[In: Volume 10, Thomas S. Ulen (ed) Methodologies of Law and Economics]

• abortion and crime 132
• academic fraud 269–71
• Acemoglu, Daron 131, 146
• adaptation 157, 213
  • as invitations to make as offer (US default rule) 92–3
  • as offers 92–3
  • three elements of 157
  • see also variation; reproduction; and selection advertisements
• affective forecasting 212–14
  • and criminal law 222–24
  • and tort liability 221–22
  • leading to victim overcompensation 222
• agent-based models 168–9
• Alchian, Armen 156, 162
• Allen, Douglas 130 (n. 3)
• Allen v. Wright 63–4
• allocative efficiency see efficiency
• Always Cooperate 167
  • see also dynamic evolutionary game theory
• Always Defect 167
  • see also dynamic evolutionary game theory
• American Law and Economics Association 3
• Anderson, Coe & King 8
• anti-positivist (Dworkin) 108
• Arminjon, Pierre 186
  • Arrow Impossibility Theory see Impossibility Theorem
• Arrow, Kenneth J. 8, 48
• Arthur, W. Brian 163
• Articles of Confederation 50
• Ashenfelter, Orley 250
• Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp 62
• autonomous agency 103
• Avoidance Rule in contract law 91
• Ayres, Ian 250 (n. 10)
• Azcárate, Gumersindo de 184

• “bad man” theory of law see Holmes
• Baird, Douglas G. 3
• Baker, C. Edwin 114–15
• Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) 218
• bargaining costs see transaction costs Barnard, Dr. Christiaan 210 battles of the sexes 49
  • see contract law as games
• Bazalgette, Joseph 249
• Becker, Gary 28, 229
  • see also BPS model of crime
• Belleisles, Michael 269–70
• Ben-Shahar, Omri 219
• Benartzi, Shlomo 215
• Bentham, Jeremy 21
• Bergson, Abram 8
• Berkowitz, Daniel 137
• Berlin, Isaiah 116
• Bevilaqua, Clovis 184
• bicameralism 36
• bidirectional histories see legal history bilateral care model 24
  • see also unilateral care model
• biology 14–15
• Birmingham, Robert 1 (n. 1)
• Black Death, legal responses to 130–31
• Blue Sky Laws 131
• Blumenthal, Jeremy 214
• Board of Regents v. Bakke 64
• Bogart, Dan 135–6
• Boomer v. Atlantic Cement 36
• BPS model of crime 28–9
• Bratman, Michael 106–7
• Brazilian Civil Code of 1916 184
• Brenner, Reuven 131
• Brickman, Philip 213
• Bronsteen, Jon 213
• Brown, John Prather 22, 23–4
• Bubb, Ryan 215
• Bubble Act of 1720 123
• Burt, Sir Cyril 269

• p. 278Calabresi and Melamed 112
• Calabresi, Guido 1 (n. 1), 251–2
• calendaring rules 46
• California gold rush 142–3
• cases as unreliable sources of historical information 125
• Chen, Keith 223
• chicken 49
• cholera 247–9
• Clark, Gregory 135
• classical utilitarianism 103
• Clay, Karen B. 137
• Coase, Ronald 1 (n. 1), 74, 124 Coase Theorem 2, 31–2, 52, 74–5, 78, 208
  • causation 31
• Commerce Clause
  • see also dormant Commerce Clause
• common law
  • efficiency of 28
• common law, economic analysis of 76–85
• common law v. civil law 180–92
• critiques of legislative law and regulation as subject to capture 193
• questions about under-theorization 195
• supposed superiority of common law for growth 192–3
• see also economic growth and legal systems; legal origins; LLSV
• Commonwealth Edison v. Montana 58 (n. 11)
• community responsibility system 138–41
  • English legislation to abolish collective responsibility 139
• comparative negligence 95 compensatory damages in breach of contract 82, 83
• Condorcet, Marquis de 49 (n. 6)
• Condorcet winner 48 (n. 5), 73, 94–5 (n. 11), 96
  • see also Condorcet, Marquis de Constitution 50
• Consumer Finance Protection Bureau 220
• contract
  • efficient breach of 3
• contract law as games 87–93
  • battle of the sexes in battle over mailbox v. receipt rule 89
• see also mailbox rule; receipt rule
• contract law in ancient Rome 128
• contract law in Biblical Israel 128
• contracts, economic analysis of 79–83
  • efficiency of certainty of reciprocal commitment 80
  • efficient breach 81–2
• contractual choice of law 52–7
  • costs of contractual exit 56
  • gambling hypothetical 53
  • medical marijuana hypothetical 53
• contractual exit, costs of see contractual choice of law
• Cooter, Robert D. 26, 223
• court fees in England
  • awarded to judges, not treasury 131–2
  • parliamentary act to direct fees to treasury, 1799 132
• couverture 133–4
• crime and criminal law 28–30, 38–40
  • as example of normative analysis 26–30
  • as necessary to enforce the General Transaction Structure 39
  • criminal law in early modern England 128
  • critical legal studies (CLS) 4, 9
  • critical race theory 9
  • critiques of behavioral law and economics (BLE) 225–38
• BLE as a normal science 226–7
• economists’ criticisms 228–31
• evolutionary biology and BLE 234
• laboratory experiments v. market behavior 230–31
• lawyers’ criticisms of BLE 231–8
  • market experience and BLE 230
  • moral hazard, regulation, and BLE 236
  • philosophers’ criticisms 238–9 cycling game in contract negotiations 83
• cycling in default rules 92
• cycling in majority voting 48
• cycling in voting on the Supreme Court 67

• p. 279Damaska, Mirjan 187
• Darley, John 224–5
• David, René 186
• Davies v. Mann 24–5 (n. 13)
• day-in-the-life video 221
• De Soto, Hernando 30
• Deal, Robert 142
• death penalty deterrence 132
• decoupled liability rules 25 (n. 15)
• default rules 80, 208–12
  • as a clear starting point for negotiation 90–91
  • not to donate 210
  • opt-in v. opt-out 210–11
  • presumed consent to donate 210
• default rules in contract
  • alternative explanation 91 (n. 27)
• deformation professionelle 268
• Demsetz, Harold, on emergence of
  • property rights 127–8
• deterrent effect of capital punishment
  • see empirical evidence in law
• Diener, Ed 212–13
• difference-in-difference regressions in legal history 132
• differential equations in evolutionary dynamics 160
• diffusion
  • contagion 160
  • of adoption of hybrid corn 161
  • of disease through a population 161
  • social influence 160
  • social learning 160
• dimensionality 85–6, 99
  • as choice between coordination and policy 90
  • lack of dimensionality in tort law 94–6
• discontinuity-based empirical study 223
• discretion of English plaintiffs as to jurisdictional choice 132
• divination 244–5
  • forms 245 (n. 3)
• Donohue, John 132, 257
• dormant Commerce Clause 50, 51, 60 driving game 49
  • and dormant Commerce Clause 60 Dunn, Elizabeth 213–14
• duration neglect and criminal deterrence 225
• Dworkin, Ronald 108, 112, 114 dynamic evolutionary game theory 165–9
  • “folk theorem” of 168
  • movement from unstable to stable equilibria 168

• easement 97–8
  • implied easements as a coordination issue 97
• Easterbrook, Frank H. 8 (n. 12)
• economic analysis of law 21–30
  • cf. law and economics
  • of tort law 22–6
• economic growth and legal systems 180–83
  • Doing Business reports 196
  • see also LLSV
• Edwards, Harry T. 4 (n. 8)
• efficiency
  • allocative efficiency 2
  • Kaldor-Hicks efficiency 2, 20
  • Kaplow and Shavell on efficiency as a central legal norm 14, 19
  • Pareto efficiency 2
  • productive efficiency 2
• efficiency of the common law see common law
• Ehrlich, Isaac 257
• Einstein, Albert 244
• Ellickson, Robert 12, 141–2
  • criticisms of whaling study 142
• empirical evidence in law
  • achieving literacy in reading 264
  • costs of 261–3
  • data collection 263
  • deterrence effect of capital punishment 256–8
  • history of 250–51
  • on takings of private property 253–5
  • value of interdisciplinary faculty in doing 260
• Engerman, Stanley 112–13
• Esmein, Adhémar 185
• evidence-based medicine 250
• evolutionary dynamics
  • AIDS research as an example 154
  • analysis of law 170–75
  • p. 280cancer treatment as example 154
  • defined 153
  • drugs and pathogens 174
  • evolution of the economic loss rule 176
  • financial regulation 173
  • NASDAQ price increments 171–2
  • networks of risk in financial regulation 154
  • payday lenders and regulators 174
  • primer 156–60
  • public health policies as example 154
  • residential segregation as an example 155
  • telecommunications as an example 155
• evolutionary economics 156
• export tax doctrine 57–61
• expressive law and economics 12–13

• feminist law and economics 13–14 filibuster 46
• financial literacy software and courses, effectiveness of 219–20
• First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics 32 (n. 30), 120
• Fisher, R.A. 156
• fitness strategies 166, 167–8
• Fogel, Robert 112–13
• Fortescue, Sir John 179
• framing or framing effect 207–8
  • in public health 207
• Fundação Getulio Vargas Law, School, São Paulo, Brazil 10

• game theory 1, 13, 49–51, 75–6
  • see also prisoners’ dilemma; driving game; battle of the sexes; and chicken
• game theory in analysis of common law 85–99
• Garoupa, Nuno 10
• General Transaction Structure 34–8 Generous Tit-for-Tat (GTFT) game strategy 167
  • see also dynamic evolutionary game theory
• Gilbert, Daniel 213
• Gilmore, Gary 65
  • mother of 65
• Gilmore, Grant 3
• Gilmore v. Utah 65
• Ginsburg, Douglas 238 (n. 41)
• Ginsburg, Tom 12
• Glasson, Ernest 184
• Glorious Revolution of 1688, economic effects of 134–5
• Goldin, Jacob 215 (n. 11)
• Goldstein, Daniel 211
• Google 244
• Gordley, James 187
• Gordon, Robert 145–6
  • “Critical Legal Histories” 145
  • criticisms of evolutionary functionalism 145
  • criticisms of Gordon by Acemoglu and Robinson 146
• Grady, Mark 25–6
• Granovetter, Mark 157
• graph theory 164–5
• Grief, Avner 138
  • study of Maghribi traders and medieval trade 143
• Guinnane, Timothy 137
• Guzman, Andrew 11

• Hadfield, Gillian 13
• Hadley v. Baxendale 27 (n. 20)
• Haldane, Andrew 173
• Haldane, J.B.S. 156
• Hand, Judge Learned 23
• Hand test 23, 84
  • see also U.S. v. Carroll Towing Co.
• Hansen, Zeynep K. 130 happiness 109
  • set point of 213
• Harris, Ron 123, 137, 140
  • Bubble Act of 1720 140
  • general incorporation 140
• hedonic treadmill 214
• Hegel on criminal deterrence 107–8
• heuristics 161
• Higgs boson 246–7 (n. 6)
• Hill, Thomas 104
• Holmes, Oliver Wendell 18–19
  • “bad man” theory 19
  • prediction theory of law 19
• Homestead Acts
  • inefficiency of 130
  • possible efficiency of 130 (n. 3)
• p. 281Hume, David 36
• Hurst, J. Willard 143
• hyperbolic discounting 216, 232 (n. 31)
• hysteresis see lock-in effect

• Illinois Department of Financial and Profession Regulation 218–19
• importance of empirical evidence in innovation 5 (n. 9)
• Impossibility Theorem 48
• inalienability 115
• incarceration and crime 224
• incentives 18
• incommensurability 115
  • Kronman on 116–17
• individual preferences
  • endogenous, not exogenous 209
• information disclosure 219–20
  • see also mandated disclosure information processing 161–3
  • see also Simon, Herbert
• Institute for Genomic Biology,
  • University of Illinois 7 (n. 11)
• interest group theory 45–7
  • defined 44
  • see also public choice
• International Congress on Comparative Law (Paris 1900) 184–5
• Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, University of Michigan 265

• Johnson, Eric 211
• Jones, Owen 15, 234
• judicial review 46
• jurisdictional competition 53–4
• justice and rights 110–12

• Kahneman, Daniel 204, 207, 225
• Kaldor-Hicks efficiency 74 (n. 2)
  • see also efficiency
• Kant, Immanuel 115
  • dignity destroyed by prices 115–16
  • intrinsic value and dignity 115–16
• Kantian theory of human decision-making 104
  • cf. to rational choice theory (economic theory of human decision-making)
• Kaplow, Louis 2 (n. 2), 14
• Kennedy, Anthony 67
• Kenny, Lawrence 132–3
• Klass, Gregory 3
• Klerman, Daniel 9, 131, 135, 137,
• 144–5
• Klick, Jon 234–6
• Kolber, Adam J. 15 (n. 28)
• Korobkin, Russell B. 212, 231
• Korsgaard, Christine 104–6
• Kötz, Hein 186, 187, 189
• Kronman, Anthony 116–17
• Krugman, Paul 163
• Kuhn, Thomas 226–7
• Kuran, Timur 141

• Lamoreaux, Naomi 137
• law and economics 30–40
  • cf. economic analysis of law defined and distinguished from economic analysis of law 30
• law-and-society 12
• law as a dependent variable see legal history
• law as an independent variable see legal history
• law as a substitute for market exchange 33
• law merchant 143
• Lawless, Robert 258, 259, 271, 272, 274
• Lee, David 223
• legal centralism 141–2
• legal centrism 12–13
• legal families 183–8
  • law and economics of 190–95
• legal history
  • bidirectional histories 126
  • law as a dependent variable 126
  • law as an independent variable 126
  • litigation and contracts 126
  • private ordering 126
• legal origins 180–83
  • critiques of 188–90
  • see also legal families; LLSV
• LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. 26 (n. 18)
• Leuck, Dean 138
• Levitt, Steven 132, 230–31
• p. 282Levy-Ullman, Henri 185
• liability rules 32–4
  • as legal (forced) exchange 33
  • see also Calabresi and Melamed
• Libecap, Gary 130
• Lincoln, Abraham 246
• Lindgren, James 270
• List, John 229
• litigation and contracts see legal history
• Litvak, Katherine 123
• LLSV 137, 180–82, 196
• LLSV (Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andre Shleifer, and Robert Vishny) 10 (n. 14)
• Locke, John 110
• lock-in effect 10
• lost keys 273
• Lott, John 132–3
• Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife 63 Lusardi, Annamaria 217

• Macey, Jonathan 131
• Madison, James 46
• Maghribi traders 143
  • see also Grief, Avner
• Mahoney, Paul 123, 131, 135, 137
• mailbox rule in contract law 87
  • cf. receipt rule
  • default rule in US 88
• mandated disclosure 219–20
• mandatory rules 80
• many biases problem 237
• market analysis 1
• market imperfections 2
• fraud 204
  • misinformation 204
  • policy correctives for 2
  • sources of market failure 204
• Markov Chain Monte Carlo Sampling (MCMC) 170
• Markovits, Dan 3
• Marshall, Alfred 156
• Marshall, John 58, 59
• May, Robert 173
• McAdams, Richard H. 13, 274
• McCrary, Justin 223
• McFadden, Daniel 225
• McGinnis, Megan 8
• M’Culloch v. Maryland 58
• medieval commercial law see law merchant
• Medina, Barak 215
• Merryman, John 187
• Miceli, Thomas 7
• Miller, Geoffrey 131
• Miller, Grant 133
• Millimet, David 229
• Mitchell, Gregory 234–6
• Mitchell, Olivia 217
• mixed strategy equilibrium 87
  • cf. pure strategy equilibrium
• model of precaution 26–8
  • as unifying torts, contracts, and property law 26–7
  • in contract law 27
• Montana severance tax, cconstitutionality of 57–61
  • see also Commonwealth Edison v. Montana
• multiple regression, criticisms of 266–9
• multiple selves 233
• myopia 216

• Nagel, Ernest 118
• Nagel, Thomas 112
• Nash equilibrium 73, 86
• Nash, John 86
• National Organ Transplantation Act of 1984 210
• Neal, Larry 124
• negligence 22–6
  • contributory negligence 24–5 (n. 13)
  • defined as nonfeasance 22
  • Posner theory of negligence 23
  • threshold of behavior 24
• network analysis 164
  • compelled access to telecommunications as example 164–5
• neuroscience 14–15
• Nisbett, Richard E. 266
• Nodle, Boris 186
• normal science 226
• normative analysis 21
  • of crime 28–30
• norms 12
  • norm entrepreneurs 13
• p. 283North, Douglass 124. 134–5, 136
  • on importance of institutional structure 128
• Nowak, Martin 167
• nudges 208–12

• Oandasan, Robert 136
• observational equivalence 237
• O’Connor, Sandra Day 67
• Oliveira, Candido Luiz Maria de 186
• Orentlicher, David 210
• organ transplantation 14
  • and default rules 210–12
  • comparison of US and European donation 211
• Ostrom, Elinor 156

• paradigm 226
• paradox of compensation 25
• Pareto efficiency 73–4, 109
  • see also efficiency
• Pareto optimality 112, 120
• Pareto, Vilfredo 73–4 (n. 2)
• Pargendler, Mariana 10
• Parsons, Talcott 157
• paternalism 209
• path dependence 163–4
  • industry clustering as an example 163
  • VHS v. Betamax 163
• payday lenders 153
• Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co. 37
• permanent income hypothesis 215 physical exit 56
  • see also contractual exit; regulatory exit
• Pigou, Arthur C. 2
• Pigouvian tax 24, 78–9
  • problems with Pigouvian taxes 79
• Pike Creek Claimant’s Union 143 Pildes, Richard 215 Pirsig, Robert 244
• Planck, Max 5 (n. 9)
• Polinsky, A. Mitchell 28
  • see also BPS model of crime positive analysis 21
• positivists (Kelsen, Hart, Raz) 108
  • cf. anti-positivist
• Posner, Richard A. 19, 22, 112, 124, 232
  • efficiency in the common law 127–8
• Powell, Lewis 67
• practical rationality 103, 104
• prediction theory of law see Holmes
• presentment (the executive veto) 46
• Price, George 165
• price theory 1
• Priest, Claire 139, 144
• prisoners’ dilemma 49
  • and dormant Commerce Clause 60
• private lighthouses 143
• private ordering 141–3
  • see also whaling; Ellickson
• productive efficiency see efficiency
• property and contract law in imperial Japan 128
• property law, economic analysis of 77–9
  • efficiency of right to exclude 80
• property rights in post-plague England 128
• property rights in the American West 128
• property rules 32–4
  • cf. liability rules
  • see also Calabresi and Melamed
• public choice, defined 44
• public good 78
• pure strategy equilibrium 87
  • cf. mixed strategy equilibrium

• Quinn, Stephen 134, 135

• Ramseyer, Mark 144, 145
• randomized controlled trials 267
• rational choice theory and rationality 1, 204, 205
  • and random behavior 162
  • axiom of 18
  • deviations from predictions of 204ff
  • technical assumptions: transitivity, invariance, completeness 204
• Rawls, John 103, 110
• Raz, Joseph 108–9, 116
• real covenants 98
  • touch and concern doctrine 98–9
• p. 284receipt rule in contract 87
  • cf. mailbox rule
  • default rule in Germany 88
• regulatory cat-and-mouse with those regulated 153
• regulatory exit 56
  • see also contractual exit; physical exit rent
  • defined 46
  • rent seeking 46
• rent-dissipating game in contract negotiations 83
• replicator dynamics 166
• reproduction 158
• research journal, importance of 271, 272
• respondeat superior 96
• retirement saving 215–18
• Richardson, Gary 135–6
• Robbennolt, Jennifer 258, 271, 272, 274
• Robinson, James 131, 146
• Robinson, Paul 224–5
• Roithmayr, Daria 9
• Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent 137
• Rubin, Paul, on evolutionary theory of common law development 129
  • criticisms of Rubin’s theory 129

• Samuelson, Paul 8
• Sarbanes-Oxley Act 123
• Sauser-Hall, Georges 185
• Save More Tomorrow 214–15
• Schelling, Thomas 155, 156, 203
  • model of residential segregation 155
• Schneider, Carl 219
• Schumpeter, Joseph 156
• Schwartz, Alan 3, 237–8
• scientific method 247
• Scott, Robert C. 3
• Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics 120
• Securities Act of 1933 123, 131
• securities regulation 131
• selection effect in empirical evidence 256 (n. 28)
• selection in evolution 158
• Seligman, Martin 212–13
• Shaffer, Greg 12
• Shapiro, Jesse 223
• shared or pooled resources as source of inefficiency 78
  • see also tragedy of the commons
• Shavell, Steven 14, 28
  • see also BPS model of crime
• Shen, Francis X. 15 (n. 28)
• Sigmund, Karl 167
• Simon, Herbert 157, 161
• slavery and efficiency 114
• slaves, free market in, and Pareto optimality 112–13
• Smith, Adam 156
• Smith, Henry, on open fields 127
• Smith, John Maynard 165 Snow, Dr. John 248–9 (n. 10)
• social and cognitive psychology 204
• social choice theory 47–9
  • in analysis of common law 85–99
• social norms 12–13
• social utility function 8
• Society for the Evolutionary Analysis of Law (SEAL) 15
• Spamann, Holger 137
• specific performance (as contract remedy) 82
• Spector, Horacio 8
• Spulber, Daniel 165
• Spur Industries v. Del W. Webb Development Co. 37
• standing 61–9
  • history of Supreme Court holdings on 62–3
  • “no right to an undistorted market” 62
  • presumptive barrier against diffuse-harm standing 65
• Stapel, Diederik 270–71
• stare decisis as a cycle-breaking rule 67
• Stasavage, David 134–5
• Stearns, Max 8
• Stewart, Potter 67
• Stigler, George
  • interest-group theory of regulation 128
• strict liability 24–5
  • as a moral hazard problem for victims 24
  • see also tort, economic analysis of
• subjective value 38
• p. 285Sunstein, Cass R. 208–9
• Sussman, Nathan 134–5
• System I thinking 235 (n. 35)
• System II thinking 235 (n. 35)

• Tarde, Gabriel 185
• tax-shelter promoters 153
• Taylor, Charles 119
• Telecommunications Act of 1996 164
• Texas A&M University School of Law 10
• Thaler, Richard 215, 208–9, 228
• Tiebout, Charles 53
  • see also jurisdictional competition
• Tit-for-Tat (TFT) game strategy 167
  • see also dynamic evolutionary game theory
• tort, economic analysis of 84–5
  • as single dimension choice 94–6
  • distinguished from contract 84
  • economics of no liability 84
  • negligence liability 84
  • strict liability 84
• tragedy of the commons 78
• transaction costs 2, 32, 33
• Tversky, Amos 204, 207

• Ulen, Thomas S. 102, 213, 223, 231, 27, 272
• Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) of 1987 212
  • Revised 2006 212
• Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2 79 (n. 11), 80 (n. 12)
• unilateral care model 24
  • see also bilateral care model
• unitary resource ownership, efficiency of 78
• Universidad Torcuato Di Tella 8
• University of California-Davis 64
• University of California at Irvine School of Law 12
• University of Chicago Law School 12
• University of Illinois College of Law 9, 10, 12
• University of Maryland Francis Carey School of Law 8
• University of San Diego School of Law 8
• University of Southern California Gould School of Law 9, 11–12
• US v. Carroll Towing Co. 23
  • see also Hand test

• value monism and pluralism 116–18
• Vanderbilt University School of Law 15
• variation 157–8
• Veblen, Thorsten 156
• veto gates 46
• vicarious liability 96
• Volcker Rule 173

• Wahl, Jenny Bourne, on judge-made law governing slavery 128
• Wallis, John 136
• Watson, Gary 106
• Watson, Timothy 21–14
• weakness of will (akrasia) 233
• wealth 109
• wealth maximization see Kaldor-Hicks efficiency
• Weber, Max 157
• Weingast, Barry 134–5, 136
• Weinstein, Mark 137
• whaling industry 141–2
  • fast-fish, loose-fish rule 142
  • iron-holds-the whale rule 142
  • see also private ordering
• willingness to accept 38
• willingness to pay 38
• Willis, Lauren 219
• Wolfers, Justin 132, 257
• Wolff, Martin 186
• women’s control of their earnings and property 132–3
  • see also couverture
• women’s right to vote and government spending 132–3
• Wright, Joshua D. 238 (n. 41)
• Wright, Sewall 156
• writing well 15–16

• Yafeh, Yishay 134–5
• Yoo, Christopher 165
• Young, Peyton 160

• Zamir, Eyal 212, 215
• Zweigert, Konrad 186, 189