[In: Volume 10, Thomas S. Ulen (ed) Methodologies of Law and Economics]

• abortion and crime 132

• academic fraud 269–71

• Acemoglu, Daron 131, 146

• adaptation 157, 213

  • as invitations to make as offer (US default rule) 92–3

  • as offers 92–3

  • three elements of 157

  • see also variation; reproduction; and selection advertisements

• affective forecasting 212–14

  • and criminal law 222–24

  • and tort liability 221–22

  • leading to victim overcompensation 222

• agent-based models 168–9

• Alchian, Armen 156, 162

• Allen, Douglas 130 (n. 3)

• Allen v. Wright 63–4

• allocative efficiency see efficiency

• Always Cooperate 167

  • see also dynamic evolutionary game theory

• Always Defect 167

  • see also dynamic evolutionary game theory

• American Law and Economics Association 3

• Anderson, Coe & King 8

• anti-positivist (Dworkin) 108

• Arminjon, Pierre 186

  • Arrow Impossibility Theory see Impossibility Theorem

• Arrow, Kenneth J. 8, 48

• Arthur, W. Brian 163

• Articles of Confederation 50

• Ashenfelter, Orley 250

• Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp 62

• autonomous agency 103

• Avoidance Rule in contract law 91

• Ayres, Ian 250 (n. 10)

• Azcárate, Gumersindo de 184

• “bad man” theory of law see Holmes

• Baird, Douglas G. 3

• Baker, C. Edwin 114–15

• Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) 218

• bargaining costs see transaction costs Barnard, Dr. Christiaan 210 battles of the sexes 49

  • see contract law as games

• Bazalgette, Joseph 249

• Becker, Gary 28, 229

  • see also BPS model of crime

• Belleisles, Michael 269–70

• Ben-Shahar, Omri 219

• Benartzi, Shlomo 215

• Bentham, Jeremy 21

• Bergson, Abram 8

• Berkowitz, Daniel 137

• Berlin, Isaiah 116

• Bevilaqua, Clovis 184

• bicameralism 36

• bidirectional histories see legal history bilateral care model 24

  • see also unilateral care model

• biology 14–15

• Birmingham, Robert 1 (n. 1)

• Black Death, legal responses to 130–31

• Blue Sky Laws 131

• Blumenthal, Jeremy 214

• Board of Regents v. Bakke 64

• Bogart, Dan 135–6

• Boomer v. Atlantic Cement 36

• BPS model of crime 28–9

• Bratman, Michael 106–7

• Brazilian Civil Code of 1916 184

• Brenner, Reuven 131

• Brickman, Philip 213

• Bronsteen, Jon 213

• Brown, John Prather 22, 23–4

• Bubb, Ryan 215

• Bubble Act of 1720 123

• Burt, Sir Cyril 269

• p. 278Calabresi and Melamed 112

• Calabresi, Guido 1 (n. 1), 251–2

• calendaring rules 46

• California gold rush 142–3

• cases as unreliable sources of historical information 125

• Chen, Keith 223

• chicken 49

• cholera 247–9

• Clark, Gregory 135

• classical utilitarianism 103

• Clay, Karen B. 137

• Coase, Ronald 1 (n. 1), 74, 124 Coase Theorem 2, 31–2, 52, 74–5, 78, 208

  • causation 31

• Commerce Clause

  • see also dormant Commerce Clause

• common law

  • efficiency of 28

• common law, economic analysis of 76–85

• common law v. civil law 180–92

• critiques of legislative law and regulation as subject to capture 193

• questions about under-theorization 195

• supposed superiority of common law for growth 192–3

• see also economic growth and legal systems; legal origins; LLSV

• Commonwealth Edison v. Montana 58 (n. 11)

• community responsibility system 138–41

  • English legislation to abolish collective responsibility 139

• comparative negligence 95 compensatory damages in breach of contract 82, 83

• Condorcet, Marquis de 49 (n. 6)

• Condorcet winner 48 (n. 5), 73, 94–5 (n. 11), 96

  • see also Condorcet, Marquis de Constitution 50

• Consumer Finance Protection Bureau 220

• contract

  • efficient breach of 3

• contract law as games 87–93

  • battle of the sexes in battle over mailbox v. receipt rule 89

• see also mailbox rule; receipt rule

• contract law in ancient Rome 128

• contract law in Biblical Israel 128

• contracts, economic analysis of 79–83

  • efficiency of certainty of reciprocal commitment 80

  • efficient breach 81–2

• contractual choice of law 52–7

  • costs of contractual exit 56

  • gambling hypothetical 53

  • medical marijuana hypothetical 53

• contractual exit, costs of see contractual choice of law

• Cooter, Robert D. 26, 223

• court fees in England

  • awarded to judges, not treasury 131–2

  • parliamentary act to direct fees to treasury, 1799 132

• couverture 133–4

• crime and criminal law 28–30, 38–40

  • as example of normative analysis 26–30

  • as necessary to enforce the General Transaction Structure 39

  • criminal law in early modern England 128

  • critical legal studies (CLS) 4, 9

  • critical race theory 9

  • critiques of behavioral law and economics (BLE) 225–38

• BLE as a normal science 226–7

• economists’ criticisms 228–31

• evolutionary biology and BLE 234

• laboratory experiments v. market behavior 230–31

• lawyers’ criticisms of BLE 231–8

  • market experience and BLE 230

  • moral hazard, regulation, and BLE 236

  • philosophers’ criticisms 238–9 cycling game in contract negotiations 83

• cycling in default rules 92

• cycling in majority voting 48

• cycling in voting on the Supreme Court 67

• p. 279Damaska, Mirjan 187

• Darley, John 224–5

• David, René 186

• Davies v. Mann 24–5 (n. 13)

• day-in-the-life video 221

• De Soto, Hernando 30

• Deal, Robert 142

• death penalty deterrence 132

• decoupled liability rules 25 (n. 15)

• default rules 80, 208–12

  • as a clear starting point for negotiation 90–91

  • not to donate 210

  • opt-in v. opt-out 210–11

  • presumed consent to donate 210

• default rules in contract

  • alternative explanation 91 (n. 27)

• deformation professionelle 268

• Demsetz, Harold, on emergence of

  • property rights 127–8

• deterrent effect of capital punishment

  • see empirical evidence in law

• Diener, Ed 212–13

• difference-in-difference regressions in legal history 132

• differential equations in evolutionary dynamics 160

• diffusion

  • contagion 160

  • of adoption of hybrid corn 161

  • of disease through a population 161

  • social influence 160

  • social learning 160

• dimensionality 85–6, 99

  • as choice between coordination and policy 90

  • lack of dimensionality in tort law 94–6

• discontinuity-based empirical study 223

• discretion of English plaintiffs as to jurisdictional choice 132

• divination 244–5

  • forms 245 (n. 3)

• Donohue, John 132, 257

• dormant Commerce Clause 50, 51, 60 driving game 49

  • and dormant Commerce Clause 60 Dunn, Elizabeth 213–14

• duration neglect and criminal deterrence 225

• Dworkin, Ronald 108, 112, 114 dynamic evolutionary game theory 165–9

  • “folk theorem” of 168

  • movement from unstable to stable equilibria 168

• easement 97–8

  • implied easements as a coordination issue 97

• Easterbrook, Frank H. 8 (n. 12)

• economic analysis of law 21–30

  • cf. law and economics

  • of tort law 22–6

• economic growth and legal systems 180–83

  • Doing Business reports 196

  • see also LLSV

• Edwards, Harry T. 4 (n. 8)

• efficiency

  • allocative efficiency 2

  • Kaldor-Hicks efficiency 2, 20

  • Kaplow and Shavell on efficiency as a central legal norm 14, 19

  • Pareto efficiency 2

  • productive efficiency 2

• efficiency of the common law see common law

• Ehrlich, Isaac 257

• Einstein, Albert 244

• Ellickson, Robert 12, 141–2

  • criticisms of whaling study 142

• empirical evidence in law

  • achieving literacy in reading 264

  • costs of 261–3

  • data collection 263

  • deterrence effect of capital punishment 256–8

  • history of 250–51

  • on takings of private property 253–5

  • value of interdisciplinary faculty in doing 260

• Engerman, Stanley 112–13

• Esmein, Adhémar 185

• evidence-based medicine 250

• evolutionary dynamics

  • AIDS research as an example 154

  • analysis of law 170–75

  • p. 280cancer treatment as example 154

  • defined 153

  • drugs and pathogens 174

  • evolution of the economic loss rule 176

  • financial regulation 173

  • NASDAQ price increments 171–2

  • networks of risk in financial regulation 154

  • payday lenders and regulators 174

  • primer 156–60

  • public health policies as example 154

  • residential segregation as an example 155

  • telecommunications as an example 155

• evolutionary economics 156

• export tax doctrine 57–61

• expressive law and economics 12–13

• feminist law and economics 13–14 filibuster 46

• financial literacy software and courses, effectiveness of 219–20

• First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics 32 (n. 30), 120

• Fisher, R.A. 156

• fitness strategies 166, 167–8

• Fogel, Robert 112–13

• Fortescue, Sir John 179

• framing or framing effect 207–8

  • in public health 207

• Fundação Getulio Vargas Law, School, São Paulo, Brazil 10

• game theory 1, 13, 49–51, 75–6

  • see also prisoners’ dilemma; driving game; battle of the sexes; and chicken

• game theory in analysis of common law 85–99

• Garoupa, Nuno 10

• General Transaction Structure 34–8 Generous Tit-for-Tat (GTFT) game strategy 167

  • see also dynamic evolutionary game theory

• Gilbert, Daniel 213

• Gilmore, Gary 65

  • mother of 65

• Gilmore, Grant 3

• Gilmore v. Utah 65

• Ginsburg, Douglas 238 (n. 41)

• Ginsburg, Tom 12

• Glasson, Ernest 184

• Glorious Revolution of 1688, economic effects of 134–5

• Goldin, Jacob 215 (n. 11)

• Goldstein, Daniel 211

• Google 244

• Gordley, James 187

• Gordon, Robert 145–6

  • “Critical Legal Histories” 145

  • criticisms of evolutionary functionalism 145

  • criticisms of Gordon by Acemoglu and Robinson 146

• Grady, Mark 25–6

• Granovetter, Mark 157

• graph theory 164–5

• Grief, Avner 138

  • study of Maghribi traders and medieval trade 143

• Guinnane, Timothy 137

• Guzman, Andrew 11

• Hadfield, Gillian 13

• Hadley v. Baxendale 27 (n. 20)

• Haldane, Andrew 173

• Haldane, J.B.S. 156

• Hand, Judge Learned 23

• Hand test 23, 84

  • see also U.S. v. Carroll Towing Co.

• Hansen, Zeynep K. 130 happiness 109

  • set point of 213

• Harris, Ron 123, 137, 140

  • Bubble Act of 1720 140

  • general incorporation 140

• hedonic treadmill 214

• Hegel on criminal deterrence 107–8

• heuristics 161

• Higgs boson 246–7 (n. 6)

• Hill, Thomas 104

• Holmes, Oliver Wendell 18–19

  • “bad man” theory 19

  • prediction theory of law 19

• Homestead Acts

  • inefficiency of 130

  • possible efficiency of 130 (n. 3)

• p. 281Hume, David 36

• Hurst, J. Willard 143

• hyperbolic discounting 216, 232 (n. 31)

• hysteresis see lock-in effect

• Illinois Department of Financial and Profession Regulation 218–19

• importance of empirical evidence in innovation 5 (n. 9)

• Impossibility Theorem 48

• inalienability 115

• incarceration and crime 224

• incentives 18

• incommensurability 115

  • Kronman on 116–17

• individual preferences

  • endogenous, not exogenous 209

• information disclosure 219–20

  • see also mandated disclosure information processing 161–3

  • see also Simon, Herbert

• Institute for Genomic Biology,

  • University of Illinois 7 (n. 11)

• interest group theory 45–7

  • defined 44

  • see also public choice

• International Congress on Comparative Law (Paris 1900) 184–5

• Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, University of Michigan 265

• Johnson, Eric 211

• Jones, Owen 15, 234

• judicial review 46

• jurisdictional competition 53–4

• justice and rights 110–12

• Kahneman, Daniel 204, 207, 225

• Kaldor-Hicks efficiency 74 (n. 2)

  • see also efficiency

• Kant, Immanuel 115

  • dignity destroyed by prices 115–16

  • intrinsic value and dignity 115–16

• Kantian theory of human decision-making 104

  • cf. to rational choice theory (economic theory of human decision-making)

• Kaplow, Louis 2 (n. 2), 14

• Kennedy, Anthony 67

• Kenny, Lawrence 132–3

• Klass, Gregory 3

• Klerman, Daniel 9, 131, 135, 137,

• 144–5

• Klick, Jon 234–6

• Kolber, Adam J. 15 (n. 28)

• Korobkin, Russell B. 212, 231

• Korsgaard, Christine 104–6

• Kötz, Hein 186, 187, 189

• Kronman, Anthony 116–17

• Krugman, Paul 163

• Kuhn, Thomas 226–7

• Kuran, Timur 141

• Lamoreaux, Naomi 137

• law and economics 30–40

  • cf. economic analysis of law defined and distinguished from economic analysis of law 30

• law-and-society 12

• law as a dependent variable see legal history

• law as an independent variable see legal history

• law as a substitute for market exchange 33

• law merchant 143

• Lawless, Robert 258, 259, 271, 272, 274

• Lee, David 223

• legal centralism 141–2

• legal centrism 12–13

• legal families 183–8

  • law and economics of 190–95

• legal history

  • bidirectional histories 126

  • law as a dependent variable 126

  • law as an independent variable 126

  • litigation and contracts 126

  • private ordering 126

• legal origins 180–83

  • critiques of 188–90

  • see also legal families; LLSV

• LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. 26 (n. 18)

• Leuck, Dean 138

• Levitt, Steven 132, 230–31

• p. 282Levy-Ullman, Henri 185

• liability rules 32–4

  • as legal (forced) exchange 33

  • see also Calabresi and Melamed

• Libecap, Gary 130

• Lincoln, Abraham 246

• Lindgren, James 270

• List, John 229

• litigation and contracts see legal history

• Litvak, Katherine 123

• LLSV 137, 180–82, 196

• LLSV (Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andre Shleifer, and Robert Vishny) 10 (n. 14)

• Locke, John 110

• lock-in effect 10

• lost keys 273

• Lott, John 132–3

• Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife 63 Lusardi, Annamaria 217

• Macey, Jonathan 131

• Madison, James 46

• Maghribi traders 143

  • see also Grief, Avner

• Mahoney, Paul 123, 131, 135, 137

• mailbox rule in contract law 87

  • cf. receipt rule

  • default rule in US 88

• mandated disclosure 219–20

• mandatory rules 80

• many biases problem 237

• market analysis 1

• market imperfections 2

• fraud 204

  • misinformation 204

  • policy correctives for 2

  • sources of market failure 204

• Markov Chain Monte Carlo Sampling (MCMC) 170

• Markovits, Dan 3

• Marshall, Alfred 156

• Marshall, John 58, 59

• May, Robert 173

• McAdams, Richard H. 13, 274

• McCrary, Justin 223

• McFadden, Daniel 225

• McGinnis, Megan 8

• M’Culloch v. Maryland 58

• medieval commercial law see law merchant

• Medina, Barak 215

• Merryman, John 187

• Miceli, Thomas 7

• Miller, Geoffrey 131

• Miller, Grant 133

• Millimet, David 229

• Mitchell, Gregory 234–6

• Mitchell, Olivia 217

• mixed strategy equilibrium 87

  • cf. pure strategy equilibrium

• model of precaution 26–8

  • as unifying torts, contracts, and property law 26–7

  • in contract law 27

• Montana severance tax, cconstitutionality of 57–61

  • see also Commonwealth Edison v. Montana

• multiple regression, criticisms of 266–9

• multiple selves 233

• myopia 216

• Nagel, Ernest 118

• Nagel, Thomas 112

• Nash equilibrium 73, 86

• Nash, John 86

• National Organ Transplantation Act of 1984 210

• Neal, Larry 124

• negligence 22–6

  • contributory negligence 24–5 (n. 13)

  • defined as nonfeasance 22

  • Posner theory of negligence 23

  • threshold of behavior 24

• network analysis 164

  • compelled access to telecommunications as example 164–5

• neuroscience 14–15

• Nisbett, Richard E. 266

• Nodle, Boris 186

• normal science 226

• normative analysis 21

  • of crime 28–30

• norms 12

  • norm entrepreneurs 13

• p. 283North, Douglass 124. 134–5, 136

  • on importance of institutional structure 128

• Nowak, Martin 167

• nudges 208–12

• Oandasan, Robert 136

• observational equivalence 237

• O’Connor, Sandra Day 67

• Oliveira, Candido Luiz Maria de 186

• Orentlicher, David 210

• organ transplantation 14

  • and default rules 210–12

  • comparison of US and European donation 211

• Ostrom, Elinor 156

• paradigm 226

• paradox of compensation 25

• Pareto efficiency 73–4, 109

  • see also efficiency

• Pareto optimality 112, 120

• Pareto, Vilfredo 73–4 (n. 2)

• Pargendler, Mariana 10

• Parsons, Talcott 157

• paternalism 209

• path dependence 163–4

  • industry clustering as an example 163

  • VHS v. Betamax 163

• payday lenders 153

• Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co. 37

• permanent income hypothesis 215 physical exit 56

  • see also contractual exit; regulatory exit

• Pigou, Arthur C. 2

• Pigouvian tax 24, 78–9

  • problems with Pigouvian taxes 79

• Pike Creek Claimant’s Union 143 Pildes, Richard 215 Pirsig, Robert 244

• Planck, Max 5 (n. 9)

• Polinsky, A. Mitchell 28

  • see also BPS model of crime positive analysis 21

• positivists (Kelsen, Hart, Raz) 108

  • cf. anti-positivist

• Posner, Richard A. 19, 22, 112, 124, 232

  • efficiency in the common law 127–8

• Powell, Lewis 67

• practical rationality 103, 104

• prediction theory of law see Holmes

• presentment (the executive veto) 46

• Price, George 165

• price theory 1

• Priest, Claire 139, 144

• prisoners’ dilemma 49

  • and dormant Commerce Clause 60

• private lighthouses 143

• private ordering 141–3

  • see also whaling; Ellickson

• productive efficiency see efficiency

• property and contract law in imperial Japan 128

• property law, economic analysis of 77–9

  • efficiency of right to exclude 80

• property rights in post-plague England 128

• property rights in the American West 128

• property rules 32–4

  • cf. liability rules

  • see also Calabresi and Melamed

• public choice, defined 44

• public good 78

• pure strategy equilibrium 87

  • cf. mixed strategy equilibrium

• Quinn, Stephen 134, 135

• Ramseyer, Mark 144, 145

• randomized controlled trials 267

• rational choice theory and rationality 1, 204, 205

  • and random behavior 162

  • axiom of 18

  • deviations from predictions of 204ff

  • technical assumptions: transitivity, invariance, completeness 204

• Rawls, John 103, 110

• Raz, Joseph 108–9, 116

• real covenants 98

  • touch and concern doctrine 98–9

• p. 284receipt rule in contract 87

  • cf. mailbox rule

  • default rule in Germany 88

• regulatory cat-and-mouse with those regulated 153

• regulatory exit 56

  • see also contractual exit; physical exit rent

  • defined 46

  • rent seeking 46

• rent-dissipating game in contract negotiations 83

• replicator dynamics 166

• reproduction 158

• research journal, importance of 271, 272

• respondeat superior 96

• retirement saving 215–18

• Richardson, Gary 135–6

• Robbennolt, Jennifer 258, 271, 272, 274

• Robinson, James 131, 146

• Robinson, Paul 224–5

• Roithmayr, Daria 9

• Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent 137

• Rubin, Paul, on evolutionary theory of common law development 129

  • criticisms of Rubin’s theory 129

• Samuelson, Paul 8

• Sarbanes-Oxley Act 123

• Sauser-Hall, Georges 185

• Save More Tomorrow 214–15

• Schelling, Thomas 155, 156, 203

  • model of residential segregation 155

• Schneider, Carl 219

• Schumpeter, Joseph 156

• Schwartz, Alan 3, 237–8

• scientific method 247

• Scott, Robert C. 3

• Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics 120

• Securities Act of 1933 123, 131

• securities regulation 131

• selection effect in empirical evidence 256 (n. 28)

• selection in evolution 158

• Seligman, Martin 212–13

• Shaffer, Greg 12

• Shapiro, Jesse 223

• shared or pooled resources as source of inefficiency 78

  • see also tragedy of the commons

• Shavell, Steven 14, 28

  • see also BPS model of crime

• Shen, Francis X. 15 (n. 28)

• Sigmund, Karl 167

• Simon, Herbert 157, 161

• slavery and efficiency 114

• slaves, free market in, and Pareto optimality 112–13

• Smith, Adam 156

• Smith, Henry, on open fields 127

• Smith, John Maynard 165 Snow, Dr. John 248–9 (n. 10)

• social and cognitive psychology 204

• social choice theory 47–9

  • in analysis of common law 85–99

• social norms 12–13

• social utility function 8

• Society for the Evolutionary Analysis of Law (SEAL) 15

• Spamann, Holger 137

• specific performance (as contract remedy) 82

• Spector, Horacio 8

• Spulber, Daniel 165

• Spur Industries v. Del W. Webb Development Co. 37

• standing 61–9

  • history of Supreme Court holdings on 62–3

  • “no right to an undistorted market” 62

  • presumptive barrier against diffuse-harm standing 65

• Stapel, Diederik 270–71

• stare decisis as a cycle-breaking rule 67

• Stasavage, David 134–5

• Stearns, Max 8

• Stewart, Potter 67

• Stigler, George

  • interest-group theory of regulation 128

• strict liability 24–5

  • as a moral hazard problem for victims 24

  • see also tort, economic analysis of

• subjective value 38

• p. 285Sunstein, Cass R. 208–9

• Sussman, Nathan 134–5

• System I thinking 235 (n. 35)

• System II thinking 235 (n. 35)

• Tarde, Gabriel 185

• tax-shelter promoters 153

• Taylor, Charles 119

• Telecommunications Act of 1996 164

• Texas A&M University School of Law 10

• Thaler, Richard 215, 208–9, 228

• Tiebout, Charles 53

  • see also jurisdictional competition

• Tit-for-Tat (TFT) game strategy 167

  • see also dynamic evolutionary game theory

• tort, economic analysis of 84–5

  • as single dimension choice 94–6

  • distinguished from contract 84

  • economics of no liability 84

  • negligence liability 84

  • strict liability 84

• tragedy of the commons 78

• transaction costs 2, 32, 33

• Tversky, Amos 204, 207

• Ulen, Thomas S. 102, 213, 223, 231, 27, 272

• Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) of 1987 212

  • Revised 2006 212

• Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2 79 (n. 11), 80 (n. 12)

• unilateral care model 24

  • see also bilateral care model

• unitary resource ownership, efficiency of 78

• Universidad Torcuato Di Tella 8

• University of California-Davis 64

• University of California at Irvine School of Law 12

• University of Chicago Law School 12

• University of Illinois College of Law 9, 10, 12

• University of Maryland Francis Carey School of Law 8

• University of San Diego School of Law 8

• University of Southern California Gould School of Law 9, 11–12

• US v. Carroll Towing Co. 23

  • see also Hand test

• value monism and pluralism 116–18

• Vanderbilt University School of Law 15

• variation 157–8

• Veblen, Thorsten 156

• veto gates 46

• vicarious liability 96

• Volcker Rule 173

• Wahl, Jenny Bourne, on judge-made law governing slavery 128

• Wallis, John 136

• Watson, Gary 106

• Watson, Timothy 21–14

• weakness of will (akrasia) 233

• wealth 109

• wealth maximization see Kaldor-Hicks efficiency

• Weber, Max 157

• Weingast, Barry 134–5, 136

• Weinstein, Mark 137

• whaling industry 141–2

  • fast-fish, loose-fish rule 142

  • iron-holds-the whale rule 142

  • see also private ordering

• willingness to accept 38

• willingness to pay 38

• Willis, Lauren 219

• Wolfers, Justin 132, 257

• Wolff, Martin 186

• women’s control of their earnings and property 132–3

  • see also couverture

• women’s right to vote and government spending 132–3

• Wright, Joshua D. 238 (n. 41)

• Wright, Sewall 156

• writing well 15–16

• Yafeh, Yishay 134–5

• Yoo, Christopher 165

• Young, Peyton 160

• Zamir, Eyal 212, 215

• Zweigert, Konrad 186, 189