Encyclopedia of Law and Economics
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Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

Edited by Gerrit De Geest

The second, expanded edition of the acclaimed Encyclopedia represents a major update of the most authoritative reference work in the field of law and economics and the nine print volumes are now released online as a single integrated product. The Encyclopedia provides balanced and comprehensive coverage of the major domain in law and economics, including: criminal law, regulation, property law, contract law, tort law, labor and employment law, antitrust law, procedural law, and the production of legal rules. Each theme or volume is overseen by a leading scholar and each of the 166 entries is prepared by an expert in the field, providing an in-depth and authoritative overview of the individual topic, combined with an exhaustive bibliography, allowing users to access and filter the entire corpus of literature in law and economics. As with the print edition, the Encyclopedia is unique in serving both as an entry point and a platform for advanced research. The online edition is enhanced with Elgaronline’s powerful search tools, facilitating the search for key terms across the entire Encyclopedia, whilst the browse function allows users to move seamlessly between the volumes. These elements combine to create a powerful research tool for any researcher or scholar in the field of law and economics.
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Index: Index

[In: Volume 8, Chris William Sanchirico (ed) Procedural Law and Economics]

  • Abrams, D. 127, 131

  • absent class members see class action

  • Acemoglu, D. 317

  • adversarial versus inquisitorial justice 118

    • adverse selection and opt-out, and intra-class conflict 757

    • and attorney-client confidentiality 58

    • centralized versus decentralized evidence production 711

    • comparison using model of litigation between two parties 57, 14

    • competing experts and decision making 15

    • cost and variance, tradeoff between 1011

    • definitions and comparisons 511

    • differences between 13

    • evidence, theoretical models 2323

    • experimental tests of sophistication 1415

    • future research 16

    • incentive alignment problem 14

    • and institutional organization 3

    • model assumptions 34

    • naïve decision makers and evidence production 1112, 15, 16

    • principal-agent problem 11, 13, 16

    • sophisticated decision makers and tradeoff between cost of evidence and accuracy 1214, 15, 16

    • theoretical literature 1114

  • Albonetti, C. 132

  • Alchian, A. 101

  • Alexander, J. 71

  • Allais, M. 221

  • Allen, R. 556, 221, 222

  • Allen, W. 91

  • Anderson, D. 291, 2956

  • Anderson, G. 100

  • Anderson, J. 1323

  • Anderson, R. 29

  • anti-pooling rationale

    • and self-incrimination 36770, 371, 372, 3738

    • see also pooling strategy

  • Antonovics, K. 122

  • Anwar, S. 122

  • appeal and supreme courts 1951

    • case space and distinguishing practice 234

    • case-by-case adjudication 324

    • civil law legal systems, precedent in 256

    • common law precedential practices 21

    • common law precedential practices and horizontal stare decisis 214

    • constitutional system, models of adjudication embedded in 425

    • convergence to compromise rule 24

    • and criminal procedure 13940

    • empirical studies of stare decisis 245, 31

    • fact space and adjudication 29

    • information-based explanation of horizontal stare decisis 23

    • issue-by-issue adjudication 324

    • judges’ reputation concerns and horizontal stare decisis 23, 24

    • judicial accuracy and Condorcet Jury Theorem 28, 29, 32

    • and judicial preferences and separability 29

    • judicial review effects on administrative agencies 423, 45

    • median justice rule 27, 28, 29, 30

    • overruling precedent 24

    • political model of doctrine 367

    • political model for horizontal stare decisis 223

    • and political theory model of legislation 20, 267, 41

    • precedential practices 216, 367

    • p. 508sentencing decisions and separation of powers game 44

    • separation of powers models 425

    • separation of powers models, empirical studies 45

    • see also judicial organization and administration; US Court of Appeals; US Supreme Court

  • appeal and supreme courts, collegiality 2634

    • adjudication and doctrinal paradox 324

    • adjudication models 28

    • of appellate courts, reasons for 278

    • and competing opinions 2930

    • and consistency and coherence 312, 33

    • and one-dimensional spatial preferences in policy 267

    • and panel effects 3031

    • policy choice on collegial courts 2830

    • and sincere versus sophisticated voting 34

    • voting protocols in collegial courts 324

  • appeal and supreme courts, hierarchical organization 3442

    • and discretionary review 412

    • and doctrinal structure 358, 39

    • and doctrinal structure, and CART estimation technique 38

    • and lower court compliance with higher courts 3541

    • and political agency models 389

    • reasons for 345

    • and team models of error correction 3941

    • and team models of error correction, and cases selected for review 4041

    • and team models of error correction, and defendant’s type 40

  • Aranson, P. 31011

  • Arnold, M. 2

  • Arrow, K. 120

  • Arther, R. 150

  • Ashenfelter, O. 315

  • asymmetric information

    • imperfect information comparisons, and settlement negotiation 4358

    • informational advantage for defendant 4956, 499500, 502

    • informational advantage for plaintiff 4967, 499500, 5023

    • litigation investment and nonparty preclusion rule 363

    • and negative-expected-value suits 3423

    • one-sided, settlement process models 42335

    • and protection of contracting parties 103, 104

    • and settlement negotiation 3938, 400, 402, 407, 414, 417, 41935, 443

    • settlement negotiation and consistent versus inconsistent priors 398401, 419, 439, 440

    • settlement and strategic behavior 48991, 4957, 499502, 504

    • structured bargaining with, and fee shifting 2846

    • versus other models of settlement bargaining 43941

    • see also evidence; imperfect information; information; private information

  • Atkins, R. 124, 126

  • attorney-client confidentiality 5266

    • accuracy and primary activity incentives 5962

    • and adversarial versus inquisitorial justice 58

    • capacity to conceal information produced by an attorney, effect of 612

    • and competition between interested parties 578, 634

    • confidentiality of information shared or generated during litigation over completed acts 557

    • confidentiality of information shared prior to contemplated act 545, 567

    • confidentiality and strategic revelation of information to courts 579

    • p. 509equilibrium decision on use of legal services 59, 60

    • future research 6061, 645

    • legal advice and strategic revelation 539

    • and litigation costs 624

    • and litigation costs, and distortion created in markets for legal goods and services 634

    • litigation costs, and dynamic quality of law 645

    • and litigation costs, and propensity for and timing of settlement 64

    • social welfare effects of legal information production and exchange 5965

    • social welfare value of confidentiality protection 539

    • unfavorable information, risk of discovering and effects on incentives 61

    • work-product doctrine 52

  • attorneys

    • experience and career paths, and criminal procedure 131

    • settlement negotiation 4413

  • auctioning counsel, class action 80

  • Aumann, R. 394

  • Austen-Smith, D. 3323

  • Axelrod, R. 93

  • axiomatic approach to solutions, settlement negotiation 392, 4034, 40713, 4545, 463

  • Ayres, I. 92, 98, 99, 127

  • Babcock, L. 401, 465

  • Bafumi, J. 314

  • bail, and pretrial release 1267

  • Bailey, M. 314

  • Baird, D. 386, 403, 404, 417

  • Baker, S. 459

  • Baker, T. 3012

  • Baldus, D. 134

  • Banerjee, A. 102

  • bankruptcy scenario model and concession limits 41113

  • Banks, J. 3323

  • Bar-Gill, O. 401

  • bargaining

    • charge bargaining and criminal procedure 128, 12930

    • and cost allocation rules, fee shifting 2956

    • range and bargaining efficiency model 407

    • under threat of trial, fee shifting 2945

  • claim preclusion see preclusion law

  • Clark, T. 27, 313, 314

  • Clarke, S. 126

  • class action 6784

    • agency costs 725, 77, 78

    • and asymmetry of litigation costs 69

    • attorney fees 71, 745

    • auctioning counsel 80

    • benefits of 6872

    • Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) 745, 7980

    • coupon settlements 75

    • and economies of scale 689, 70

    • fee award rules, adjusting 80

    • frivolous and weak suits 77, 8081

    • intra-class conflict, and adverse selection and opt-out 757

    • judicial review, bolstering 7980

    • large claim 6870, 73, 74, 76

    • mass tort settlement actions 78, 80

    • monitoring of class counsel, improving 789

    • monitoring, lack of 73

    • nonmonetary settlements 745

    • opportunistic behavior, control of 745

    • and prediction of outcomes 4023, 4468

    • Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) 73, 789, 80

    • public and private enforcement coordination 712

    • reform proposals 7881

    • reversionary fund settlement 75

    • securities fraud 789, 80

    • settlement, special case of 78

    • small claim 7073, 74, 767

    • small claim costs 71

    • social costs of sweetheart settlements 74

    • subclassing 77

    • p. 511sweetheart settlements 735, 78, 79, 80

    • treatment costs 727

  • client confidentiality see attorney-client confidentiality

  • Coase, R. 105

  • Coffee, J. 68, 70, 72, 73, 74, 77, 78

  • Cohen, Laurence 223

  • Cohen, Linda 367, 43, 45

  • Cohen, M. 31213

  • collegiality see appeal and supreme courts, collegiality

  • commerce law and cost-exportation theory 1067

  • common law system

    • and civil law, differences between, in judicial organization and administration 31719

    • and enforcement of contractual choice of law 1034

    • precedential practices and horizontal stare decisis 214

    • see also civil law system

  • compensation scheme for plaintiffs’ lawyers 4423

  • competition

    • between interested parties, and attorney-client confidentiality 578, 634

    • jurisdictional see jurisdictional competition

  • complete-information model, settlement negotiation 446, 457

  • Condorcet jury theorem 28, 29, 32, 3323

    • see also juries

  • confessions

    • economics of 37884

    • false, and admissibility rules 381

    • reasons for 37881

    • see also self-incrimination, privilege against

  • confidentiality see attorney-client confidentiality

  • conflict of laws and choice of laws 85115

    • adhesion contracts 103

    • Allstate Insurance Co v. Hague 107

    • ‘balance of state interests’ approach 90, 91

    • choice-of-law approach in practice 946

    • and choice-of-law monitoring and precedents 93

    • commerce law and cost-exportation theory 1067

    • common law and enforcement of contractual choice of law 1034

    • comparative regulatory advantages and forum law 889

    • conflict of laws problem 8796

    • constitutional law 1068

    • contract validity issues 912

    • Cooley v. Board of Wardens 106

    • corporate internal affairs rule 1056

    • CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America 107

    • Edgar v. Mite Corp 107

    • escape devices 86

    • federal law 108

    • First Restatement of Conflicts 856, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96

    • foreign law, reasons for and against choosing 8790

    • forum law, costs and benefits of 879

    • Home Insurance v. Dick 89

    • inefficiency and forum shopping 88

    • information asymmetry and protection of contracting parties 103, 104

    • interest analysis 8991, 100

    • interstate compacts 934

    • jurisdictional competition and contractual choice of law 1012, 105, 106

    • jurisdictional competition and evolutionary theories 1012

    • jurisdictional competition and herd behavior 1012

    • Leflar’s ‘better law’ 89, 90, 94, 95, 96

    • legislators’ weak incentives to innovate 99

    • mandatory rules, evasion of 102

    • ‘most significant relationship’ test 89, 90

    • recovery-favoring modern approach 946

    • rule versus standard-based approaches 8992

    • p. 512rule-based approaches, coordination problems with 924

    • Second Restatement of Conflicts 90, 95, 1034

    • state competition incentives for corporate law 989

    • state competition incentives for lawyers 99100, 106

    • state competition incentives for non-corporate law 100

    • statutory law and enforcement of contractual choice of law 1045

    • Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum v. Green 1078

    • territorial approach, criticism of 856

  • conflict of laws and choice of laws, contractual choice of law 96108

    • benefits of enforcing 97102

    • and clarification of applicable law 97

    • costs of 1023

    • and elimination of inconsistency 97

    • enforcement 1038

    • and jurisdictional competition 97101

  • constitutional system

    • conflict of laws and choice of laws 1068

    • courts and judicial organization and administration 330

    • and criminal procedure 123

    • models of adjudication embedded in 425

  • contingent fees

    • and retainer arrangements 3467

    • settlement negotiation 442, 457

  • contracts scholarship, questioning emphasis on verifiability in 2513

  • contractual choice of law see conflict of laws and choice of laws, contractual choice of law

  • Cooter, R. 2, 64, 191, 192, 193, 195, 1978, 201, 240, 284, 291, 311, 320, 324, 386, 463, 481

  • Corchón, L. 206

  • Cornell, B. 280, 345

  • corporate internal affairs rule 1056

  • Cosgel, M. 23, 24, 481

  • cost-exportation theory and commerce law 1067

  • Coughlan, P. 333

  • coupled awards 4578

  • coupon settlements, and class action 75

  • Coursey, D. 2945

  • courts

    • congestion 33031

    • functions of 31620

    • organization of 3217

    • see also judicial organization and administration

  • Cover, A. 313, 314

  • Cover, R. 106

  • Cox, J. 73, 79

  • Crain, W. 100

  • Craswell, R. 476

  • Crémer, J. 256

  • criminal procedure 11644

    • appeals 13940

    • Apprendi v. New Jersey 138

    • and attorney experience and career paths 131

    • bail amounts and probability of re-arrest 127

    • bail and pretrial release 1267

    • Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents 123

    • charge bargaining 128, 12930

    • civil lawsuits by jail and prison inmates 140

    • and constitutional law 123

    • criminal punishment statistics 116

    • death penalty and plea bargaining 129

    • death penalty reversal rates 140

    • defendant characteristics and prosecutor preferences 130

    • demographic characteristics and sentencing 1345

    • discretionary sentencing 1312

    • economic studies and criminology, differences between 11718

    • exclusionary rule 1226

    • exclusionary rule and defendant’s statement 1245

    • exclusionary rule, effect on crime rates 124

    • federal sentencing grid 132

    • indeterminate sentencing, abandonment of 134

    • inmate litigation 140

    • p. 513judicial characteristics and sentencing 136

    • judicial discretion, regulation of 1319

    • jury tral rights and mandatory sentencing 138

    • mandatory sentencing 1289, 132, 133, 1379

    • Mapp v. Ohio 124

    • Miranda case, and confession rates 1256

    • Miranda case, effects of 1246

    • Miranda case, effects on police behavior 125

    • parole boards 134

    • plea bargaining and length of sentence 128

    • plea bargaining and pretrial release 1267

    • police discretion and regulation of investigations 11826

    • policing levels and crime rates 11819

    • political affiliation of judge, and sentencing 1367

    • post-conviction litigation 13940

    • prosecutor behavior 12731

    • and prosecutors’ career patterns 13031

    • punishment imposition 13140

    • recidivism and sentencing 134, 136

    • and right to silence 3734

    • sentencing guidelines and prosecutors’ discretion 12830, 1312

    • sentencing and inter-judge disparity 1323, 139

    • three-strikes laws 129

    • truth-in-sentencing laws 134

    • United States v. Booker 1389

  • criminal procedure, racial disparities 116

    • in bail 127

    • and discretionary sentencing 1312

    • and post-guidelines sentencing 1346

    • racial profiling 11822

    • racial profiling of black motorists 11922

  • defendants

    • advantage theory, and trial selection theory 5023

    • asymmetric information and informational advantage for 4956, 499500, 502

    • characteristics, and prosecutor preferences 130

    • innocent, an indirect benefit of right to silence 377

    • insolvent defendant model, settlement negotiation 446

    • strategic search models and possibility of pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant bias 2312

    • see also plaintiffs; prosecutor

  • Deffains, B. 461

  • Demsetz, H. 2

  • Deneckere, R. 248, 416

  • detection avoidance and enforcement theory 14587

    • complementarities, accounting for, across orders of detection avoidance 17980

    • conventional approach to enforcement 1489

    • conventional enforcement model with detection avoidance added 15054

    • and court’s inherent powers 1467

    • detection avoidance, theoretical possibility of preventing increases in 1768

    • p. 514deterrence mechanics, effects on 15054, 156

    • evidence of reasonableness of destruction 147

    • and firms’ document retention policies 147

    • incorporation of detection avoidance and effect on enforcement model 14854

    • Malik’s qualification, and counter qualifications 155, 1617, 1689

    • misconduct penalties 1467

    • policies directed at detection avoidance 1524

    • regulation overview 1457

    • regulation scope 147

    • responsive increases in detection avoidance, effects of 156

    • responsive increases in detection avoidance, effects when violation is a continuous variable 15761

    • social cost-benefit accounting, effect of responsive increases in detection avoidance 1617

    • social cost-benefit analysis in conventional approach 149, 1512, 154

    • technological approach 147, 18085

    • technological approach, implementing 1835

    • technological approach, mechanics of 18082

    • and US Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 146, 147

    • see also evidence, theoretical models

  • detection avoidance and enforcement theory, recursivity of detection avoidance 17080

    • nature of, and substitution effect 1713

    • practical assessment of state involvement 1789

    • practical import of 17071

  • detection avoidance and enforcement theory, sanctioning

    • detection avoidance, and assuming no recursivity 16770

    • for detection avoidance, importance of 1678

    • for detection avoidance, potentially decisive impact of adding 16870

    • first-order 152, 153, 1556, 169, 170, 172, 1737, 17980

    • hierarchies 1739

    • hierarchies, uniform 1745

    • hierarchies, variable 1759

    • for misconduct 1467, 149, 151, 1523

    • public detection costs and comparison to 183

    • second-order 1523, 170, 172, 17980

    • of underlying activity 15567

  • Dewatripont, M. 3, 5, 14, 15

  • Dharmapala, D. 121

  • Dicey, A. 87

  • Dinkin, S. 73, 79

  • discovery process 188202

    • abusive discovery 197, 1989, 200

    • concealment of information, and benefit of trial surprise 190

    • cost shifting 201

    • excessive discovery 1978, 201

    • filing incentives, benefits for 196

    • limits 200

    • mandatory disclosure 199200

    • primary activity incentive, benefits for 1967

    • Prisoner’s Dilemma and discovery abuse 1989, 200

    • rational processing of information 190

    • reforms 199201

    • settlement benefits 1915

    • settlement quality 1935

    • settlement rate 1923

    • social benefits of 18997

    • social costs of 1979

    • trial outcomes, benefits for 195

    • truthfulness verification 190

    • voluntary disclosure 18991, 1923, 463

    • voluntary disclosure of favorable information 18990

    • voluntary disclosure of unfavorable information 19091

  • discretionary sentencing, criminal procedure 1312

  • p. 515diversity jurisdiction 330

  • Dixit, A. 6

  • Djankov, S. 318

  • doctrinal structure

    • and adjudication paradox 324

    • and appeal and supreme courts, hierarchical organization 358, 39

    • and CART estimation technique 38

    • and self-incrimination, privilege against 37076

  • documentary evidence

    • firms’ document retention policies 147

    • and self-incrimination, privilege against 373

  • Epstein, L. 313

  • Eskridge, W. 43, 45

  • Europe

    • ‘most significant relationship’ test 90

    • see also France; UK

  • Evans, D. 77, 81

  • evidence

    • evidentiary misconduct see detection avoidance and enforcement theory

    • generation following plea bargaining 459

    • see also asymmetric information; imperfect information; information

  • evidence, theoretical models 20370

    • adversarial versus inquisitorial justice 2323

    • assume-the-worst rule 2256, 22930, 232

    • binary cost interpretation of omission models 231, 2423

    • character evidence and conduct 251

    • contracts scholarship, questioning emphasis on verifiability in 2513

    • damages accuracy assessment, effect on incentives 251

    • endogenous cost signaling 24856

    • exogenous cost signaling 2448

    • exogenous cost signaling, applied to legal evidence 245

    • exogenous cost signaling, and comparison to emission models 2468

    • false evidence, costs of 243

    • feasible presentation 230, 233

    • feasible presentation, lingering problems in 24042

    • Herring v. New York 227

    • infinite or zero cost 23031, 246

    • infinite or zero cost, illusory solution of adopting 2423

    • p. 516jury’s role, historical evolution of 2656

    • and law and economics of litigation 2047

    • link to primary activities 233

    • Lipman and Seppi on partial provability 2348, 243

    • multiple informed parties with conflicting interests 2267, 233

    • omission models 22343

    • partial provability in a multi-party context 2338

    • partial provability in a multi-party context, partial solution of 243

    • and plaintiff victory, probability of 2057

    • predictive evidence 251

    • presumptions and litigation-primary activity feedback 2535

    • private information, correlated 25666

    • private information, correlated, implementing caution without endogenous cost signaling 25962

    • proof burdens’ allocations and strategic complementarities in evidentiary choice 2556

    • single party model 2246, 2334

    • and spoliation 2256

    • strategic search models and possibility of pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant bias 2312

    • subset reporting 227, 2289

    • subset reporting, no-lying assumption 23941

    • third-party information, efficacy of 2579

    • trace evidence as byproduct of conduct 251

    • trial error minimization and deterrence maximization, link between 25051

    • truth revelation versus primary activity incentive setting 24950

    • truth-consistent presentation 22730, 241

    • truth-consistent presentation, no-lying assumption 23940

    • see also detection avoidance and enforcement theory

  • evidence, theoretical models, pure probabilistic deduction 20723

    • accounting for interests of parties 2223

    • conjunction problem 2212

    • gatecrasher paradox 222, 223, 226

    • paradoxes and criticisms 2213

  • evidence, theoretical models, pure probabilistic deduction, Bayes’ rule 20811, 254

    • across-person hindsight bias and its rational twin 21721

    • basic rate neglect 21314

    • iterated application of 21112

    • likelihood ratio 211

    • loss function 21213

    • trial selection bias and past crimes evidence 21517

  • exclusionary rule 1226

    • and defendant’s statement 1245

    • effect on crime rates 124

  • Fagan, J. 116

  • Fairly, W. 207

  • false statements, and self-incrimination, privilege against 3712

  • Fang, H. 122

  • Farber, H. 393, 488, 490, 4989, 504

  • Farmer, A. 12, 58, 61, 62, 193, 27980, 281, 346, 455, 4634

  • Farnsworth, W. 314

  • Farrell, J. 224

  • Farrell, M. 2

  • Fawcett, J. 86

  • Feddersen, T. 332, 333

  • federal judges, nomination of 31314, 316

  • fee shifting 271307

    • agency problems in lawyer-client relationship 278

    • Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society 273

    • American rule as default rule 274

    • asymmetric information, structured bargaining with 2846

    • bargaining and cost allocation rules, laboratory experiment 2956

    • p. 517bargaining under threat of trial, laboratory experiment 2945

    • conditioned on offers made in settlement 28992

    • Contract with America (Republican Party) proposal 271, 290

    • court-awarded fees 273, 274

    • and damage multipliers 2878

    • and decisions to file and contest lawsuits 27881

    • econometric evidence of actual disputes 297302

    • and efficiency levels 2745, 27980

    • empirical evidence on effects of 294302

    • English rule 271, 273, 274, 27689, 292, 2957, 298301

    • externalities in litigation decision making 272

    • and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 2734, 28991, 292, 293, 2956

    • indemnification rules 271, 272, 2734, 27681, 2823, 2867, 2912, 2934

    • and Internal Revenue Code 292

    • laboratory experiments 2946

    • liability disputes and damages 29091

    • and litigation settlement 2816, 2889

    • Marek v. Chesny 289

    • and margin of victory 2924

    • marginal-cost effect 2767, 278

    • medical malpractice cases experiments 298302

    • multi-phase models 28081, 2856

    • Nash equilibrium of litigation expenditure 275, 2778

    • offer based, and settlement negotiation 4556

    • offer-of-judgment procedure 2734, 29092, 296

    • one-way policies 273, 274

    • and optimal incentives 287

    • practical extent of 2735

    • pretrial settlements and effect of switching between English and American rules, laboratory experiment 296

    • primary behavior, simulation of effects on 297

    • relative optimism models 2825, 2912

    • settlement behavior, econometric model of 298

    • and settlement negotiation 442

    • settlement timing and effect of English rule experiment 300302

    • simulation of quantitative effects 2967

    • and substantive behavior 2869

    • and trial outcomes 285

    • trial and pretrial expenditures, effect on 2758

  • Feeney, F. 126

  • Feld, L. 324

  • Fenn, P. 461, 462

  • Ferejohn, J. 36, 423

  • Fernandez, P. 24

  • Fernandez, R. 415

  • finite-horizon model

    • settlement negotiation 393, 434, 460, 461

    • see also infinite-horizon model

  • Finkelstein, M. 207

  • Fischel, D. 63, 98, 107

  • Fischhoff, B. 217

  • Fischman, J. 31, 137

  • Fisher, T. 382

  • Fluet, C. 13

  • Fon, V. 26

  • foreign law, reasons for and against choosing 8790

  • Forst, B. 128

  • forum law, costs and benefits of 879

  • Fournier, G. 298, 461

  • Fowles, R. 126, 36970

  • France

    • adjudication specialization 3278

    • jurisprudence constante 25

    • legal structures, evolution of 319

    • settlement and deadline effect 461

    • see also Europe

  • Frankel, L. 198

  • Frankel, M. 131

  • Franzoni, L. 148, 162, 459, 460

  • Frey, B. 98

  • p. 518Friedman, D. 76, 434, 435, 440

  • Friedman, G. 74

  • Friedman, J. 93

  • frivolous (weak) lawsuits 77, 8081, 452

  • Froeb, Luke M. 118, 57, 58, 61, 62, 2312

  • future research

    • adversarial versus inquisitorial justice 16

    • attorney-client confidentiality 6061, 645

    • inmate litigation 140

    • negative-expected-value suits 347

    • preclusion law 365

  • Iaryczower, M. 325

  • ideology views, and judicial organization and administration 31416, 3234

  • p. 519imperfect information

    • asymmetric information comparisons, and settlement negotiation 4358

    • model, settlement negotiation 41011

    • see also asymmetric information; evidence; information; private information

  • incentive compatibility condition, settlement negotiation 43031

  • indemnification rules, and fee shifting 271, 272, 2734, 27681, 2823, 2867, 2912, 2934

  • infinite-horizon model

    • settlement negotiation 41415, 417, 454, 461

    • see also finite-horizon model

  • information

    • acquiring from experts, and settlement negotiation 464

    • acquiring from other player, and settlement negotiation 4624

    • capacity to conceal information produced by an attorney, effect of 612

    • confidentiality of information shared prior to contemplated act 545, 567

    • confidentiality and strategic revelation of information to courts 579

    • role in settlement negotiation 393401

    • unfavorable, risk of discovering and effects on incentives 61

    • see also asymmetric information; evidence; imperfect information; private information

  • inmate litigation 140

  • Innes, R. 1623, 167

  • innocent defendants, indirect benefit of right to silence 377

  • inquisitorial justice see adversarial versus inquisitorial justice

  • insolvent defendant model 446

  • interrogation, coercive, and self-incrimination, privilege against 3812

  • interstate compacts 934

  • Issacharoff, S. 199, 200

  • Japan, judicial independence 322, 3234, 326

  • Jehl, S. 222

  • Jensen, M. 328

  • Johnson, S. 315

  • judges

    • characteristics and sentencing 136

    • discretion, regulation of 1319

    • judicial accuracy and Condorcet Jury Theorem 28, 29, 32

    • judicial preferences and separability 29

    • judicial review, bolstering, and class action 7980

    • judicial review effects on administrative agencies 423, 45

    • political affiliation of, and sentencing 1367

    • promotion of efficiency, and incentive to sue 481

    • reputation concerns and horizontal stare decisis 23, 24

    • sentencing and inter-judge disparity 1323, 139

    • and settlement negotiation 4434

  • judicial organization and administration 30840

    • adjudication organization 32731

    • appointment and tenure of judges 3257

    • case and controversy requirement 328

    • civil and common law systems, differences between 31719

    • constitutional courts 330

    • court congestion 33031

    • court organization 3217

    • courts, functions of 31620

    • diversity jurisdiction 330

    • electoral pressures 3267

    • fact-finding process 3315

    • federal judges, nomination of 31314, 316

    • ideology views 31416, 3234

    • independence of judiciary 3215

    • independence of judiciary, and political pressure 3245, 326

    • p. 520independence of judiciary, and size of jurisdiction 3223

    • judicial decisions and case arguments 313

    • judicial motivation and preferences 30916

    • judicial preferences over policies 310, 31112

    • judicial reputation among peers 310, 311

    • judicial self-interest 310, 31112

    • jurisdiction 32830

    • legal functions of courts 317

    • legal system development and mechanisms 31819

    • monitoring mechanisms 312

    • non-ideological judicial preferences 30913

    • non-pecuniary benefits 312

    • performance of appointed versus elected judges 327

    • policy preferences 31316

    • policy preferences, measurement of 31315

    • promotion prospects 31112, 3234

    • public versus private adjudication 320

    • sentencing pattern and promotion 31213

    • sequential versus unitary trials 331

    • social cost of court congestion 33031

    • social cost of jury system 332

    • social functions of courts 31719

    • specialization 3278

    • specialized courts versus courts of general jurisdiction 32830

    • utility maximizing and judicial power 311

    • voting on cases and policy preferences 314

    • see also appeal and supreme courts

  • juries

    • Condorcet Jury Theorem 28, 29, 32, 3323

    • jurors’ strategic behavior 3323

    • jury tral rights and mandatory sentencing 138

    • role, historical evolution of 2656

    • selection 332, 334

    • and settlement negotiation 4434

    • size and voting rules 3325

    • social cost of jury system 332

    • system 319, 3315

    • voting rule 3345

  • jurisdictional competition

    • and contractual choice of law 1012, 105, 106

    • and evolutionary theories 1012

    • and herd behavior 1012

  • litigation costs

    • and attorney-client confidentiality 624

    • and distortion created in markets for legal goods and services 634

    • and dynamic quality of law 645

  • Loewenstein, G. 199, 200

  • Long, C. 131

  • LoPucki, L. 88

  • loser pays all see English rule

  • Lowenstein, G. 190

  • Nagin, D. 118

  • Nalebuff, B. 44950, 457, 460

  • Nardulli, P. 124

  • Nash Bargaining Solution, and settlement negotiation 404, 410, 41113, 415, 419, 436, 438, 4545, 463

  • Neeman, Z. 80, 2889, 455

  • negative-expected-value suits 3419

    • and asymmetric information 3423

    • contingent fees and retainer arrangements 3467

    • definition 341

    • and divisibility of litigation cost 3434

    • future research 347

    • meritorious suits 347

    • and new information at intermediate points 3456

    • normative implications 3478

    • puzzle of 3417

    • repeat playing and reputation 346

    • and settlement negotiation 4514

    • upfront costs by defendant 345

    • see also positive-expected-value suits

  • Oaks, D. 123

  • offer-of-judgment procedure, and fee shifting 2734, 29092, 296

  • O’Hara O’Connor, Erin 23, 85115

  • Okada, A. 403

  • Okuno-Fujiwara, M. 234

  • Olson, M. 100

  • opportunistic behavior, control of, and class action 745

  • Ordover, J. 7

  • plea bargaining

    • and length of sentence 128

    • p. 523and pretrial release 1267

    • settlement negotiation 45860

  • Polinsky, A. 75, 148, 161, 162, 2858, 293, 367, 442, 4567, 476

  • political affiliation of judge, and sentencing 1367

  • political pressure, and independence of judiciary 3245, 326

  • political theory models of legislation 20, 223, 267, 369, 41

  • Ponzetto, G. 24

  • pooling strategy

    • settlement negotiation 4223, 4256, 429

    • see also anti-pooling rationale

  • Porter, R. 93

  • positive-expected-value suits

    • and settlement negotiation 4512

    • see also negative-expected-value suits

  • preclusion law 34965

    • asymmetric litigation investment and nonparty preclusion rule 363

    • Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation 356

    • claim preclusion 35051

    • claim preclusion by agreement 3512

    • claim preclusion scope 3523

    • complete preclusion system 3623

    • costs associated with nonmutual issue preclusion 3568

    • costs associated with nonparty issue preclusion 362

    • error cost reduction and claim preclusion 352

    • future research 365

    • issue preclusion 350, 351, 35465

    • legal right test and claim preclusion 353

    • mutuality doctrine and issue preclusion 355

    • nonmutual issue preclusion 35561, 362

    • nonparty preclusion 3615

    • Parklane Hosiery v. Shore 356, 357

    • settlement effects and issue preclusion 35861

    • settlement effects and nonparty preclusion rule 3645

    • stare decisis and issue preclusion, difference between 3545, 359

    • Taylor v. Sturgell 361

    • transaction cost reduction and claim preclusion 352

    • transaction test and claim preclusion 353

    • trial effects and nonmutuality doctrine 3568

    • trial effects and nonparty preclusion 3614

  • prediction of outcome, and settlement negotiation 4014

  • predictive evidence 251

  • Prescott, J. 138

  • pretrial settlements and effect of switching between English and American rules 296

  • Prichard, J. 303

  • Priest, G. 77, 95, 97, 99, 290, 291, 439, 440, 481, 48791, 4935, 497, 499500, 5025

  • prison inmate litigation 140

  • Prisoner’s Dilemma game, and settlement negotiation 404

  • private incentive to sue see social versus private incentive to sue

  • private information

    • correlated 25666

    • correlated, implementing caution without endogenous cost signaling 25962

    • p. 524and differences in player assessment 41935, 447, 4489, 461, 4624

    • procedures for monitoring effects of 4645

    • see also asymmetric information; evidence; imperfect information; information

  • products liability cases, and trial selection theory 500501, 503

  • prosecutor

    • behavior, and criminal procedure 12731

    • career patterns, and criminal procedure 13031

    • disclosure requirements from, and self-incrimination, privilege against 377

    • discretion and sentencing guidelines 12830, 1312

    • preferences, and defendant characteristics 130

    • see also defendants; plaintiffs

  • pure probabilistic deduction see evidence, theoretical models, pure probabilistic deduction

  • Sebenius, J. 402

  • securities fraud, class action 789, 80

  • Segal, J. 245, 36, 38, 41, 42, 45, 310, 313, 314

  • Seidmann, D. 11, 367, 369, 370, 372, 373, 376

  • self-incrimination, privilege against 36685

    • admissibility rules and false confessions 381

    • anti-pooling rationale 36770, 371, 372, 3738

    • collective entity rule 3756

    • confessions, reasons for 37881

    • and disclosure requirements from prosecution 377

    • doctrinal fit 37076

    • and documentary evidence 373

    • double jeopardy rule 382

    • economics of confessions 37884

    • emergency exception to the right to silence 3745

    • and false statements 3712

    • Gilbert v. California 373

    • Harris v. New York 383

    • innocent defendants, indirect benefit of right to silence 377

    • and interrogation, coercive 3812

    • Johnson v. United States 369

    • and law-enforcers personal interests 37981

    • Lego v. Twomey 381

    • Mincey v. Arizona 383

    • and Miranda rights 366, 369, 370, 3834

    • monitoring law-enforcers 3834

    • New York v. Quarles 375

    • non-verbal responses 3723

    • and punishment for remaining silent 378

    • true and false confessions, separation of 3812

    • Twining v. New Jersey 369

    • United States v. Hubbell 373

    • United States v. Mezzanatto 3845

    • United States v. Patane 383

    • voluntariness, meaning of 37881, 382

    • waiver of 3845

    • Withrow v. Williams 366

    • see also confessions

  • self-incrimination, privilege against, right to silence

    • as anti-pooling device 36770

    • as applying to every phase of the criminal process 3712

    • and asymmetrical information 36770, 380, 382

    • as belonging to persons, not corporations 3756

    • as confined to criminal trials 3734

    • as confined to same-sovereign prosecutions 374

    • and false positives and negatives 367

    • and intermediate cases 368

    • as legal regime 368

    • and privilege against adverse inferences to some civil cases 3778

    • problem of removing from trial 3712

    • as restricted to testimonial evidence 3723

    • and social welfare 3767

    • utility of 36776

  • p. 526sentencing

    • guidelines and prosecutors’ discretion 12830, 1312

    • and inter-judge disparity 1323, 139

    • pattern and judicial promotion 31213

    • and recidivism 134, 136

    • and separation of powers game 44

  • separation of powers models 425

  • Seppi, D. 2, 11, 2348, 243

  • sequential rationality, settlement negotiation 392, 415, 41617, 421, 4334, 4445, 4478, 464

  • sequential versus unitary trials 331

  • Setear, J. 198

  • settlement

    • asymmetric information and settlement and strategic behavior 48991, 4957, 499502, 504

    • econometric model of, and fee shifting 298

    • effects and issue preclusion 35861

    • effects and nonparty preclusion rule 3645

    • settlement-trial decision, and incentive to sue 4779

    • special case of, and class action 78

    • timing, and effect of English rule experiment 300302

    • and trial selection theory 4889

  • settlement negotiation 386471

    • actions and strategies 38890, 44954

    • admissible settlement model 4057

    • asymmetric information, one-sided, settlement process models 42332

    • asymmetric information, one-sided, settlement process models, robustness of 4335

    • asymmetric information versus other models of settlement bargaining 43941

    • and asymmetrical information 3938, 400, 402, 407, 414, 417, 41935, 443

    • asymmetrical information and consistent versus inconsistent priors 398401, 419, 439, 440

    • attorneys 4413

    • axiomatic approach to solutions 392, 4034, 40713, 4545, 463

    • bankruptcy scenario model and concession limits 41113

    • bargaining range and bargaining efficiency model 407

    • card game model 38990, 3945, 3967, 408, 420, 4213, 425

    • class action suits and prediction of outcomes 4023, 4468

    • common value attribute 416

    • compensation scheme for plaintiffs’ lawyers 4423

    • complete-information model 446, 457

    • confidentiality agreements 448

    • contingent-fee contract 442, 457

    • counterclaims 454

    • coupled awards 4578

    • credibility of proceeding to trial should negotiations fail 44950

    • damage awards 4568

    • deadline effects 46061, 462

    • decoupled liability 4567

    • delay, reasons for 4612

    • discovery and voluntary disclosure, impact of 463

    • divergent expectations approach 401, 43940

    • and efficiency loss 395, 404, 407, 415, 416, 41920, 426, 433, 438

    • English system 455, 461

    • evidence generation following plea bargaining 459

    • and fee shifting 442

    • and fee shifting, offer based 4556

    • filing and pursuing claim 4514

    • finite-horizon model 393, 434, 460, 461

    • frivolous lawsuits 452

    • imperfect and asymmetric information comparisons 4358

    • imperfect-information model 41011

    • imperfect-information model in noncooperative case 414, 415, 417, 418, 426

    • incentive compatibility condition 43031

    • p. 527infinite-horizon model 41415, 417, 454, 461

    • information, acquiring from experts 464

    • information, acquiring from other player 4624

    • information role 393401

    • information role, and modeling uncertainty 3958

    • insolvent defendant model 446

    • interdependent value attribute 416

    • judges and juries 4434

    • mandatory disclosure, impact of 4634

    • models 40441

    • most-favored-nation clauses 4489

    • multiple litigants 4449

    • and Nash Bargaining Solution 404, 410, 41113, 415, 419, 436, 438, 4545, 463

    • and negative-expected-value (NEV) suits 4514

    • nuisance suits 451

    • outcomes and payoffs 39091, 45460

    • overview 3868

    • perfect-information model 40710, 4545

    • perfect-information model in noncooperative case 41418, 42930

    • players 4419

    • plea bargaining 45860

    • pooling strategy 4223, 4256, 429

    • and positive-expected-value (PEV) suits 4512

    • prediction of outcome 4014

    • prediction of outcome, and cooperative solutions 4034

    • prediction of outcome, and Nash equilibrium in noncooperative games 4014

    • primary participants 388

    • and Prisoner’s Dilemma game 404

    • private information and differences in player assessment 41935, 447, 4489, 461, 4624

    • private information, procedures for monitoring effects of 4645

    • proposal/response periods, number of 414

    • random proposer game 414, 420, 435, 440, 453

    • revealing equilibrium 423, 429, 431

    • risk aversion 390, 4545, 458

    • screening model 420, 421, 4238, 434, 435, 438, 439, 450, 455, 457, 458, 4634

    • screening model, with continuum of types 4268

    • sequential rationality 392, 415, 41617, 421, 4334, 4445, 4478, 464

    • signaling model 420, 4213, 42832, 438, 439, 4634

    • signaling model, with continuum of types 4312, 4434

    • and simultaneous proposals 388, 391, 392, 395, 4334, 435, 440, 446, 464

    • split-award statutes 442, 457

    • strategic approach to solutions 3923, 399, 403, 404, 41435, 4545

    • subgame perfect equilibrium 417

    • time factors 3913, 41516, 41718, 46062

    • ultimatum game 414, 415, 417, 419, 420, 42438, 4415, 44950, 452, 455, 456, 458, 46061

    • variations on basic models 44165

  • silence, right to see self-incrimination, privilege against; self-incrimination, privilege against, right to silence

  • Silver, C. 73, 77, 79

  • simultaneous proposals, and settlement negotiation 388, 391, 392, 395, 4334, 435, 440, 446, 464

  • Singer, L. 75

  • Sisk, G. 316

  • Sitkoff, R. 98

  • Skaperdas, S. 206

  • Smith, J. 45

  • Smorodinsky, M. 413

  • Snyder, E. 155, 298300

  • Sobel, J. 2, 5, 12, 193, 224, 434, 463

  • social cost

    • of court congestion 33031

    • detection avoidance, effect of responsive increases in 1617

    • of jury system 332

    • social cost-benefit analysis in conventional approach 149, 1512, 154

    • sweetheart settlements 74

  • social functions of courts 31719

  • social versus private incentive to sue 47286

    • alternative cost rules 482

    • bilateral care accidents 4823

    • corrective policies 4756

    • deterministic damages 4812

    • English rule 482

    • and judges’ promotion of efficiency 481

    • model 4736

    • model under negligence rule 4767

    • model when settlement is possible 47780

    • numerical example 475

    • settlement-trial decision 4779

    • social costs when settlement is possible 47980

    • trials, lawmaking function of 48081

  • social welfare

    • effects of legal information production and exchange 5965

    • and right to silence 3767

    • value of confidentiality protection 539

  • Solimine, M. 86, 89, 94, 95

  • Songer, D. 25, 36, 378, 41, 42, 316

  • sorting model see screening model

  • Spaeth, H. 245, 310

  • specialization

    • judicial organization and administration 3278

    • specialized courts versus courts of general jurisdiction 32830

  • state competition incentives

    • for corporate law 989

    • for lawyers 99100, 106

    • for non-corporate law 100

  • state involvement

    • ‘balance of state interests’ approach 90, 91

    • and recursivity of detection avoidance 1789

  • p. 529Stearns, M. 312, 33, 328

  • Stein, Alex 80, 222, 36685

  • Stein, J. 102

  • Steir, M. 25

  • Stephenson, M. 45, 323

  • Sterk, S. 88, 93, 94

  • Stigler, G. 161

  • Stiglitz, J. 497, 498

  • Stith, K. 132, 382

  • Stone, R. 23

  • strategic approach to solutions, and settlement negotiation 3923, 399, 403, 404, 41435, 4545

  • strategic behavior models of litigation 4978

  • Stuntz, W. 117, 168

  • Subrin, S. 188

  • subset reporting

    • evidence, theoretical models 227, 2289

    • no-lying assumption, evidence, theoretical models 23941

  • suing incentives see social versus private incentive to sue

  • Sullivan, J. 72

  • Sunstein, C. 31

  • sweetheart settlements 735, 78, 79, 80

  • Symeonides, S. 86

  • Tabarrok, A. 127, 326

  • Tabbach, A. 155, 15761, 162, 1648, 179, 182

  • Tahk, A. 29

  • team models of error correction, and appeal and supreme courts, hierarchical organization 3941

  • Thibault, J. 1

  • Thiel, S. 87, 96

  • third-party information

    • efficacy of 2579

    • see also evidence

  • Thomas, G. 125

  • Thomas, R. 73, 79, 80

  • three-strikes laws 129

  • Tiebout, C. 98

  • Tiller, E. 31, 37, 44, 136, 137

  • time factors, settlement negotiation 3913, 41516, 41718, 46062

  • Tirole, J. 3, 5, 14, 15, 323

  • Todd, P. 121, 122

  • Tollison, R. 98, 100, 101

  • Toma, E. 434

  • Tonry, M. 128

  • trial

    • effects and nonmutuality doctrine 3568

    • effects and nonparty preclusion 3614

    • lawmaking function of 48081

    • outcomes, and fee shifting 285

    • and pretrial expenditures, effect on fee shifting 2758

  • trial selection theory 487506

    • asymmetric information and informational advantage for defendant 4956, 499500, 502

    • asymmetric information and informational advantage for plaintiff 4967, 499500, 5023

    • asymmetric information and settlement and strategic behavior 48991, 4957, 499502, 504

    • defendant advantage theory 5023

    • divergent expectations 488, 499, 5012, 504

    • empirical evidence 498504

    • heteroscedasticity assumption 493, 494

    • importance of 4878

    • literature review 48891

    • litigious-plaintiff hypothesis 490, 4989

    • medical malpractice cases 500, 503, 5034

    • model 4917

    • model and frequency of litigation 4935

    • products liability cases 500501, 503

    • selection hypothesis or effect 48990

    • settlement decision 4889

    • signaling and screening approaches 489, 490, 491, 4978, 502

    • strategic behavior models of litigation 4978

    • and win rates 500501

  • Triantis, G. 251

  • Tribe, L. 221

  • p. 530Trubek, D. 297

  • truth revelation versus primary activity incentive setting 24950

  • truth-consistent presentation

    • evidence, theoretical models 22730, 241

    • no-lying assumption, evidence, theoretical models 23940

  • UK

    • English rule see English rule

    • judicial review 321

    • jury system 332

    • legal structures, evolution of 319

    • ‘payment into court’ settlement 289

    • Vita Food Products Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. 104

    • see also Europe

  • US Court of Appeals

    • Chavez v. Illinois State Police (racial disparity) 119

    • see also appeal and supreme courts

  • US Supreme Court

    • Allstate Insurance Co v. Hague 107

    • Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society 273

    • Apprendi v. New Jersey 138

    • Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents 123

    • Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation 356

    • Chevron USA Inc. v Natural Resources Defense Council Inc 43

    • collegiality 28

    • and conflict of laws and choice of laws 89, 106, 1078

    • Cooley v. Board of Wardens 106

    • and criminal procedure 123, 124, 1389

    • CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America 107

    • discretionary review 412, 434, 45

    • Edgar v. Mite Corp 107

    • exclusionary rule 123, 1245

    • fee shifting 273, 289

    • Gilbert v. California 373

    • Harris v. New York 383

    • Herring v. New York 227

    • Home Insurance v Dick 89

    • INS v Chadha 43

    • Johnson v. United States 369

    • and judicial ideology 316

    • Lego v. Twomey 381

    • Mapp v. Ohio 124

    • Marek v. Chesny 289

    • Mincey v. Arizona 383

    • Miranda v. Arizona 1246, 366, 369, 370, 3834

    • New York v. Quarles 375

    • Parklane Hosiery v. Shore 356, 357

    • precedent adherence 245

    • and preclusion law 356, 357, 361

    • and right to silence 366, 369, 373, 375, 381, 3835

    • and self-incrimination, privilege against 366, 369, 370, 373, 375, 381, 3835

    • and Sentencing Guidelines 1378

    • Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum v. Green 1078

    • p. 531Taylor v. Sturgell 361

    • Twining v. New Jersey 369

    • United States v. Booker 1389

    • United States v. Hubbell 373

    • United States v. Mezzanatto 3845

    • United States v. Patane 383

    • Warren Court, precedent adherence 25

    • Withrow v. Williams 366

    • see also appeal and supreme courts

  • Vanberg, V. 98, 101

  • Vidmar, N. 295

  • Vihanto, M. 101

  • Vincent, D. 416

  • Voigt, S. 324

  • voting protocols in collegial courts 324