[In: Volume 1, Michael Faure (ed) Tort Law and Economics]

• Abel, Richard 461
• Abraham, Kenneth 50, 172, 239, 307
  • environmental liability 264, 266
  • joint and several liability 129, 130
• accidents
  • automobile see automobile
  • bilateral see bilateral accidents
  • catastrophic and dangerous seecatastrophic
  • costs see costs
  • estimating likelihood of 35–6
  • fatal see fatal accidents model 54–7, 85
  • prevention costs see under costs
  • secondary, cost reduction 180–81
  • unilateral see unilateral accidents
• activities, dangerous see underdangerous
• Adams, John
• Adams, Michael 15, 163–4
  • non pecuniary loss 216–17, 219, 221–2, 224
• Adler, Matthew 162
• administrative costs see under costs
• adverse selection 265, 297, 348, 381, 388–9, 391, 422
• advertising 293–4
• agents and principals 344, 386
  • vicarious liability see vicarious
• Aickin, Mikel 98
• Akerlof, G. 265, 292, 388
• Alberini, A. 249, 270
• Aldy, Joseph 161, 223, 224
• allocation of risks 33–5
• alternative care model 54–8
• American
  • Food and Drug Administration 162
  • Law Institute 307, 311, 314
  • Insurance Association 342
  • Medical Association 342–3, 355
• antitrust 117, 291
• Antoniolli, Luisa 436
• Arcuri, A. 254
• Aristotle 245
• Arlen, Jennifer
  • damages 155–6, 160, 172
  • medical malpractice 342, 349, 350
  • vicarious liability 137–9, 142–3
• Arnold, Frank 98, 257
• Arrow, Kenneth 377, 383, 386, 389, 390, 401
• asbestos cases 36, 182, 258, 287, 308, 484–5
• Ashenfelter, Orley 162
• Ashford, Robert 406
• Ashford, Nicholas 305
• Atkins, F. J. 406, 413
• auditors see gatekeepers
• Ault, R. W. 273
• Austin, D. 249
• Australia 408, 412–13, 474–5
• automobile accidents 50, 181, 406, 412–16, 437, 457, 474–9
• Avraham, Ronen 172, 352, 361–2, 357
• Bagenstos, Samuel 162
• Bagga, Shalini 487
• Baicker, Katherine 342, 354–5, 356
• Baker, Tom 241, 307, 389–90, 399, 401
  • medical malpractice 342, 353, 355, 359, 360, 365
• Baldwin, L. M. 487
• Banakas, Stathis 442
• Bar-Gill, Oren 25, 54, 65–6, 72, 77, 316
• Barnes, David 407
• Baron, Jonathan 437
• Baumol, William 22, 251
• Beard, T. Randolph 29, 175
• Bebchuk, Lucian 103
• behavioral incentives 153, 155, 160, 165–6, 177, 178–9, 249
• see also incentives
• Becker, David 486
• Beider, Perry 487
• Ben-Shahar, Omri 25, 315–16
  • causation 91, 99, 101,
  • negligence 54, 65–6, 77
• p. 500Benson, Bruce 477, 479
• Bergkamp, Lucas 129, 179, 248, 258–9, 266, 270
• Berliner, Baruch 399, 418
• Bernard, Andrew 294
• Bernstein, Lisa 112
• Bertram, R. 253, 263, 301, 305
• Best, Arthur 50, 52–3
• Biddle, Jeff481
• Biggar, Darryl 234
• Bilandic, Michale 406
• bilateral accidents 15–24, 33, 37, 48, 421
  • cheapest cost avoider 16–17
  • damages, and 155–6
  • economic loss, and 208–9
  • negligence 17–19, 37
    • comparative negligence rule 18–19
    • contributory negligence, defence of 18
    • simple 17–18
    • relaxing assumptions 20–24
  • non pecuniary loss 219
  • rule of no liability 17
  • strict liability 19–20
    • contributory negligence, defence of, and 20, 37
    • losses, division of 19
    • relative negligence, defence of, and 20, 37
    • simple 19
• binary care 63–5
• Binswanger, Hans 305
• Bishop, William 168, 204, 205, 435
• Bisso, Juan 143
• Black, Bernard 154, 472
• Blackburn, Joseph 157–8
• Blair, Roger 342
• Bluffstone, R. A. 262
• Bocken, H. 269
• Bode, S. 262
• Bohm, P. 256
• Bond, V. 272
• Bongaerts, J. C. 273
• Borch, Karl 383, 388–9, 401
• Borgo, John 85
• Born, Patricia 308, 399, 410, 473
• Bouchaert, B. 251
• Bovbjerg, Randall 473
• Boyd, James 125, 175
  • environmental liability 256, 259, 260–61, 263, 267, 273
  • products liability 296, 312, 316
• Boyer, M. 254, 261, 413
• Bradford, T. 256
• brand names 293–4
• Braskin, Aaron 63
• Brennan, Troyen 342, 459, 463, 472, 486
• Brissette, S. 421
• Brocket, P.L. 306
• Brooks, Jennifer 158, 306
• Brown, Craig 413, 415, 475
• Brown, John 15, 54–7, 59, 85, 154, 473
  • environmental liability 251, 253
  • medical malpractice 342, 349
• Browne, Mark 473
• Bruce, Christopher 406, 474
• Bruggeman, V. 258
• Budden, Mark 117
• bonus-malus insurance 348
• Burrows, Paul 89, 254, 272, 294, 295, 342
• Bussani, Mauro 201, 202, 203, 209, 211, 435
• but-for cause 83, 85, 86
  • see also causation
• Butler, Richard 480, 481
• bystander injuries 317–18
• Caldwell, Daniel 410
• Calebresi, Guido 4, 16, 234, 401, 412, 453
  • causation 84, 85, 100, 101
  • damages 153
  • environmental liability 251, 253, 257
  • harmonizing tort law 436, 438
  • medical malpractice 342, 346
  • non pecuniary loss 216, 220, 224
• Calfee, John 13, 91, 155, 318, 482
• California
  • Hospital Association study 352
  • Medical Association study 351
• Caminiti, Donald 413
• Campbell,Thomas 306
• Canada 357–8, 408, 412–13, 423, 474
• Cane, P. 254
• caretaking see monitoring underprecautions
• p. 501Carney, William 137
• Carroll, Stephen 409–10, 413, 485
• Cascao, Rui 436
• catastrophic injury and mass exposure34, 35, 92, 96–7, 269
  • no-fault compensation schemes 410, 417–18, 420–27
• Caterina, Raffaele 443
• causal uncertainty 266, 272
• causation
  • causal apportionment among joint tortfeasors 97–100
  • early economic analysis of law 84–5
  • foreseeability, and 83–104
  • contract law, foreseeability in 102–4
  • litigation costs 104
  • negligence rule, under 89–91, 94–5
    • optimal standard of care 89
    • scope of liability
      • care level, and 89
      • imperfect system, in 89–91
  • magnitude and scope of liability 87–9
  • proportional liability rule 93–6, 176–7, 258, 266
  • prospective causation 85–6, 103–4
  • retrospective causation 85–6
  • risk-based liability and safety regulation 96–7
  • socially optimal care, and 86–7
  • strict liability, under 87–9, 94–5
    • scope of liability
      • activity level, and 88–9
      • care level, and 87–9
  • threshold probability rules 92–3, 94–6
  • tort law, foreseeability in 100–102
  • uncertainty over 91–3
• cause in fact 83–4
• Celli, Andrew 97
• Chaloupka, Frank 477, 478
• Chandra, Amitabh 342, 354–5, 356
• Chang, Tai-Yeong 117, 118
• channelling of liability 260, 273, 423, 424, 425
• Chapman, Bruce 137, 140, 406
• Chapman, D. J. 256
• Che, Yeon-Koo 164, 318
• cheapest cost avoider 16–17
• Chelius, James 406, 410, 456, 479–80
• Cheney F. W. 353, 465, 468,
• Chernobyl 421
• Choharis, Peter 317
• Choi, Albert 143, 145, 165
• Chu, C.Y. Cyrus 142
• Chung, Tai-Yeong 54, 64
• ‘claims made policy’ 265
• climate change 276
• Coase, Ronald 16, 30–31, 84, 135, 216, 419, 479
  • environmental liability 248, 249–51, 260
  • medical malpractice 342, 347
• Coffee, John 138, 145
• Coghlin, T. G. 268
• Cohen, Alma 413, 457, 476, 478
• Cohen, George 342
• Cohen, M. A. 272
• Cohen, Thomas 465, 466, 471
• co-insurance see under insurance
• Colpitts, Jeffrey 124
• Comande, Giovanni 217
• comparative negligence 3, 18–19, 38, 456–7
  • contributory negligence, and see under contributory negligence
  • criticised 73–4
  • pure and modified forms 52–3, 74–7
• compensation see damages; no-fault compensation schemes
  • funds 268, 274, 408, 414–15, 426
  • mechanisms 262–4, 267–9
• competition 291, 292, 443–4
• compulsory insurance see under insurance
• conduct see consumers; corporations; reprehensible
• Congressional
  • Budget Office 308, 458, 473, 489
  • Office of Technology Assessment 354, 355
• consequential loss 201
• ‘consumer awareness test’ 32
• consumers 237, 240, 441, 458
  • information see under information
  • doctors and patients 343–4, 458
  • products liability 288, 297–8, 305, 316–18
    • product safety, and 292–3, 304
  • professional advice 210
• contingent valuation 256
• p. 502contracts law 30–31, 102–4, 168–9, 204, 344, 441
  • products liability 289–90, 318
• contribution actions 109–11
• contributory negligence
  • comparative negligence, and 46–77, 456–7
  • comparative negligence criticised 73–4
  • defence of 18, 19, 20, 21
  • economic performance 54–8
  • empirical studies 74–7
  • equivalence, comparative negligence and 58–9
  • incentives to take care 53–73
  • least-cost avoider, and 53–8
  • origins and development 48–52
    • rule criticised 49–50
  • relaxing assumptions 59–73
    • equilibrium, convergence to 72–3
    • evidentiary uncertainty and court error 59–66
    • heterogenous agents and parties 67–72
    • liability rules and revealing information 70–72
  • stochastic due care and losses 66–7
  • summary 77
• Cook, Philip 220, 222, 478
• Cooter, Robert 436
  • causation 83, 84, 85, 87, 88, 91, 97
  • contributory and comparative negligence 59–63, 66, 71, 77
  • damages 154–6, 158, 159, 163, 170, 174, 179–80
  • environmental liability 252
  • medical malpractice 362
  • non pecuniary loss 219
  • products liability 317, 319
  • punitive damages 166–7, 232, 234, 239
  • strict liability and negligence 7, 12, 15, 24
• copyright 234–5
• corporations and firms 146, 304–6, 379, 442
  • civil liability see vicarious
  • conduct 234, 236–7, 239, 253, 396–8, 401
  • crime see crime
  • liability
    • innovation and productivity, impact on 304–6
    • limited 139–40, 394, 396–8
    • managers, personal 144, 396–8
    • product safety, and 303–4
  • non-profit 139
• costs
  • accident 19–20, 22, 46, 84, 153, 174, 216
  • administrative 11, 153, 210, 453, 457–8, 470–71
    • causation, and 93, 97, 100, 104
    • damages, and 153, 163, 165, 168
    • liability insurance 379, 381–2, 384, 385–6, 391–2, 458
    • medical malpractice 347, 362
    • negligence, and 57, 59
    • no-fault compensation schemes 412–13
    • products liability 292
    • punitive damages 235
    • vicarious liability 143
  • care 14, 24–7, 29–30, 36, 56–7, 71–2
  • damage compensation, of 36
  • due care, of 36
  • enforcement 138
  • externalities 16
  • funeral 160, 161
  • information 309–10, 314, 417
  • innovation and production 304–5
  • litigation 24, 36, 57, 74, 297
    • damages, and 154–6, 179
    • economic loss, pure 203–4
    • joint and several liability 104, 115, 128
    • punitive damages 23, 240–41
    • vicarious liability 137
  • medical malpractice 346
  • mitigation 156
  • monitoring 136
  • preventions and precautions 4, 5, 12, 22, 241, 346, 391–2, 453
  • primary 153, 216–17, 225
  • secondary 153, 217, 225, 437
  • social and welfare 12, 13, 37, 93, 154, 346
  • strict liability, and 19
  • tertiary costs 153, 217, 225, 436–7
  • p. 503transaction 16, 30–31, 250–51, 347, 409–10, 480
    • harmonizing tort law 438, 441, 446–7
  • Courbage, C. 418
  • courts 409
    • due care level see under due care errors 13, 19, 56, 89–90, 93–4, 143, 252, 319, 380
      • damages 155, 159, 166–7, 171–2
      • evidentiary uncertainty, and 59–66, 77
      • punitive damages 230, 233
  • Cousy, H. 264
  • Cowell, J. 265
  • Coyte, Peter 342, 352, 357–8, 361
  • Craig, Andrew 305
  • Craswell, Richard 13, 91, 155, 319
    • harmonizing tort law 437, 440
    • punitive damages 232, 240
  • Crevier, Stephanie 63
  • crime and criminal liability 22, 385
    • corporate civil liability, and 145–7, 398
    • vicarious liability, and 134, 141–3
  • Croley, Steven 137, 164, 308, 381, 406
    • non pecuniary loss 216, 217, 220, 222–5
  • Cross, Gary 294
  • Crouch, Edmund 437
  • Cummins, J. David 307, 413, 476,
  • Curran, Christopher 17, 54, 58–60, 77
  • ‘customary practice test’ 263
  • customers see consumers 237, 240
• damage 3, 29–30, 255–7
• damages and compensation 12, 14, 37, 153–84
  • assessment of losses 159–60
  • basis of compensation 170–71
  • behavioral incentive, as 153, 155, 160, 165–6, 177, 178–9
  • chance, loss of 176–8
  • compensation mechanisms 267–9
  • compensatory 12
    • not perfectly 11–12, 21, 38
    • products liability, and 318–19
  • costs of 36
  • economic loss, pure 168–70
  • empirical research 181–2
  • environmental liability 255–7
  • fairness in 73
  • fatal accidents 160–63, 182
    • optimal amount
      • injurers should pay 160–61
      • relatives should receive 162–3
  • full compensation of harm 156–8
  • future 171–2, 182
  • harm equaling 229–31
  • indirect 411
  • limitation and moderation of 174–6
  • medical malpractice 344–5
  • mitigation of losses 173–4
  • multiple tortfeasors 178–80
  • no-fault compensation system 409, 411
  • non-pecuniary losses
    • compensation for 163–5
    • pecuniary losses, and 158–9
  • optimal see under punitive damages
  • over-compensation 3, 14–15, 37
    • deterrence and 8
  • principles, assessment of 182–3
  • punitive damages see punitive damages
  • secondary accident cost reduction 180–81
  • uncompensated losses 165–6
  • under-compensation 14–15, 21, 29, 30, 37, 97, 182, 417, 419
  • wealth of defendants 172–3
  • workers compensation 480–82
• dangerous
  • activities, abnormally 27, 34, 220, 398, 437–8
• see also catastrophic
• Danzon, Patricia 164, 318, 381, 412–13
  • empirics 463–4, 468, 472, 485, 489
  • medical malpractice 342–6, 351–2, 354–5, 357–61, 364
• D’Arge, R. 251
• Dari-Mattiacci, Guiseppe 16, 57, 95, 140, 435
  • damages 168, 169–70, 175, 176
  • economic loss, pure 203, 204, 205, 206, 207
• Daughety, Andrew 241, 295, 305, 319
• Davis, R. K. 256
• Dawar, N. 293
• De Bievre, A. F. M. 273
• p. 504De Geest, Gerrit 57, 175, 176
• De Smedt, K. 270
• decentralisation effect of strict liability and negligence 24–7
• deductibles see partial under insurance
• Dee, Thomas 478
• defective rationality 137
• defects see under products liability
• defences
  • comparative negligence rule 18–19, 38
  • contributory negligence 3, 18, 20, 38, 48–52
  • relative negligence 3, 20
• defensive medicine 354–6, 458, 472, 486–8
• Dehejia, Rajeev 413, 457, 476–8
• Delgado, Richard 94, 95
• delictual liability 344
• Demougin, Dominique 28–30
• Demsetz, H. 406
• Denmark 362
• Derrig, Richard 408, 413, 476
• design defects see product liability Designated Compensable Event 350, 364
• deterrence 8, 29, 37–8, 153, 210, 453–4
  • comparative negligence 73, 76
  • contracts and liability 30–31
  • corporations, and 146
  • damages, and 160, 162–3, 167, 177, 179
  • environmental liability 249, 252–3, 256–7, 259
  • errors, and 93–4
  • joint and several liability 118, 119–25
  • legal rules, of 13
  • liability insurance 308, 379–80, 382, 385–6
  • medical malpractice 344, 485
  • non pecuniary loss 220
  • punitive damages 228–31, 237–8, 468–9
  • over 13–15, 37, 146, 158, 259, 353–4
    • standard of care, changes in 262–3
  • strict liability 23
  • theory of 229–31
  • under 13–15, 29–30, 37–8, 94, 97, 146
    • damages, and 160
    • environmental liability 252–3, 256–7, 266
    • no-fault liability 413, 415, 418–20, 424–6
• development see innovation
• DeVille, Kenneth 342
• Devlin, Nancy 162
• Devlin, Rose 409, 412–13, 475–6, 489
• Dewar, Marvin 342
• Dewees, Nancy 181–2, 269, 302, 384–5
  • empirics 456, 484
  • no-fault compensation 410, 413
  • medical malpractice 342, 352–3, 355, 357–8, 361–3
• Dhankhar, Praveen 487
• Diamond, Peter 56, 238
• difference principle see partial liability
• Dionne, Georges 413
• disaster insurance and relief 267, 269
• disclosure 313–15
• Djamaludin, I. 295
• doctors see under consumers
• Dodge, Joseph 158
• Doherty, N. 267
• Donohue, John 488–9
• Dowdell, T. D. 303
• Drake, J. 256
• Dranove, David 486
• Dubay, Lisa 486–7
• Dubin, J. A. 272
• due care 6, 17
  • causation, and 89–91
  • costs of 36
  • courts, and 20, 25, 27, 36, 38
  • efficient standard of care 47, 54
  • experts 25
  • inducing 46
  • legal standards, uncertainty of 13–15
  • medical malpractice 351, 485
  • negligence 87
    • comparative 18–19, 54–8
    • contributory 54–8
  • public information 27
  • reasonable man 25–6, 47
  • socially optimal level see optimal level
  • standard of care 47–8, 58
    • changes in 262–3
  • stochastic, losses and 66–7
  • strict liability 10, 87–9
• p. 505Duff, David 181–2, 269, 302, 384–5, 456
  • no-fault compensation system 410, 413
  • medical malpractice 342, 352–3, 355, 357, 363,
• Duggan, Anthony 166
• Dunford, R. 272
• Dunn, Richard 465
• Dworkin, Ronald 23

• Eads, George 303
• Earnhart, D. 253, 262
• earnings, loss of see under loss
• Easterbrook, Frank 112, 379, 395, 398
• Eaton, Thomas 240, 465, 469
• Eckert, A. 253, 270
• economic loss, pure 8, 14, 168–70, 201–11, 435, 441
  • categories of cases 202–3
    • analysis of 209–11
  • definition 201
  • intentional versus negligent torts 209
  • justifications for 203–4
  • private versus social loss 204–6
  • products liability, and 318
  • professional advice cases 202–3, 210–11
  • public service, closure of cases 202, 210
  • ricochet loss cases 202, 209
  • strict liability versus negligence 207–9
  • transferred loss cases 202, 209–10
• economic rationale of insurance 377–84
• Edlin, Aaron 61
• efficiency equivalence theorem 19
• Efroymson, R. A. 256
• ‘eggshell skull’ doctrine 101 66
• Egon, Zehnder International 303, 305
• Eisen, Roland 377, 379, 388–9
• Eisenberg, Theodore 166, 228, 469
• Ekelund, R. B. 273
• Ellis, Dorsey 1, 232–3, 234
• empirics of tort 74–7, 453–90
  • cost-benefit analysis 488–90
  • empirical analysis, pre-requisites for 456–61
    • data 458–9
    • methods 459–61
    • variation 456–8
  • safety effects 473–88
    • automobile accidents 474–9
      • no-fault 474–7
      • other changes in liability rules 477
      • other safety measures 477–9
    • industrial accidents 479–82
      • workers compensation 480–82
    • medical malpractice 485–8
      • defensive medicine 486–8
    • products liability 482–5
      • asbestos 484–5
      • empirical findings 483–4
  • tort litigation system 461–71
    • administrative costs 470–71
    • base rate 462–3
    • claiming rate 463–5
    • disposition of claims 465–8
    • punitive damages 468–70
  • tort reform, effects of 471–3
• employment 236, 239
  • scope of and liability see vicarious
• Endres, Alfred 8, 18, 379, 389, 391
  • environmental liability 249, 251–3, 263–4, 266, 269
  • product liability 299, 301, 305
• England see United Kingdom
• Enron 145
• environmental liability 110–11, 182, 247–76
  • assessment of 274–6
  • compensation mechanisms 267–9
  • damage and damages 255–7
  • environmental federalism, and 269–70
  • goals 249
  • insurance of 263–7, 397–8, 399
    • adverse selection 265
    • causal uncertainty 266
    • compulsory 266–7
    • disaster 267
    • latency and retroactive liability 265, 396, 397
    • moral hazard 264–5
  • latency 261, 265
  • lenders and producers, liability of 260–61
  • marine oil pollution 268, 269, 272–4
  • p. 506moving beyond original polluter 257–61
    • causal uncertainty 257–8, 259
    • channelling of liability 260, 273
    • joint and several liability 258–60
  • negligence versus strict liability 252–3
  • nuclear risk 260, 268–9, 270–72
  • regulation
    • compliance and liability 254–5
    • criteria 253
    • influence on liability, and 253–5
    • liability and incentive based instruments 255
    • tort system, combined with 253–4
    • violation of regulation and liability 254
  • retroactive liability 261–3, 266
    • latency, and 265
  • standard of care, changes in 262–3
  • risks 35
  • vicarious liability, and 143
• Epple, D. 272, 290
• Epstein, Richard 85, 96, 104, 417, 422, 455
  • environmental liability 267, 269
  • medical malpractice 342–3, 349, 350, 365
  • products liability 297, 317
  • vicarious liability 136–7
• equilibrium, convergence to 72–3
• equivalence theorem 19
• errors 60, 347
• court see court
• Estep, E. 258, 272
• Europe 46, 51, 402, 485
  • economic loss, pure 201, 203, 209, 210
  • European Union 31, 270, 442
    • liability insurance 384, 393–4
    • product liability 287, 308–9, 318
  • tort law systems, harmonization and 438, 439–47
• Evans, William 221
• evidentiary
  • privileges 143
  • uncertainty and court error 59–66, 77
• excess and deductibles see under insurance
• ‘exclusionary rule’ 201, 207–9, 435
• exogenous solvency 124–5
• experts 25
• externalities 16, 88, 158, 163, 169, 295, 439
  • cross-border externalities 444–5
  • pollution 249–51
• Exxon Valdez 273
• fairness and joint liability 125–30
• ‘false positives’ and ‘false negatives’ 353–4, 364, 385, 464, 482
• Farber, Henry 342, 353–4, 465, 468
• Farber, Michael 94
• fatal accidents 352, 413, 415, 484
  • damages 160–63, 181–2,
  • products liability 287, 302, 304
• Faure, Michael 54, 95, 224, 402
  • damages 159, 174, 179
  • environmental liability 248, 251–2, 254, 257–8, 261, 263–4, 266–71, 273, 276
  • harmonizing tort law 435–6, 439–40, 442–3, 445
  • medical malpractice 342, 344–5, 347, 365
  • no-fault compensation schemes 417–19, 420, 422, 424, 426
  • products liability 315
• Fedtke, Jorg 436
• Fees, Eberhard 27, 259
• Feinstein, J. S. 270
• Feldman, Allan 156
• Feldman, Roger 342–3
• Feldthusen, Bruce 203, 413
• Felsteiner, William 461
• Fenn, Paul 261, 315, 418
• Ferguson, William 76, 77
• financial caps 256–7, 393–4, 399, 418–21, 424–6, 457–8, 473
• Finland 362, 411
• Finsinger, Jorg 9, 11, 268
• Fiore, K. 272
• firms see corporations
• first party insurance see under insurance
• Fischel, Daniel 144–6, 379, 395, 398
• Fischer, Charles 177
• Fishback, Price 480
• Flanigan, George 76, 77
• p. 507Fluet, Claude 28–30
• foreseeability
  • causation, and see under causation
  • contract law, in see under causation
  • tort law, in see under causation
• France 3, 51, 385, 412, 424, 435, 437, 441
  • medical malpractice 342, 344, 350–52, 362–4
  • see also medical malpractice
• Franklin, Marc 410
• Franzoni, Luigi 145
• Frasca, Ralph 176–7
• Fraser, Clive 164
• Frech, H. E, 318
• Freeman, P. 264
• Frey, B. S. 251
• Friedman, Daniel 63, 163–4, 167, 221
• Frontier Insurance Group 359
• Froot, Kenneth 307
• Frost, C. 249, 270
• Galanter, Marc 181, 455, 461
• Galligan, Thomas 233, 238
• Garber, Steven 303, 483
• Gardner, Steven 50
• Garoupa, Nuno 16, 95
• gatekeepers 139, 144–5
• see also professional advice
• Gaudry, Marc 413, 475
• Geistfeld, Mark 164
  • products liability 288, 295, 297–8, 308–9, 311, 314, 317–18
• Germany 3, 7, 51, 226, 344, 384, 435
• Gigerenzer, Gerd 35
• Gilead, Israel 435
• Gimpel-Hinteregger, M. 249
• Goldberg, Victor 178, 204, 273, 291
• Gollier, C. 269
• Gomez, Fernando 168–9, 204, 435
• Gotanda, John 228
• Government 139
• Gowda, R. 264
• Grabowski, Henry 409
• Grady, Mark 47, 85, 89–90, 101, 155
• Graf von der Schulenburg, J, 386, 388
• Graham, Daniel 164, 220, 222, 302–3, 305
• Grayston, Richard 474
• greater degree of blame exception 50
• Greene, William 461
• Greenwald, B. 355
• Grimaud, D. 264
• Gron, A. 269, 486
• Grossman, D. A. 276, 296
• Grossman, Michael 477–8
• guarantee funds 268
• Guppy, A. 35
• Haazen, Olav 441
• Haddock, David 17, 54, 58–60, 77, 234
• Hagen, Stuart 487
• Hamada, Koichi 289
• Hamdani, Assaf 139
• Hand, Learned 6, 32, 47–8, 351
• Haneman, W. M. 256
• Hankey, S. 265
• Hansmann, Henry 140, 396
• Hanson, John 164, 381, 406
  • non pecuniary losses 216, 217, 220, 222–5
  • products liability 292, 292–3, 308
• Hansson, I. 267
• harm, damages equaling 229–31
• harmonization see tort law
• Harrington, Scott 476
• Harris, Catherine 342, 351, 353, 465, 468
• Harrison, D. 256
• Hart, H.L.A. 83, 85
• Hartlief, T. 252, 267, 424, 437, 439, 442, 443
• Harvard Medical Practice study 341, 352, 353, 355, 459, 463
• Hausman, J. A. 256
• Havighurst, Clark 364
• Hay, Bruce 304, 318
• Hay, J. 273
• Hazen, O. A. 265
• Heal, Geoffrey 290
• health
  • damages, and 158
  • healthcare measures, value of 161–2
  • insurance see under insurance
  • medical malpractice see medical malpractice
  • risks 35
• hedonic price technique 155–6
• Hege, U. 259
• p. 508Heine, G. 273, 426
• Helland, Eric 182
• Hellwig, Martin 383, 386, 388, 390
• Henderson. James 288, 300, 312
• Hendrickx, Ruud 273, 274, 436
• Hensler, Deborah 181, 287, 316, 406, 459, 462
• Hersch, Joni 154, 303, 409
• Hershey, Nathan 354
• heterogenous agents and parties 67–72
• Heyes, A 248, 272
• Higgins, Richard 302, 457, 482, 484
• history of liability 3, 406, 456–8, 471
• Hoch, I. 256
• Hoerger, Thomas 468
• Hoffer, George 303
• Hogarth, H. R. 265
• Honore, Tony 83, 85, 86
• Housmann, Michael 354
• Hsieh, Chee Ruey 353
• Howells, Geraint 443
• Hu, J. 426
• Huber, Peter, 302
• human life, value of 160–63, 223–4
• Hurst, Ady 353
• Huybrechts, M. A. 426
• Hyde, C. E. 259
• Hylton, Keith 154, 167, 241, 254, 301
• Hyman, David 345, 352, 353, 354
  • medical malpractice 349
• Iceland 362
• immunity 143
• imperfectly competitive markets 290–91
• incentives to take care 53–73, 412, 415, 424, 473–88, 485–6
  • environmental liability 255, 269
  • liability insurance 389–90, 393–5
  • medical malpractice 344–5, 349–50
• see also behavioural incentives
• independent
  • contractors 139–49
  • probabilities 113–15
• industrial accidents see workers
• information 97, 101, 422
  • asymmetry 386–8, 390–91, 410, 485
  • concealing and liability 138, 142
  • consumers, and 291–3, 301, 309–11, 317, 468, 482–3
  • costs see under costs
  • insurance, for 263, 268
  • liability rules revealing 70–72
  • mechanisms in products markets 293–5
  • medical malpractice 346–7
    • patients 341
  • misleading, capital markets in 206
  • perfect information 56–8, 60, 72, 77
  • safety technologies 27–8, 38
  • warning defects 313–15
• see also preventions; safety
• Ingberman, Daniel 125, 175, 259, 261, 263
  • products liability 296, 312, 316
• innovation and productivity 304–6
  • induced innovation 305
  • research and development 305–6, 417, 483–4
• insolvency see solvency
• insurance 4, 12, 16, 21, 57, 97, 267, 453
  • automobile 412–13
  • bonus-malus 348
  • ‘claims made policy’ 265
  • co-insurance 348, 384, 426
  • compulsory 266–7, 299, 362, 397–8, 408, 421–2, 425–6
  • costs and warranty liability 297–8, 309
  • damages, and 158, 174, 180–81
  • disaster 267
  • efficient distribution, and 220–21
  • environmental liability 256, 263–7
  • excess and deductibles 348, 391–2
  • first party 12, 297–8, 402, 457
    • liability insurance 377, 381, 384–5
    • medical malpractice 345, 350–51
    • no-fault compensation system 406, 408, 410, 412, 421–2, 475
  • health 292–3, 297, 385
  • insolvency 268
  • joint and several liability 129–30
  • liability see liability insurance
  • ‘long tail risk’ 261, 265, 360
  • markets 19
  • medical malpractice 343, 345, 348–9, 350–51, 357–60, 486
  • non-pecuniary loss 163–4, 217, 220–23, 225
  • p. 509pain and suffering see pain and suffering
  • pecuniary loss 163
  • products liability 3, 225, 296–300, 305, 306–8, 315
  • punitive damages 241
  • re-insurance 384
  • risk aversion see under risk aversion
  • self 362, 379, 402, 408, 410, 423, 486
  • social 12
  • terrorism 307, 359
  • third party 73, 297–8, 350–51, 377, 410, 421–2
  • underwriting, and 359–60, 383
• see also compensation mechanisms
• Insurance Information Institute study 354
• intellectual property 170–71
• intentional harm or tort 3, 50, 143, 400
  • negligence, and 209
• interest 157, 360, 394, 458
• International Organization for
• Standardization 217
• Italy 342, 344, 438
• Jackson, Howell 145
• Jarrell, Gregg 303
• Jeffries, John 172, 239
• Johnson, Gary 12, 253, 254, 255
• Johnson, Joseph 76, 77
• Johnson, Rollin 305
• Johnson, William 406
• joint and several liability 109–30, 458
  • deterrence 118, 119–25
    • endogenous solvency 124–5
    • full solvency 120–22
      • negligence 120–21
      • strict liability 122
    • limited, exogenously determined solvency 122–3
  • environmental liability 258–60
  • fairness 125–30
  • insolvency, division of burden 128–9
  • insurance 129–30
  • legal regimes 10
  • litigation costs 128
  • plaintiff’s recovery
    • division of 126–7
    • size 126
  • settlements, effects of 112, 127–8
  • several only liability 112
  • two defendants, 113–17
    • effects of limited solvency 116–17
    • independent probabilities 113–15
    • more than 117–18
    • perfectly correlated probabilities 115
• joint tortfeasors, causal
  • apportionment see under
  • causation
• Jolls, Christine 35
• Jones, P. 317
• Jost, Peter 174, 266, 397
• judgment-proof
  • agents 143, 144, 146
  • tortfeasors 29–30, 38, 68, 97, 139, 175–6, 394, 421
• judicial moderation and damages 174–6
• Jung, M. 262
• juries 50, 60, 73, 74, 314, 318, 399, 467 469
• Kabler, Brent 413, 476
• Kaestner, Robert 486–7
• Kahan, Marcel 7, 26, 47, 90–91, 120
  • damages 155, 158, 159, 176, 241
• Kahneman, Daniel 292
• Kakalik, James 409, 410, 413, 470, 488–9
• Kalss, Susanne 207
• Kanning, Arnold 436
• Kaplow, Louis 172, 234, 438
  • causation 94, 101, 102,
  • environmental liability 261, 269
  • non pecuniary losses 221, 224,
  • products liability 315
• Kapp, W. 251
• Karpoff, Jonathan 147, 166, 470
• Karten, W. T. 264
• Katzman, M. 265, 266
• Kavanaugh, Karen 480
• Kaye, David 92, 98, 257
• Keeton, R. 406, 412,
• Keeton, W. P. 1, 83
• Kelman, Mark 98
• Kennedy, Duncan 437, 440
• Kerkmeester, Heico 257, 436
• p. 510Kessler, Daniel 306, 342, 356, 486–7
• Ketchum, L. 272
• Khan, M. Mahmud 487
• Khanna, V. S. 147
• Kim, Jeonghyun 58, 156
• King, Elizabeth 177
• Kirmani, A. 294
• Klee, Elizabeth 124, 125
• Kleffner, A. 267
• Klein, Benjamin 293, 466
• Klerman, Daniel 111, 112
• Klevorick, Alvin 306
• Klevorick, K. S. 412
• Klick, Jonathan 356, 486
• Knoll, Michael 157
• Kochanowski, Paul 413, 476
• Koenig, Thomas 469
• Kolstad, Charles 12, 253, 254, 255
• Kornhauser, Lewis 32
  • damages 178, 179
  • environmental liability 259, 260
  • joint and several liability 109–30
  • vicarious liability 135, 136
• Kotowitz, Yehnda 386
• Kotz, Hein 3, 177
• Kraakman, Reinier 396
  • vicarious liability 138, 140, 143, 144, 145
• Kramer, Larry
• vicarious liability 136, 137, 139, 143
• Krier, James 159
• Krueger, Alan 480
• Kruskal, William 98
• Krutilla, J. V. 256
• Kunreuther, H. 261, 264, 265, 267, 307
• Kysar, Douglas 292
• Landeo, Claudia 241
• Landes, Elizabeth 413
• Landes, William 4, 10, 32, 204, 216, 310, 342
  • causation 84–5, 87–90, 94, 96, 99, 101–2, 104
  • damages 154, 168, 175, 179
  • empirics 453, 455, 476, 488–9
  • environmental liability 256–7, 258
  • joint and several liability 112, 119
  • punitive damages 229, 234
• Langevoort, Donald 138
• Laroque, Francois 344
• Lasagna, Louis 305
• last clear chance doctrine 50
• latency 261, 265
• Latin, Howard 292, 314
• Laurent, C. 421
• law of large numbers 382–3, 400
• Lawrence, B. A. 287
• lawyers see gatekeepers
• least-cost avoider 53–8, 63–4, 84
• Leape, Lucian 463
• Lee, Han-Duck 473
• Leebron, David 396
• Leffler, Keith 293
• legal
  • aid 182
  • malpractice 178, 210
• Legrand, P. 444
• lenders and producers, liability of 260–61
• Levmore, Saul 92–3, 94
• Lewis, Christopher 307
• Lewis, Richard 171–2, 175, 261, 401
• liability insurance 377–402, 454
  • definition 377
  • compensation as purpose of 384–6
  • economic problems of 386–93
    • adverse selection 388–9
    • asymmetric information and imperfect insurance 386–8
    • moral hazard 389–93
      • incentives, destruction of 389–90
      • informational asymmetry 264, 390–91
      • insurance, partial 391–2
      • levels of activity 392–3
  • economic rationale of 377–84
    • demand for insurance 377–82
      • deterrence function, consequences of 379–80
      • insuring liability for fault 380–81
      • non-pecuniary losses 381–2
      • risk aversion 377–9
    • supply of insurance 382–4
      • pooling: law of large numbers 382–3
      • sub-division of risk 383–4
  • economic virtues of 393–8
    • alternative means 398
    • p. 511limited liability 393–8
      • activity levels 397
      • compulsory insurance 397–8
      • incentives to
        • take care 394–5
        • insure 395–7
    • impact, tort law on 401–2
    • limits of insurance: insurability elements of 399–400
      • flexible concept, as 400–401
  • Liang, Bryan 342
  • Liang, Lan 477
  • Libecap, G. D. 273
  • Lidgren, K. 261
  • Liedtke, P. M. 418
  • Likens, Thomas 477, 479
  • Lillard, Lee 468
  • limited liability 139–40, 393–8
  • Liston-Heyes, C. 272
  • Litan, Robert 302
  • litigation costs see under costs
  • Little, Joseph 73
  • Lloyds 383, 401
  • Localio, A. R. 464, 465, 487
  • Logue, Kyle 293
  • Lomas, O. 273
  • ‘long tail risk’ 261, 265, 360
  • Lopuci, Lynn 296, 394
  • loss 3
    • assessment of 159–60
    • chance, of 176–8
    • earnings and wages 157, 171
    • emotional and psychological 163, 233
    • future 171–2
    • income 161
    • life, of see human life
    • mitigation of 156–7, 173–4, 207
    • private 204–6, 206–7, 210
    • social welfare 157, 167, 168, 182, 210, 379, 389
      • private, and 204–6, 206–7
  • Lott, John 147, 166, 182, 470
  • Loughran, David 413, 477
  • Ludeke, A. 299
  • lump sum 171–2
  • Lund, Adrian 413, 476
• MacLeod, W. Bentley 139
• MacKay, Murray 303
• MacMinn, R. D. 306
• Magaddino, Joseph 413, 476
• Magat, Wesley 313
• Magnus, Ulrich 160, 170, 437, 440, 441, 442
• Mahshigian, L. 406
• Makdisi, J. 258
• Maler, K. G. 256
• Mankiw, N. Gregory 206
• Manning, Richard 182, 304, 483
• marine oil pollution 268, 269, 272–4, 425–7
• Marino, Anthony 95, 291
• Markesinis, Basile 342
• marketplace and transactions 167, 206, 209
  • constraints 139
  • damages, and 234–5, 240
  • imperfectly competitive 290–91
  • informational mechanisms in 292–5
  • products liability, and 288–9, 292, 298
  • structure, private and social loss and 206–7
• Marks, Stephen 90
• Martin, Robert 305
• Mary Carter agreements 112
• Mason, M. 426
• Mason, Robin 296
• mass exposure torts see under catastrophic
• Mast, Brent 477, 479
• Mattei, Ugo 436
• Mayers, David 379
• McAfee, D. 253, 270
• McChesney, Fred 234
• McClellan, Mark 342, 356
• McEwin, R. Ian 362, 475, 478
  • no fault compensation system 406, 409–11, 413–15, 421–2
• McGuire, E. Partrick 303
• McLeod, Bentley 342, 349
• McKeen, Roland 287, 291
• Meddler, F. 272
• Medical Adversity Insurance 364
• medical malpractice 178, 181, 238, 341–65, 462–8, 485–8
  • assessment 364–5
  • crisis, in 356–60
    • proposals to end 360–64
      • tort reforms 360–62
  • p. 512defensive medicine 354–6
  • definition 341, 342, 351, 353
  • insurance and underwriting 359–60
  • liability
    • development 342–3
    • economic analysis of 343–9
      • doctor-patient relationship 343–4
      • incentive and compensation 344–5
      • law and economics approach 346–7
      • tort law, regulation and insurance 347–9
  • negligence versus strict liability 349–51
  • no-fault compensation schemes 410–11
  • standard of care 351
  • tort system, relevance of 351–4
• Medoff, Marshall 413, 476
• Melamed, A. Douglas 234, 342, 438
• Mello, Michelle 342, 472, 486
• Merolla, A. Todd 296, 306
• Meszaros, J. 265
• Metzloff, Thomas 351, 353
• Miceli, Thomas 122, 155, 241
  • causation 85, 86, 99
  • damages 167, 172
  • negligence and strict liability 25, 26, 29
• Michelman, F. I. 251
• Miller, C. 258
• Miller, Dan 351, 359
• Mills, Don 459, 463
• minimum asset requirement 398
• Mishan, E. J. 251
  • mitigation of loss see under loss
• mobility, tort law as obstacle to 442–3
• moderation of damages 174–6
• monitoring see under precautions
• Monti, A. 249
• Moore, Michael 305, 481, 483
• moral hazard 264–5, 297, 348, 360, 381, 389–90, 397, 400, 481
• Moselly, R. 272
• Mueller, Marnie 343, 355,
• multiple
  • agents 136
  • parties see joint and several tortfeasors 32–3, 38, 178–80
• Murthy, D. N. P. 295
• Mustard, David 240, 469
• Nagel, Thomas 223
• Nash equilibrium 18, 22, 23, 64, 121
• National
  • Association of Insurance Commissioners 358
  • Health Service 344, 352
  • Institute for Clinical Excellence 162
• natural risks 406, 409, 422–3
• negligence
  • apportionment of 73
  • bilateral accidents see bilateral accidents
  • causation, and see under causation
  • comparative see comparative negligence
  • contributory see contributory negligence
  • costs 24
  • damages, and 154–6, 165–6, 176, 179–80
  • design defects see product liability due care see due care
  • economic loss, pure and 207–9
  • environmental liability 252–3
  • exclusionary rule 207
  • history 3
  • information generating consequence 27–8, 38
  • insurance 380–81
  • intentional, negligent torts and209
  • joint and several liability see under joint and several
  • judgment-proof tortfeasors 29–30, 38
  • liability, magnitude and scope 87
  • medical malpractice 349–51
  • products liability 300–301, 309–16
  • punitive damages 230
  • reasonable care see due care recovery rule 207
  • relative 3, 20, 21
  • strict liability, and 3–38
    • summary of 36–8
  • p. 513unilateral accidents see unilateral accidents
  • vicarious liability, and 134, 141–2, 142–4
• Nell, Martin 34
• Nelson, B. J. 256
• Net Environmental Benefit Analysis 256
• New Zealand 262, 406, 408, 411
  • universal no-fault system 413–16, 474–5
• Nichols, E. 270
• Nikitin, Maxim 241
• no-fault compensation system 262–4, 406–27, 436, 457, 474–7
  • advantages 409–11
    • higher compensation 409
    • lower
      • insurance premiums 410–11
      • transaction costs 409–10
  • automobile insurance 412–13
  • definition of 407–8
  • disadvantages 411–12
  • protection of victims, priority of 407–16
  • strict liability, and 416–22
  • universal no-fault system 413–16
• no-liability rule 6, 22
• Noll, Juergen 296
• Nollkaemper, A. 276
• non-legal sanctions see sanctions
• non pecuniary losses 3, 158–9, 160, 163–5, 215–26, 399
  • awards, risk of high 224–5
  • definition 215
  • insurance 381–2
  • justification for compensating 217–18
    • insurance
      • demand for 222–3
      • efficient distribution, and 220–21
      • no demand for 221
  • prevention 218–20
  • valuation 223–4
  • tort law and economics 216–17
• non-profit corporations 139
• Norway 362
• nuclear risk 260, 268, 269, 270–72, 421, 423–5
• Nussim, Jacob 159–60, 175
• Oates, Wallace 22, 251
• occupational diseases 182
• see also asbestos; workers O’Connell, Jeffrey 406, 410, 412, 413
• O’Connell, Paul 307
• Ogburn, Paul 353
• Ogus, A. 253–4, 344, 436–7, 439, 441, 444–5
• Ohl, C. 269
• Oi, Walter 299
• oil pollution see marine oil
• Olsen, Reed Neil 343
• ONIAM 364
• optimal damages see under punitive damages
• optimal level of care
  • causation, and 86–7, 94
  • contributory and comparative negligence 54–8
  • damages, and 12, 153–6, 158, 178, 179–80
  • economic loss, pure 207–9
  • environmental liability 255–7
  • medical malpractice 344–5, 346, 351
  • risk spreading 153
  • strict liability and negligence 6–10, 13, 16–31, 36–8, 417
  • vicarious liability see vicarious
• optimality condition 5, 11–12, 19–20
• optimistic behaviour 35–6, 38
• Orr, Daniel 19, 63–5
• Ostrom, Brian 471
• Ott, Claus 205, 263, 381, 436
  • damages 154, 156, 168, 171, 175
  • strict liability and negligence 5, 7, 15, 27
• over-compensation see under damages
• over-compliance and investment in care 13, 94, 472
• over-deterrence see under deterrence
• Owen, David 272, 310
• Pace, Nicholas 409, 470, 488–9
• pain and suffering 181, 233, 297, 318–19, 474
• Painter, Christopher 397
• Palmer, G. 406, 414, 415
• Palmer, Vernon 201, 202, 203, 209, 211, 435
• Panayotou, T. 262
• p. 514parasitic loss 201
• partial insurance see under insurance patients see under consumers
• Parisi, Francesco 140, 435
• Parker, Jeffrey 146
• Parkin, David 162
• partial liability 7, 26
• Pate-Cornell, M. E. 270
• Patell, James 157
• Pauly, Mark 9, 390
• pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses 158–9
• Peeples, Ralph 342, 351, 353
• Peirce, Ellen 164
• Peltzman, Sam 303
• perfect information see under information
• perfectly correlated probabilities 115, 120
• periodic payments 171–2
• pessimistic behaviour 35–6, 38
• Peterson, Mark 467
• PHICO 359
• Phillips, Richard 476
• Physicians Insurers Association of
• America 357
• Pigou, A. C. 22, 250
• Pinna, Andrea 363, 438
• Png, I. P. L. 241
• Polborn, Mattias 397
• Polinsky, A. Mitchell 13
  • damages 154, 156, 159, 164, 170, 172
  • joint and several liability 112, 141, 144
  • medical malpractice 342, 349
  • punitive damages 166, 167, 232–3, 236, 238, 239–41, 469
  • products liability 300, 318, 319
  • vicarious liability 136, 141, 144
• pollution see environmental
• Pomata, Gianna 342
• Pommerehne, W. W. 256
• pooling of risks 382–3
• Popp, David 305
• Porat, Ariel 96, 99, 100, 158, 179–80
• Porrini, D. 254, 261
• Posner, Eric 136, 139, 161, 162, 163
• Posner, Richard 204, 310, 406
  • causation 84–5, 87–90, 94, 96, 99, 101–2, 104
  • contributory and comparative negligence 49, 53, 56, 57
  • damages 154, 156, 168, 175, 179
  • empirics 453, 455
  • environmental liability 251, 256–7, 258
  • joint and several liability 112, 119
  • medical malpractice 342, 346, 349
  • non pecuniary loss 216, 219, 221
  • punitive damages 229, 232, 234
  • strict liability and negligence 4, 6, 7, 10, 27, 32, 37
• Pozzo, B. 252
• precautions and preventions 7–10, 11, 19, 21, 47, 386, 390
  • contributory negligence, and 49, 60
  • costs of see under costs
  • damages 159
    • equaling harm 229–31
  • economic loss, pure and 206, 207–9
  • environmental liability 259, 264
  • level of 229–31
  • monitoring and regulating 220, 259, 390–91, 396
    • vicarious liability, and 136–44, 146
  • non pecuniary loss 216, 218–20
  • products, in 146
  • standard of care, changes in 262–3
• see also information; safety
• premiums 357–60, 410–11, 415, 422, 438, 472–3
  • liability insurance 378, 384, 386–9, 400–401
• Price, L. J. 293
• Priest, George 3, 164, 222, 241, 381, 406
  • empirics 456–7, 466, 471
  • environmental liability 265, 267, 269
  • no-fault compensation schemes 410, 422
  • products liability 287, 290, 297, 301–4, 306
• primary costs 153, 216–17, 225
• Prince, David 303
• principals and agents see agents; vicarious
• private loss see under loss
• privilege 143
• p. 515producers and lenders, liability of 260–61
  • limited 139–40
• productivity and innovation 304–6
• products liability 63, 182, 225, 240, 287–320, 482–5
  • bystander injuries 317–18
  • consumer information about product risk 291–2
  • contracting and tort liability, efficiency properties of 289–90
  • damages
    • compensatory 318–19
    • punitive 319–20
  • defects
    • construction and manufacturing 310–11
    • design 311–12
    • requirement of 309–10
    • warning 313–15
  • doctrines of 308–20
  • empirics, liability and product safety on 301–4
  • European Union Directive 393–4
  • harmonization of laws 443–5
  • informational mechanisms in product markets 292–5
  • imperfectly competitive markets 290–91
  • innovation and productivity, impact of liability on 304–6
  • insurance 3, 385, 396, 482–5
    • costs and warranty liability 297–8
    • market for 306–8
    • regulatory problem 298–300
  • liability 315–16
    • enforceability of contractual waivers of 316–17
    • extended seller 315–16
  • negligence, and 31–2
  • product safety, consumers undervaluing 292–3
  • purpose 287–9
  • regulatory problem 298–300
  • strict liability 3, 31–2, 457
    • negligence, and, choice between 300–301
  • warranties 295–6
    • insurance costs and warranty liability 297–8
• professional
  • advice cases 202–3, 210–11
  • liability see chance under loss
• proof 29–30
• proportional liability rule see under causation
• prospective
  • causation see under causation
  • overruling 263
• Protection and Indemnity Clubs 268, 273, 426
• proximate cause 83–4
• see also causation
• public
  • compensation mechanism see
  • compensation mechanism information on safety technology 27–8, 38
  • service, closure of cases 202, 210
• Puelz, Robert 473
• punishment 228, 235, 238, 239, 385
• punitive damages 3, 12, 158, 166–8, 175, 182, 228–41
  • damages equaling harm 229–31
  • definition 228
  • deterrence, theory of 229–31
  • empirics 468–70
  • insurability 241, 399
  • litigation costs 240–41
  • optimal damages 237–8
    • harm underestimated, and 232–3
    • injurers escaping liability, and 231–2
    • marketplace, transacting and bargaining in, and 234–5
    • punishment, and 235–7, 239
    • socially illicit gains, and 233–4
  • products liability, and 319–20
  • reprehensible conduct 238
  • tax treatment 241
  • victims, strangers or customers as 240
  • wealth 239
• Quality Adjusted Life Years 161–2
• Querner, Immo 18
• Qian, Yingy 142
• race to the bottom 445–6
• Rachlinski, Jeffrey 437
• p. 516Radetzki, M. and M. 269
• Randow, von Philipp 11
• Rao, A. 294
• Rapp, Geoffrey 472,
• Rassmussen, David 477, 479
• rational choice, behavioural assumptions of 35–6
• Raviv, Artur 290
• Rawls, John 223
• Rea, Samuel 67–70, 77, 171, 381
• reasonable care see due care
• recovery see recovery under joint and several
  • plaintiffs 126–8
  • rule 207, 208
• regulating see monitoring under precautions
• regulation 253–5, 298–300, 317, 347–9, 398, 443, 485
• see also safety
• Rehme, D. 251
• Reilly, Bridget 50, 76, 457, 465, 476–8
• Reinganum, Jennifer 241, 295, 305, 319
• re-insurance see under insurance
• relative negligence see under negligence relatives 160, 162–3
• remoteness test 102–3
• reprehensible conduct 236, 238
• research and development see innovation
• retroactive liability 261–3, 265, 266
• retrospective causation see under
• causation
• Reuter, Peter 303
• Revesz, Richard 109–30, 178, 179, 224, 248
  • environmental liability 259, 260, 268
• Reynolds, R. A. 355
• Rhoads, T. A. 251
• Richter, Andreas 34
• ricochet loss cases 202, 209
• right of contribution see contribution
• Riley, John 293
• Ringleb, Al 124, 296, 306
• risk
  • allocation of 33–5, 73
  • aversion 33–5, 135–6, 141, 180, 398, 401, 453
    • insurance, and 163, 174, 220–21, 239, 297, 377–80, 389, 392
    • based liability and safety regulation 96–7
• ‘risk utility test’ 32, 310, 311, 313, 314
• Rizzo, Mario 168, 257, 435
  • causation 86, 87, 98, 100
  • economic loss, pure 204, 205,
• Roberts, Karen 481
• Robinette, Christopher 51, 73, 76–7
• Robinson, Glen 94, 96, 258
• Rock, Steven 487
• Roe, Mark 97
• Rogers, W. V. Horton 134, 215, 217, 224
• Rogerson, William 293, 294
• Rogge, J. 265
• ‘role-type uncertainty’ 156
• Rolph, John 411
• Rose-Ackerman, Susan 22, 95, 98, 254, 255
• Rosenberg, David 27, 37, 93, 94, 257
• Rosenblatt, Roger 353
• Rossato, Andrea 436
• Rothschild, Michael 388
• Rothwell, G.S. 272
• Rowley, C. K. 272
• Rubin, Paul 225, 303–4, 317–18, 455, 458, 483–4
• Rubinfeld, Daniel 319
  • damages 154, 156, 165
  • environmental liability 256
  • negligence 52, 56, 70–72, 77
    • strict liability, and 19, 25
• Ruegg, M. 254
• Ruhm, Cristopher 477, 478
• Ruiz, Juan 168, 169, 204, 435
• rule of no liability 6, 17, 31
• Rundshagen, B. 269
• Ruser, John 480, 481
• Rustad, Michael 319
• Ruttan, Vernon 305
• safety 50, 57, 137, 301–6, 349, 390, 411, 413
  • products liability 289–95, 296, 297, 301, 484–5
  • regulation 254, 267, 417, 420–21, 423–4, 454–6, 477–9
    • risk-based liability, and 96–7, 220
• see also information; preventions
• Saffer, Henry 477, 478
• p. 517Sage, William 342, 354, 359, 360, 486
• Saks, Michael 455, 458, 461
• Samuelson, P. A. 383
• Sanchirico, Chris 165, 172
• sanctions and enforcement 143, 147, 239, 419
  • non-legal 158
  • private 138, 141, 237
• Sappington, David 175, 261
• Sarat, Austin 461
• satisfaction 3
• Schafer, Hans-Bernd 263, 381, 435–6
  • damages 154, 156, 167, 168, 169, 171, 177
  • economic loss, pure 203, 204, 205, 207
  • strict liability and negligence 5, 7, 15, 27
• Schauffler, Richard 465, 471
• Schelling, Thomas 224
• Schenzler, Christoph 50, 76, 457, 465, 476–8
• Schlanger, Margo 162
• Schmitt, Joan 473
• Schmitz, P. W. 254
• Schmookler, Jacob 305
• Schulze, W. 251
• Schwab, Stewart 15
• Schwartz, Alan 292, 295, 312, 317, 320, 381
• Schwartz, Gary 3, 57–8, 406
  • economic loss, pure 201
  • empirics 454, 455, 456, 457, 489
  • environmental liability 249, 252, 255
  • non pecuniary loss 222
  • products liability 303
  • vicarious liability 137
• Schwartz, Victor 406
• Schwartze, Raimund 264, 266, 267, 379, 389, 391,
• Schweizer, Urs 206, 207
• Sclar, David 354
• scope of liability 87
• secondary
  • accident cost reduction 180–81
  • costs see under costs
  • liability, strict see vicarious
• Segerson, Kathleen 29, 99, 122, 124, 172, 261
• self-insurance see under insurance
  • regulation 348
  • selection effect 24–7
• Sen, Amartya 223
• set-off110, 118
• Settle, C. T. M. Hurley 248
• settlements 110–18, 127–8, 182
• several only liability 112
• Shanley, Michael 467
• Shapiro, Carl 293
• shareholders and investors 139–40, 231, 237, 262, 379, 396–7, 398
• Shavell, Steven 112, 204, 438, 453
  • causation 54, 58–9, 85–91, 93–5, 97, 100–104
  • damages 154–60, 163–4, 168, 170, 172–5, 178–9, 180–81
  • environmental liability 251–4, 257, 262, 264, 266
  • medical malpractice 342, 345, 346, 347, 349
  • no-fault compensation system 409, 412, 417, 420, 421
  • non-pecuniary loss 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224
  • products liability 289, 300, 301, 310, 315, 318, 319
  • punitive damages 166, 167, 229, 232–4, 236, 238–41
  • strict liability and negligence 5, 10, 11, 13, 15, 22
  • tort law and liability insurance 377, 379–82, 384, 386, 389, 392, 394–8
  • vicarious liability 135, 136, 137, 141, 142
• Shepherd, George 306
• Shepherd, Joanna 225, 304, 458, 484
• Sher, Noam 349
• Sherland, Paul 51, 73, 76–7
• Shogren, J. F. 251
• Shukaitis, Marc 163
• Sigman, Hilary 117, 118, 249, 259, 261
• Silver, Charles 345, 352, 353, 354
• Simon, Marilyn 301
• Singh, Ram 158, 159
• Skogh, Goran 397, 418, 424
  • environmental liability 251, 261, 266, 267, 268, 271
• p. 518Sloan, Frank 303, 413
  • empirics 457, 465, 468, 473, 476–8, 485, 487
  • medical malpractice 349, 353, 356, 358
  • negligence 50, 76
• Slovic, Paul 267, 437
• Smith, Adam 218
• Smith, Clifford 379
• Smith, Michael 379
• Smith, R. T. 253, 270
• Smith, Steven 465
• Smits, Jan 436, 440, 442, 444, 445, 447
• social
  • costs see under costs
  • loss see under loss
  • welfare 33–4, 123, 172, 180, 206–7, 264, 439
    • effects of liability regimes 4, 33–5
    • illicit gains 167, 233–4
    • medical malpractice 344–5, 346
    • products liability 306, 316
• socially optimal level of care see optimal level
• solvency and insolvency 109, 112, 347, 418, 421–2
  • damages, and 174–6, 179, 397
  • environmental liability 252, 253, 259, 268
  • joint and several liability 116–17, 119–25, 120–26
  • vicarious liability 135, 136
• Spelman, William 461
• Spence, A. 291
• Spence, Michael 388, 482
• Spiegel, Menahem 234
• Spier, Jaap 98, 120, 203, 265, 276, 441
• Spier, Kathryn 318
• Spulber, Daniel 289, 291
• Stahel, W. R. 264
• Staiger, B. 249, 251, 252
• standard of care see due care
• Stein, Alex 96, 99
• Stewart, R 248, 268
• Stiglitz, Joseph 388
• stochastic due care and losses 66–7
• stock value 303–4
• Stone, Robert 305
• Stool, H. 228
• Stout, Emily 477
• Stout, Lynn 407
• St-Paul Travelers Companies 359
• Stratmann, Thomas 356, 486
• strict liability 402, 457
  • accidents see accidents; bilateral;
  • unilateral
  • causation, and see under causation
  • costs 24
  • damages, and 155–6, 165–6, 176, 178, 180
  • defences see defences
  • design defects see product liability
  • economic loss, pure and 207–9
  • environmental liability 252–3
  • exclusionary rule 207, 208
  • information 27, 38
  • insurance 380
  • joint and several liability see under joint and several
  • judgment-proof tortfeasor 29–30
  • liability, magnitude and scope of87
  • medical malpractice 349–51
  • negligence, and 3–38
    • summary of 36–8
  • no-fault compensation system, and 416–18
  • products liability 3, 31–2, 300–301, 308–11, 314–18
  • punitive damages, and 229–30
  • rule of 10–13
  • vicarious liability, and see vicarious
• Studdert, David 353, 409
  • empirics 459, 463–5, 468, 470, 472
• subdivision of risk 383–4
• Sudman, Michael 50
• Sugarman, Stephen 128
• Summers, John 175
• Sunstein, Cass 35, 161, 162, 163, 437
• superfund 249, 258, 259–60, 261, 266, 268, 275
• Suurmond, Guido 221
• Swan, Peter 413, 415, 475, 478
• Swazey, Judith 305
• Sweden 362, 363, 364, 411
• Switzerland 344
• Sykes, Alan
  • environmental liability 269
  • vicarious liability 135, 136, 137, 139, 142–6
• p. 519Tabbach, Avraham 159–60, 175
• Tabarrok, Alexander 182
• Takaoka, Sumiko 303, 305
• Takeda, Keith 110, 117, 118
• Talarico, Susette 240–41, 465, 469
• Tancredi, Laurence 364
• Taragin, Mark 353, 465, 468
• Tauchen, George 478
• taxes and tax laws 145, 157, 165, 172–3, 206, 241
  • environmental liability 254
    • Pigovian taxes 250
• ‘technological advancement test’ 263
• Teitelbaum, Joshua 35, 36
• terrorism 307, 359, 406, 409, 422–3
• tertiary costs see under costs
• Thaler, Richard 35
• ‘thin skull plaintiff rule’ 157
• third party
  • defendant 110
  • insurance see under insurance
• Thirtle, Colin 305
• Thomas, Eric 459, 463
• Thorpe, Kenneth, 357–8, 360, 361, 410, 473
• threshold
  • liability 258
  • probability rules see under causation
• Tiebout, Charles 439
• Tietenberg, T. 119, 179, 259
• Tillinghast-Towers Perrin 217, 459, 470–71
• Tirole, Jean 293
• Tol, R. S. J. 276
• tort law, harmonizing 435–47
  • cross-border externalities 444–5
  • domestic preferences 436–8
    • market for tort law systems 438–9
  • economic analysis and harmonization 440–41
  • European tort law systems, differences in 439–47
  • mobility, tort law as obstacle to 442–3
  • race to the bottom 445–6
  • regulatory competition 443–4
  • transaction costs, reduction of 446–7
• tort litigation system 461–71, 471–3
• transaction costs see under costs
• transferred loss cases 202, 209–10
• Trebilock, Michael 129–30, 181–2, 456
  • environmental liability 252–3, 260, 269, 271
  • liability insurance 384–5, 402, medical malpractice 342, 345, 352–3, 355, 357–8, 361–3
  • no-fault compensation system 406, 410, 412, 413, 417
  • products liability 302, 307
• Tribe, B. 258
• trilateral precaution accidents 208–9
• Tuckman, Bruce 241
• Tunc, A. 406, 412
• Tussing, A. Dale 487
• Twerski, Aaron 300, 312
• Ulen, Thomas 97, 219, 362, 436
  • contributory and comparative negligence 59–63, 66, 71, 77
  • damages 154, 155, 156, 159, 174
  • environmental liability 253, 254, 255
  • strict liability and negligence 7, 12, 15, 24
• uncertainty 24, 156, 252–3, 307–8, 453
  • causation, over 91–3, 96, 97, 176–7, 266, 272
    • environmental liability 257–8, 259
• under-
  • compensation see under damages
  • compliance and investment in care 13, 95
  • deterrence see under deterrence
  • investment 88–9
  • writers see gatekeepers; see under insurance
• unilateral accidents 5–15, 16, 36–8, 47–8, 349, 409
  • damages, and 154–5, 164
  • economic loss, and 207–8
  • environmental liability 252–3
  • legal standards of due care 13–15, 20
  • negligence 6–7
    • relaxing assumptions 7–10
  • non pecuniary loss 219
  • punitive damages 235
  • rule of no liability 6
  • strict liability 10, 20–22
    • relaxing assumptions 10–13
    • rule of 10–13
• unilateral care 63–5
• p. 520United Kingdom 3, 49, 51, 134, 211, 385, 437
  • medical malpractice 342, 344, 352, 357
  • see also medical malpractice
• United States 3, 46, 408
  • automobile accidents 412–13, 474–7
  • see also automobile
  • catastrophic risks 92, 423
  • see also catastrophic
  • compensation 157, 161, 171, 224, 225
  • see also damages
  • contributory and comparative negligence 49, 50, 51–2, 77
  • see also contributory negligence
  • corporate crime 134, 143, 145, 146
  • see also corporations; crime
  • data 458–9
  • Department of Transportation 413
  • economic loss, pure 201, 209
  • see also economic loss
  • empirics 455–8, 461–73, 480, 484–9
  • see also empirics
  • environmental liability 110–11, 253, 256, 261, 266
    • nuclear risk 269, 271–2, 276
    • oil pollution 272–3
  • see also environmental liability; marine oil; nuclear
    • insurance 224–5, 226, 385
  • see also insurance
  • juries, role of 74
  • see also juries
  • medical malpractice 342–3, 351–9, 361, 362
  • see also medical malpractice
  • products liability 287–8, 294, 296, 304, 306–10, 314, 318, 320
  • see also products liability
  • punitive damages 3, 228
  • see also punitive damages
  • standard of care 48
  • see also due care
  • vicarious liability 134
  • see also vicarious
• valuation
  • contingent 256
  • environmental damage 255–7
  • human life of see human life
• Value of a Statistical Life 161, 162, 224, 226
  • Year 161–2
• Van Aaken, Anne 167
• Van Boom, William 363, 438, 440
• Van Dam, Cees 51
• Van Damme, K. N. 426
• Van den Bergh, Roger 174, 266, 271, 424, 439–46,
• Van den Borre, T. 260, 271–2
• Van Egteren, H. 253, 270
• Van Mieghem, E. 272
• Van Randow, Philipp 219
• van Velthoven, Ben 221, 406, 413
• Van Wijck, Peter 158
• Venezian, E. C. 307
• van’t Veld, Klaus 306
• Veljanovski, Cento 342, 345
• Verheij, A. 248, 273
• Verheyen, R. 276
• Vertinsky, Ilan 437
• vicarious liability and corporate civil liability 27–8, 38, 134–47
  • alternative liability targets 144–5
    • gatekeepers 144
    • personal liability 144
  • criminal liability, and 145–7
  • definition 134
  • factors militating against 137–40
  • negligence and composite regimes 142–4
  • principal and agent liability, interaction between 140–42
  • standard case for 135–7
• Viney, Genevieve 342
• Viscusi, W. Kip 265, 361, 399, 437, 471, 473, 481, 483
  • damages 154, 161, 181
  • economic loss, pure 217, 221, 223–5
  • no-fault compensation schemes 409, 410
  • products liability 303, 305, 307–8, 310, 313, 319–20
• Visscher, Louis 166, 174, 272, 436, 440, 442–6
• Von Bar, Christian 51
• Von Weizsacker, Carl 206
• p. 521wages see under loss
• Wagner, Gerhard 437, 439–41
  • environmental liability 249, 266–7
  • liability insurance 386, 396, 398–9, 402
• Wagner, Wendy 315
• Waidmann, Timothy 486–7
• Waldman, Steven 313
• Wang, H. 273, 426
• warranties 295–8
• Watts, Alison 124
• wealth
  • defendants, of 171–2
  • injurers 239
    • lower than damage 29–30, 38
• Weber, Nathan 303
• Wehrung, Donald 437
• Weil, Roman 157
• Weinstein, Neil 35, 162
• Weir, Tony 203
• Weisbach, David 172
• Weiss, Mary 413, 476
• welfare effects of liability regimes see under social welfare
• Wheeler, Malcolm 146
• Whetten-Goldstein, Kathryn 477, 479
• Whinston, Michael 206
• White, G. 267
• White, Michelle 19, 457
  • empirics 468, 477, 484–5
  • medical malpractice 342, 352, 353, 354
  • negligence 67, 73, 74–5
• Wickelgren, Abraham 298
• Wiggins, Steven 124, 273, 296, 306
• Wildavsky, A. 270
• Wilde, Louis 295
• Wilkins, David 145
• Wilkinson, James 478
• Wilson, Charles 388
• Wilson, Richard 437
• Winkler, Daniel 76, 77
• Winter, Jan Kees 158, 260, 271
• Winter, Ralph 307
• Witt, Robert 379
• Wittman, Donald 17, 63, 72–3, 74, 99
  • damages 156, 170, 173
  • environmental liability 253
• Wohlschlegel, Ansgar 27
• Wojtowycz, Martha 487
• Wolinsky, Asher 294
• Wolson, Mark 157
• Woodhouse Royal Commission Report 414
• workers and workplaces 136, 182, 352, 362, 406, 456–7, 479–82
  • asbestos claims see asbestos
• Worldcom 145
• Worrall, John 480, 481
• Wren, J. 426
• Wright, Richard 89, 119, 125–6
• Yahya, M. 124, 125
• Yoon, Albert 472
• Young, Douglas 477, 479
• Young, Madelyn 413, 476
• Young, Robert 99
• Yun, John 167, 319
• Zador, Paul 413, 476
• Zeckhauser, R. 264
• Zelizer, Viviana 222
• Zervogianni, Eleni 153, 159
• Zolt, Eric 241
• Zuckerman, Stephen 355, 358, 410, 473,
• Zweifel, Peter 377, 379, 388, 389
• Zweigert, Konrad 3