and human rights law. Answering questions of Indigenous identity is a difficult and complex endeavour, and is subject to many considerations, including individual, collective, internal and external perspectives. The theory of vulnerability of Martha Fineman provides the author with a prism through which to examine Indigenous identity and inequality across the social, economic, cultural, environmental and political spectra in the Indigenous peoples’ context, and permits the elaboration of a normative pathway to inform legal responses able to compensate for situations of inequity. In the author’s opinion, Fineman’s theory of vulnerability provides an innovative perspective from which to engage in the epistemological, analytical and normative legal analysis that is required, with the aim of supporting the resilience of the Sami peoples at the collective and individual level. The debate within the paradigm of human rights is based on the premise of the existence of different groups with different identities within States (such as minority groups and Indigenous peoples). The recognition of different rights defined internationally and constitutionally has resulted in the possibility for these groups of recognition of their specific cultural traits.
1 INTRODUCTION
The view was expressed that international law, a product of the consent of States, takes into little consideration the views of individuals and groups within the State. On the other hand, ‘it is undeniable that the evolution of the protection of individuals and groups has a strong basis in the contemporary international legal system’.7 Therefore, the content of rights that are related to cultural identity should be analysed through this prism.8Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems.6
Cultural rights ‘ha[ve] been strictly associated with the concept of identity, because cultural elements, such as language, religion, ethnicity and traditions shape the identity of groups and individuals’.9
Therefore, it may be stated that cultural rights of Indigenous identity have been extrapolated from the catalogue of rights contained in soft law and hard law instruments. The most important is without doubt the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).10 There are several articles therein granting Indigenous peoples the following rights: Article 1 of the UNDRIP states that: ‘Indigenous peoples have the right to the full enjoyment, as a collective or as individuals, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised in the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international human rights law’.
The term ‘identity’ is mentioned in Article 2 of the UNDRIP with reference to the right of non-discrimination based on identity or ‘indigenous origin’. Indigenous culture is mentioned in Article 8, with reference to peoples and individuals ‘not to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture’. Rights of Indigenous peoples to their lands or territories is mentioned in Article 10. Article 11 grants the right to practise and revitalise their cultural traditions and customs. This includes, inter alia, the right to maintain, protect and develop the past, present and future manifestations of their cultures, such as archaeological and historical sites, artefacts, designs, ceremonies, technologies and visual and performing arts. Article 13 refers to the right to literature (to manifest, practise, develop and teach their spiritual and religious traditions, customs and ceremonies). The right to the dignity and diversity of their cultures, traditions, histories and aspirations which shall be appropriately reflected in education and public information is included in Article 15.
These rights are often controversial, each and every one of them generating robust debate. They constitute a very complex nexus of rights which, according to a commonly held view, forms the right to cultural identity; the most challenging question being whether the right to cultural identity may become part of the international catalogue of human rights. There are several international conventions whose catalogues of rights have contributed to the better understanding of cultural rights. The International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples has to be singled out as capturing the cultural right of Indigenous peoples through the prism of other extensive rights.11 The ILO Convention is an important international legal instrument that deals specifically with Indigenous peoples’ land and natural resources rights.
With respect to the rights of ownership and possession of Indigenous peoples, the ILO Convention envisages two categories of rights: (a) lands which they traditionally occupy; and (b) lands which they do not occupy but to which they have access rights for their subsistence and traditional activities.12 This distinction is important as it requires the recognition of Indigenous land rights, even when land is not exclusively occupied by them. This author supports the view that these land rights should be interpreted broadly.13 For example, the rights recognised by the ILO Convention correspond to the rights accorded to the owner of land.14 However, in the light of the Indigenous traditional land rights, it is suggested that the rights recognised under Article 14 do not need to be transferred to the Indigenous peoples, for such rights are based on historic title.
The theory of vulnerability of Martha Fineman provides the author with a prism through which to examine Indigenous identity. In the author’s opinion, Fineman’s theory of vulnerability provides an innovative perspective from which to engage in the epistemological, analytical and normative legal analysis that is required, with the aim of supporting the resilience of Indigenous peoples at the collective and individual level. As Fineman states, vulnerability is a universal condition and inherent in human nature.15 From the theoretical point of view, Fineman analyses vulnerability within the context of the United States. However, as she observes, ‘the points made are relevant for any system that seeks justice, particularly those that address discrimination as a primary cause of social, economic, and political inequalities and systems in which individual liberty or autonomy is seen as a paramount virtue and privileged over equality’.16 The present author, therefore, applies this theory to Indigenous peoples, as having been subjected to discrimination, vulnerable, and deprived in many cases of expressing their identity and autonomy.
The author will establish some caveats in the interpretation of vulnerability, to ensure that necessary identity considerations and their role in guiding legitimate State responses are not neglected in the course of a vulnerability analysis. This vulnerability approach deploys a resilience ‘grid’ comprising asset-conferring categories as postulated by Fineman (physical goods, environmental resources, human capital goods, social assets, and existential resources) as the equalising method.
Fineman’s theory of vulnerability is a novel and original approach to the identity of Indigenous peoples.
2 VULNERABILITY THEORY AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ IDENTITY
Within the framework of the vulnerability theory, the question of identity is one of the most complex and perhaps thought-provoking issues. This paper will analyse the theory of Fineman relating to identity within the context of Indigenous peoples. It approaches identity of Indigenous peoples as an indispensable element of autonomy which, in our view, has a broader meaning than self-determination (which will be discussed below). The view to which this author adheres is that there are no monolithic regimes defining autonomy. They can differ according to the principle they are predicated on: the personality or the territoriality principle. As it was explained, ‘personal autonomies confer specific powers of governmental authority to members of a given ethnic group’.17 The characteristic feature of personal autonomies is that they are based on group membership and do not have a territorial basis.18 Territorial autonomies constitute a certain region within a State, which enjoy ‘a special status with specific powers of State authority granted to the territory’.19 As will be explained, ‘a pre-condition to using territorial autonomies as a means of group protection, however, is that the given Indigenous peoples settle there in an ethnically homogenous community’.20 Autonomous regimes are not uniform and powers bestowed on Indigenous communities vary to a great degree. The areas of autonomy may concern, for example, fiscal, educational and cultural jurisdiction. Indigenous peoples’ cultural identity is particularly well preserved and protected by autonomous regimes, as it enables them to decide on their own path for development, not subject to a majority ruling. The autonomy of Indigenous peoples is strongly formulated in the UNDRIP (see Article 4).21 In my view, therefore, autonomy and identity are inexorably linked together. There cannot be an assertion of identity without autonomy, personal or territorial. In this section, the author intends to focus on the link between the right of self-determination and autonomy, in light of Fineman’s theory. As noted below, Article 27 of the ICCPR has a pivotal relevance to Indigenous peoples, as it grants them the right to enjoy their own culture. From this Article, their right to autonomy can be derived.22 The UNDRIP in Article 3 refers to the right of self-determination of Indigenous peoples, which means the ability freely to ‘determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’.
In broad brushstrokes, it can be said that one of the tenets of Fineman’s theory is her scepticism relating to identity and autonomy.23 The main argument against identity is that, according to Fineman, ‘aspects of organising equality discourse around identity characteristics is that it distorts our understanding of a variety of various problems and takes only a limited view of what should constitute governmental responsibility in regard to social justice issues’.24 Fineman therefore postulates moving ‘beyond identity’ and to approach social justice and equality from the point of view of universal identity.25 Fineman finds that ascribing vulnerability to only one group is, in fact, discriminatory. She advocates the view that labelling vulnerability as characterising one group obliterates significant differences between individuals. The most important effect of the identification of vulnerable groups is to suggest that there are certain groups that are not vulnerable.26 The point of the criticism that this theory on identity and autonomy has incurred is the position on the public policy regarding the elderly. Fineman, who strongly opposes labelling certain groups as vulnerable, identifies one group, the elderly, as vulnerable.27 The singling-out of this group goes against the grain of Fineman’s theory and it is considered inconsistent.28 However, in response to such a critique, it was explained that the departure from a general principle of a ‘beyond identity’ approach in relation to older populations was dictated by the concern of Fineman for the lack of proper protection of the elderly and it is ‘better than nothing’.29 An important observation was made that a specific population may have a particular differentiating experience, which would entitle them not to move beyond identity.30
In general terms, Indigenous identity is a truly complex and somewhat controversial topic. ‘There is little agreement on precisely what constitutes an Indigenous identity, how to measure it, and who truly has it.’33 The main principle of identification derives from ‘recognition of a common origin or shared characteristics with another person, group, or ideal leading to solidarity and allegiance’.34 Identity is a composite term, consisting of self-identification and the perception of others. The conflict occurs when self-identification and the perception of others are not in harmony.35 Self-perception is the main element of identity. Cultural identity is a fluid concept, which may result in the evolving self-identification of a person.36 In our view, the most important constituting element of Indigenous identity is the following:Even when Indigenous territories and lands are recognized, protection of boundaries or external parties use of natural resources are often weak. Insecure land tenure is a driver of conflict, environmental degradation, and weak economic and social development. This threatens cultural survival and vital knowledge systems – both of which contribute to ecological integrity, biodiversity and environmental health upon which we all depend.32
The theoretical considerations concerning Indigenous identity have brought about a concept of ‘common identity’.38 In very broad brushstrokes, such a common identity is based on a common (amongst Indigenous peoples) sense of injustice, background and history.39 Values of Indigenous peoples are shared values. Their relationship with ancestral lands is without doubt a fundamental element of their identity. As has been eloquently described, ‘this relationship, which is the core of Indigenous societies, has social, cultural, spiritual economic dimensions’.40Indigenous identity is connected to a sense of peoplehood inseparably linked to sacred traditions, traditional homelands, and a shared history as indigenous people. A person must be integrated into a society, not simply stand alone as an individual, in order to be fully human. Additionally, identity can only be confirmed by others who share that identity. The sense of membership in a community is so integrally linked to a sense of identity that Native people often identify themselves by their reservations or tribal communities. This stands in striking contrast to the practice of many members of the dominant society who commonly identify themselves by their professional affiliations. Tribal members have an enduring sense of their own unique indigenous identity. The sense of a traditional homeland is so strong for many Navajos that when outside their traditional territory and away from sacred geography they sometimes experience an extreme imbalance that can only be corrected by returning to their home communities for ceremonies.37
The Arctic Council regime has proved that there is a possibility of an existence of parallel sovereignties, ie, that of the State and that of Indigenous peoples.45 Therefore, it raises a very pertinent question of the defining of Indigenous peoples’ identity from the non-native perspective, which lacks authenticity. It results in the definition of Indigenous peoples by the non-indigenous,46 thus at odds with concepts of self-identification and self-perception.The institutional composition of the Arctic Council allows it to surpass the epistemological limitations of the traditional international legal order in that the centrality of Indigenous transboundary representation and participation removes the state as the definitional reference point of sovereignty in international relations. Moreover, the institutionalization of Indigenous sovereignty expands the breadth of knowledge and science that is produced by the Arctic Council and upon which its decisions are made.44
Fineman’s theory of vulnerability47 is exceptionally relevant to the plight of Indigenous peoples who suffer multiple and numerous vulnerabilities. In particular, this vulnerability is characterised by the historic erosion of their Indigenous rights to land and natural resources. Fineman pertinently observes that the proper protection of Indigenous peoples requires that legislative and response strategies deal also with the specificities of their vulnerability. When examining the status of these people, one cannot help noticing the erosion of their resilience over the years, largely due to their exclusion from access to land and natural resources, an exclusion which is imposed through both legal obligations and physical obstacles. In relation to Indigenous peoples of the Artic (the Sami), this problem is aggravated by the extreme weather conditions in the Arctic territories which the Sami inhabit, which is getting worse due to contemporary environmental threats such as climate change.48 Climate change is having a detrimental effect on Sami peoples’ livelihood.49
Of particular concern is the risk of identity loss, which emanates from their constant integration into mainstream societies. This leads to the consequential effects of identity loss suffered by young and future generations due to lack of culture exposure and the deprivation of access to their traditional spiritual lands together with loss of access to natural resources. The special spiritual and cultural links of the Indigenous peoples to their land and territories have continuously been challenged since their colonisation. Furthermore, the vulnerability of Indigenous people has been used to exploit their rights, including those to land and resources.
The problem of environmental degradation is also a major contributor which further enhances the risk of identity loss.50 Today, the lands of Indigenous peoples are facing a multitude of challenges which range from large-scale exploitation of natural resources to increasing commercial development. Conflicts between Indigenous peoples and the interests of third parties over land51 and over natural resources have resulted in effective expropriation of lands, with the resulting diminution of substantive resource utilisation rights.52 These realities continue to constitute present threats to traditional ways of Indigenous peoples’ living, as exemplified by the Sami peoples.53 It is suggested that Fineman’s vulnerability theory is well suited to ensure sustainability. A major feature of Fineman’s theory is utilising normativity in combating vulnerability. The latter is usually a result of the trend that the State should ensure the equal protection of its citizens from stigmatisation or deprivation. This is usually done through the State’s institutions and national mechanisms (particularly the law) to ensure, for example, that access to public assets is influenced by the need to enjoy substantive equality. This outcome leads Fineman to reject reliance upon legal systems based on formal equality.54
3 THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)55 provides strong protection for Indigenous peoples, their culture and their livelihoods. Certain provisions are significant for safeguarding the right to land and natural resources. When read in conjunction with Article 27 on minority rights, Article 1 of the ICCPR,56 on the right to self-determination, provides a useful platform in the effort to secure the legal resilience of the rights of Indigenous peoples. The Covenant clearly links the right to self-determination, not only to determine the peoples’ political status but also to pursue their economic, social and cultural development. Peoples are given the right to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources and requires that in no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence. These rights are fundamental to the existence and survival of Indigenous peoples and highlight the importance of their rights of self-determination in their efforts to control their lands, territories and natural resources.57 In the context of Indigenous peoples, as noted above, their claim for self-determination is largely defined by their control over the land and natural resources. Securing rights over the land and its natural resources remains crucial to their quest to exist as a distinct people.58
It appears that the State is obliged to take positive measures to protect the right in Article 27. This duty is elaborated upon by the UNHRC, which has stated that ‘positive measures by States may also be necessary to protect the identity of a minority and the rights of its members to enjoy and develop their culture’.61 Indeed, one author has argued that the prohibition in Article 27 may be used to deter States from depriving historically acquired title to land by Indigenous peoples.62 Despite the various challenges facing Indigenous peoples, he goes further by suggesting that it can be interpreted as a requirement upon States to return land that traditionally belonged to them.63 It may be said that Article 27 offers significant legal protection against measures which deny or could potentially deprive Indigenous peoples of the use of their traditional land, territories, and their natural resources. In this respect, noteworthy is the UNHRC’s support for a broad interpretation of ‘enjoyment of culture’ to encompass and provide extensive protection to a range of Indigenous livelihoods, including coastal fishing and reindeer husbandry. In practice, however, this international progress in the protection of Indigenous peoples’ rights has not been generally evident in the decisions of municipal courts.64 Consequently, such rights – even though they may constitute international obligations – encounter problems with respect to enforcement.With regard to the exercise of the cultural rights protected under article 27, the Committee observes that culture manifests itself in many forms, including a particular way of life associated with the use of land resources, especially in the case of indigenous peoples. That right may include such traditional activities as fishing or hunting and the right to live in reserves protected by law. The enjoyment of those rights may require positive legal measures of protection and measures to ensure the effective participation of members of minority communities in decisions which affect them.60
In general, the identification of Indigenous peoples through culture is characterised by a narrow approach, which was a feature of most international human rights protections. The definition of cultural rights and their normative content can only be found in the 2001 UNESCO Declaration on Cultural Diversity65 and the 2005 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions.66 However, as Odello argues, the concept of rights-oriented cultural identity is still rather vague.67 The identification of a single concept of cultural identity among Indigenous peoples is very complex on account of the fact that identity includes three facets, namely: self-identification, community identification and external identification. Cultural elements define the different types of identity. However, identities also change over time as cultural values and expressions are subject to modification.68
4 CONCLUSIONS
This article’s focus is on Indigenous peoples’ identity through the prism of Martha Fineman’s theory of vulnerability. As was suggested, there can be no true resilience without a significant level of autonomy. One of the tenets of Fineman’s theory is her scepticism relating to identity and autonomy. According to Fineman, the main argument against identity is that aspects of organising equality discourses around identity characteristics distorts our understanding of a variety of problems. Fineman’s concept of a ‘beyond identity’ approach to social justice and equality from the point of view of universal identity is, in the view of the present author, considered not appropriate. An exception from this concept of Indigenous peoples, as in relation to the elderly and due to a past history of enforced assimilation and persecution and living in the environment of majority-based decision-making, is justified. Due to their many characteristics which identify their vulnerability as a group, their experiences exclude them from the paradigm of universal vulnerability. Their cultural identity and autonomy, exercised collectively, define them. The fight for their own group identity is an ongoing battle. According to the theory, vulnerability is characterised by the historic erosion of Indigenous rights to land and natural resources. The struggle of Indigenous peoples in the area of land and natural resources bolsters Fineman’s observation that the proper protection of Indigenous peoples requires that legislative and response strategies deal with the specificities of their vulnerability.
The author is of the view that Fineman’s theory of vulnerability is a very instructive tool for analysing Indigenous peoples holistically. Their position, seen through the prism of the main tenets of her theory (resilience, identity, vulnerability), brings together and shows the continuity of their struggles seen through the historical lens and takes into account the present position from national and international perspectives.
The other aspect of Indigenous identity was that of culture mobilising existing human rights. This approach to identity is not as fully defined and its contours are rather vague. As was suggested, ‘possible interpretation of the right to cultural identity and the recognition of cultural rights by relevant supervisory bodies should contribute to understanding of the legal content of the right’.69 The UNDRIP is the most important instrument which relates to the defining of Indigenous rights. It mentions cultural elements which are considered indispensable in the protection of Indigenous rights. The rights listed in the UNDRIP have become ‘an essential element for the protection of the right to the cultural survival of indigenous populations. Many of the mentioned rights are based on the existing set of international human rights’.70 However, despite the indisputable evolution in the recognition of Indigenous cultural human rights and the acknowledging of ‘the importance of cultural rights as an integral part of human rights’,71 the question of cultural identity of Indigenous peoples has not been fully defined. It still awaits further clarification and practical development.
- 1↑
Weaver Hilary N , '‘Indigenous Identity: What is It, and Who Really has It?’ ' (2001 ) 25 American Indian Quarterly : 240, 240.
See also
Odello Marco , '‘Indigenous Peoples’ Rights and Cultural Identity in the Inter-American Context’ ' (2012 ) 16 The International Journal of Human Rights : 25, 26 -29.
- 6↑
United Nations, ‘1983 Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations’ <https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/publications/martinez-cobo-study.html> accessed 9 July 2021
The definition is in chapter 21 of the Study, at para 379. See
José Martinez Cobo, ‘Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations’, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7Add.4 para 379. Also available at <https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/MCS_xxi_xxii_e.pdf> accessed 28 July 2021.
- 10↑
UNGA A/RES/61/295 (13 September 2007);
Odello Marco , '‘United Nations Declaration on Indigenous Peoples’ ' (2008 ) 82 Australian Law Journal : 306.
- 11↑
ILO Convention (No 169) concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (adopted 27 June 1989, entered into force 5 September 1991) 1650 UNTS 383 (ILO Convention No 169).
- 13↑
Ulfstein Geir , '‘Indigenous Peoples’ Right to Land’ ' (2004 ) 8 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law : 1, 19.
- 16↑
Fineman Martha Albertson , '‘Equality, Autonomy, and the Vulnerable Subject in Law and Politics’ ', in Martha Alberston Fineman & Anna Grear (eds), Vulnerability: Reflections on a New Ethical Foundation for Law and Politics , (Routledge , London 2013 ) 13.
- 17↑
Binder Christina & Binder Constanze , '‘A Capability Perspective on Indigenous Autonomy’ ' (2016 ) 44 Oxford Development Studies : 297, 298.
- 22↑
Szpak Agnieszka , '‘The Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination: International Law Perspective’ ' (2018 ) 59 Polish Political Science Studies : 178, 194 -195.
- 25↑
Fineman Martha Albertson , '‘Beyond Identities: The Limits of an Antidiscrimination Approach to Equality’ ' (2012 ) 92 (6 ) Boston University Law Review : 1713.
- 28↑
Kohn Nina A , '‘Vulnerability Theory and the Role of Government’ ' (2014 ) 26 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism : 1, 14.
On the critique of Kohn, see
Philip Rich, ‘What can We Learn from Vulnerability Theory?’ (Bowling Green State University Honours Project, 30 April 2018) 24 <https://scholarworks.bgsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1461&context=honorsprojects> accessed 19 April 2021.
- 32↑
World Bank, ‘Indigenous Peoples Overview’ <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/indigenouspeoples> accessed 29 April 2021.
- 38↑
Barelli Mauro , Seeking Justice in International Law: The Significance and Implications of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples , (Routledge , London 2016 ) 124.
- 41↑
Khan Sabaa Ahmad , '‘Rebalancing State and Indigenous Sovereignties in International Law: An Arctic Lens on Trajectories for Global Governance’ ' (2019 ) 32 Leiden Journal of International Law : 675, 677.
- 44↑
Ibid. See also
Koivurova Timo & Heinämäki Lena , '‘The Participation of Indigenous Peoples in International Norm-Making in the Arctic’ ' (2006 ) 42 Polar Record: A Journal of Arctic and Antarctic Research : 101.
- 48↑
Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘The Covid-19 Crisis, Indigenous Peoples, and International Law: A Vulnerability Perspective’ (forthcoming).
- 50↑
Axelsson Per & Sköld Peter , '‘Indigenous Populations and Vulnerability: Characterizing Vulnerability in a Sami Context’ ' (2006 ) 111 (1 ) Revue Annales De Démographie Historique : 115, 119 128.
- 51↑
See eg the recent project to establish a railway across traditional Sami land:
Tom Wall, ‘The Battle to Save Lapland: ‘First, They Took the Religion, Now They Want to Build a Railroad’, The Guardian (London, 23 February 2019) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/23/battle-save-lapland-want-to-build-railroad> accessed 1 May 2021.
- 52↑
Beach Hugh , '‘Self-Determining the Self: Aspects of Saami Identity Management in Sweden’ ' (2007 ) 24 Acta Borealea : 1, 3.
- 53↑
UNHRC, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya: The Situation of the Sami People in the Sápmi Region of Norway, Sweden and Finland’ (6 June 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/18/35/Add.2, paras 55–62.
- 55↑
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171.
- 56↑
See also International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 art 1.
- 57↑
Szpak (n 22) 194;
Castellino Joshua , '‘Conceptual Difficulties and the Right to Indigenous Self-Determination’ ', in Nazia Ghanea-Hercock & Alexandra Xanthaki (eds), Minorities, Peoples and Self-Determination: Essays in Honour of Patrick Thornberry , (Martinus Nijhoff , Leiden 2004 ) 55 58 -60.
- 59↑
Banks Nigel , '‘International Human Rights Law and Natural Resources Projects Within the Traditional Territories of the Indigenous Peoples’ ' (2010 ) 47 Alberta Law Review : 457, 477.
Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘Tensions Between States and Indigenous People Over Natural Resources in Light of the 1989 ILO Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries and the 2007 UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Including Relevant National Legislation and Case-Law)’ (2012) IV Yearbook of Polar Law 227, 242–243.
- 60↑
UNHRC ‘CCPR General Comment No. 23: Article 27 (Rights of Minorities)’ (8 April 1994) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5, para 7. See also UNHRC Communication No 197/1985 Ivan Kitok v Sweden (1988) UN Doc CCPR/C/33/D/197/1985.
- 62↑
Eide Asbjørn , '‘Legal and Normative Bases for Sammi Claims to Land in the Nordic’ ' (2001 ) 8 International Journal of Minority and Groups : 127, 142.
- 64↑
Ahren Mattias , Indigenous Peoples’ Status in the International Legal System , (OUP , Oxford 2016 ) 84.
- 66↑
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (adopted 20 October 2005, entered into force 18 March 2007) 2440 UNTS 311.
