[In: Volume 1, Michael Faure (ed) Tort Law and Economics]

• Abel, Richard 461

• Abraham, Kenneth 50, 172, 239, 307

  • environmental liability 264, 266

  • joint and several liability 129, 130

• accidents

  • automobile see automobile

  • bilateral see bilateral accidents

  • catastrophic and dangerous seecatastrophic

  • costs see costs

  • estimating likelihood of 35–6

  • fatal see fatal accidents model 54–7, 85

  • prevention costs see under costs

  • secondary, cost reduction 180–81

  • unilateral see unilateral accidents

• activities, dangerous see underdangerous

• Adams, John

• Adams, Michael 15, 163–4

  • non pecuniary loss 216–17, 219, 221–2, 224

• Adler, Matthew 162

• administrative costs see under costs

• adverse selection 265, 297, 348, 381, 388–9, 391, 422

• advertising 293–4

• agents and principals 344, 386

  • vicarious liability see vicarious

• Aickin, Mikel 98

• Akerlof, G. 265, 292, 388

• Alberini, A. 249, 270

• Aldy, Joseph 161, 223, 224

• allocation of risks 33–5

• alternative care model 54–8

• American

  • Food and Drug Administration 162

  • Law Institute 307, 311, 314

  • Insurance Association 342

  • Medical Association 342–3, 355

• antitrust 117, 291

• Antoniolli, Luisa 436

• Arcuri, A. 254

• Aristotle 245

• Arlen, Jennifer

  • damages 155–6, 160, 172

  • medical malpractice 342, 349, 350

  • vicarious liability 137–9, 142–3

• Arnold, Frank 98, 257

• Arrow, Kenneth 377, 383, 386, 389, 390, 401

• asbestos cases 36, 182, 258, 287, 308, 484–5

• Ashenfelter, Orley 162

• Ashford, Robert 406

• Ashford, Nicholas 305

• Atkins, F. J. 406, 413

• auditors see gatekeepers

• Ault, R. W. 273

• Austin, D. 249

• Australia 408, 412–13, 474–5

• automobile accidents 50, 181, 406, 412–16, 437, 457, 474–9

• Avraham, Ronen 172, 352, 361–2, 357

• Bagenstos, Samuel 162

• Bagga, Shalini 487

• Baicker, Katherine 342, 354–5, 356

• Baker, Tom 241, 307, 389–90, 399, 401

  • medical malpractice 342, 353, 355, 359, 360, 365

• Baldwin, L. M. 487

• Banakas, Stathis 442

• Bar-Gill, Oren 25, 54, 65–6, 72, 77, 316

• Barnes, David 407

• Baron, Jonathan 437

• Baumol, William 22, 251

• Beard, T. Randolph 29, 175

• Bebchuk, Lucian 103

• behavioral incentives 153, 155, 160, 165–6, 177, 178–9, 249

• see also incentives

• Becker, David 486

• Beider, Perry 487

• Ben-Shahar, Omri 25, 315–16

  • causation 91, 99, 101,

  • negligence 54, 65–6, 77

• p. 500Benson, Bruce 477, 479

• Bergkamp, Lucas 129, 179, 248, 258–9, 266, 270

• Berliner, Baruch 399, 418

• Bernard, Andrew 294

• Bernstein, Lisa 112

• Bertram, R. 253, 263, 301, 305

• Best, Arthur 50, 52–3

• Biddle, Jeff481

• Biggar, Darryl 234

• Bilandic, Michale 406

• bilateral accidents 15–24, 33, 37, 48, 421

  • cheapest cost avoider 16–17

  • damages, and 155–6

  • economic loss, and 208–9

  • negligence 17–19, 37

    • comparative negligence rule 18–19

    • contributory negligence, defence of 18

    • simple 17–18

    • relaxing assumptions 20–24

  • non pecuniary loss 219

  • rule of no liability 17

  • strict liability 19–20

    • contributory negligence, defence of, and 20, 37

    • losses, division of 19

    • relative negligence, defence of, and 20, 37

    • simple 19

• binary care 63–5

• Binswanger, Hans 305

• Bishop, William 168, 204, 205, 435

• Bisso, Juan 143

• Black, Bernard 154, 472

• Blackburn, Joseph 157–8

• Blair, Roger 342

• Bluffstone, R. A. 262

• Bocken, H. 269

• Bode, S. 262

• Bohm, P. 256

• Bond, V. 272

• Bongaerts, J. C. 273

• Borch, Karl 383, 388–9, 401

• Borgo, John 85

• Born, Patricia 308, 399, 410, 473

• Bouchaert, B. 251

• Bovbjerg, Randall 473

• Boyd, James 125, 175

  • environmental liability 256, 259, 260–61, 263, 267, 273

  • products liability 296, 312, 316

• Boyer, M. 254, 261, 413

• Bradford, T. 256

• brand names 293–4

• Braskin, Aaron 63

• Brennan, Troyen 342, 459, 463, 472, 486

• Brissette, S. 421

• Brocket, P.L. 306

• Brooks, Jennifer 158, 306

• Brown, Craig 413, 415, 475

• Brown, John 15, 54–7, 59, 85, 154, 473

  • environmental liability 251, 253

  • medical malpractice 342, 349

• Browne, Mark 473

• Bruce, Christopher 406, 474

• Bruggeman, V. 258

• Budden, Mark 117

• bonus-malus insurance 348

• Burrows, Paul 89, 254, 272, 294, 295, 342

• Bussani, Mauro 201, 202, 203, 209, 211, 435

• but-for cause 83, 85, 86

  • see also causation

• Butler, Richard 480, 481

• bystander injuries 317–18

• Caldwell, Daniel 410

• Calebresi, Guido 4, 16, 234, 401, 412, 453

  • causation 84, 85, 100, 101

  • damages 153

  • environmental liability 251, 253, 257

  • harmonizing tort law 436, 438

  • medical malpractice 342, 346

  • non pecuniary loss 216, 220, 224

• Calfee, John 13, 91, 155, 318, 482

• California

  • Hospital Association study 352

  • Medical Association study 351

• Caminiti, Donald 413

• Campbell,Thomas 306

• Canada 357–8, 408, 412–13, 423, 474

• Cane, P. 254

• caretaking see monitoring underprecautions

• p. 501Carney, William 137

• Carroll, Stephen 409–10, 413, 485

• Cascao, Rui 436

• catastrophic injury and mass exposure34, 35, 92, 96–7, 269

  • no-fault compensation schemes 410, 417–18, 420–27

• Caterina, Raffaele 443

• causal uncertainty 266, 272

• causation

  • causal apportionment among joint tortfeasors 97–100

  • early economic analysis of law 84–5

  • foreseeability, and 83–104

  • contract law, foreseeability in 102–4

  • litigation costs 104

  • negligence rule, under 89–91, 94–5

    • optimal standard of care 89

    • scope of liability

      • care level, and 89

      • imperfect system, in 89–91

  • magnitude and scope of liability 87–9

  • proportional liability rule 93–6, 176–7, 258, 266

  • prospective causation 85–6, 103–4

  • retrospective causation 85–6

  • risk-based liability and safety regulation 96–7

  • socially optimal care, and 86–7

  • strict liability, under 87–9, 94–5

    • scope of liability

      • activity level, and 88–9

      • care level, and 87–9

  • threshold probability rules 92–3, 94–6

  • tort law, foreseeability in 100–102

  • uncertainty over 91–3

• cause in fact 83–4

• Celli, Andrew 97

• Chaloupka, Frank 477, 478

• Chandra, Amitabh 342, 354–5, 356

• Chang, Tai-Yeong 117, 118

• channelling of liability 260, 273, 423, 424, 425

• Chapman, Bruce 137, 140, 406

• Chapman, D. J. 256

• Che, Yeon-Koo 164, 318

• cheapest cost avoider 16–17

• Chelius, James 406, 410, 456, 479–80

• Cheney F. W. 353, 465, 468,

• Chernobyl 421

• Choharis, Peter 317

• Choi, Albert 143, 145, 165

• Chu, C.Y. Cyrus 142

• Chung, Tai-Yeong 54, 64

• ‘claims made policy’ 265

• climate change 276

• Coase, Ronald 16, 30–31, 84, 135, 216, 419, 479

  • environmental liability 248, 249–51, 260

  • medical malpractice 342, 347

• Coffee, John 138, 145

• Coghlin, T. G. 268

• Cohen, Alma 413, 457, 476, 478

• Cohen, George 342

• Cohen, M. A. 272

• Cohen, Thomas 465, 466, 471

• co-insurance see under insurance

• Colpitts, Jeffrey 124

• Comande, Giovanni 217

• comparative negligence 3, 18–19, 38, 456–7

  • contributory negligence, and see under contributory negligence

  • criticised 73–4

  • pure and modified forms 52–3, 74–7

• compensation see damages; no-fault compensation schemes

  • funds 268, 274, 408, 414–15, 426

  • mechanisms 262–4, 267–9

• competition 291, 292, 443–4

• compulsory insurance see under insurance

• conduct see consumers; corporations; reprehensible

• Congressional

  • Budget Office 308, 458, 473, 489

  • Office of Technology Assessment 354, 355

• consequential loss 201

• ‘consumer awareness test’ 32

• consumers 237, 240, 441, 458

  • information see under information

  • doctors and patients 343–4, 458

  • products liability 288, 297–8, 305, 316–18

    • product safety, and 292–3, 304

  • professional advice 210

• contingent valuation 256

• p. 502contracts law 30–31, 102–4, 168–9, 204, 344, 441

  • products liability 289–90, 318

• contribution actions 109–11

• contributory negligence

  • comparative negligence, and 46–77, 456–7

  • comparative negligence criticised 73–4

  • defence of 18, 19, 20, 21

  • economic performance 54–8

  • empirical studies 74–7

  • equivalence, comparative negligence and 58–9

  • incentives to take care 53–73

  • least-cost avoider, and 53–8

  • origins and development 48–52

    • rule criticised 49–50

  • relaxing assumptions 59–73

    • equilibrium, convergence to 72–3

    • evidentiary uncertainty and court error 59–66

    • heterogenous agents and parties 67–72

    • liability rules and revealing information 70–72

  • stochastic due care and losses 66–7

  • summary 77

• Cook, Philip 220, 222, 478

• Cooter, Robert 436

  • causation 83, 84, 85, 87, 88, 91, 97

  • contributory and comparative negligence 59–63, 66, 71, 77

  • damages 154–6, 158, 159, 163, 170, 174, 179–80

  • environmental liability 252

  • medical malpractice 362

  • non pecuniary loss 219

  • products liability 317, 319

  • punitive damages 166–7, 232, 234, 239

  • strict liability and negligence 7, 12, 15, 24

• copyright 234–5

• corporations and firms 146, 304–6, 379, 442

  • civil liability see vicarious

  • conduct 234, 236–7, 239, 253, 396–8, 401

  • crime see crime

  • liability

    • innovation and productivity, impact on 304–6

    • limited 139–40, 394, 396–8

    • managers, personal 144, 396–8

    • product safety, and 303–4

  • non-profit 139

• costs

  • accident 19–20, 22, 46, 84, 153, 174, 216

  • administrative 11, 153, 210, 453, 457–8, 470–71

    • causation, and 93, 97, 100, 104

    • damages, and 153, 163, 165, 168

    • liability insurance 379, 381–2, 384, 385–6, 391–2, 458

    • medical malpractice 347, 362

    • negligence, and 57, 59

    • no-fault compensation schemes 412–13

    • products liability 292

    • punitive damages 235

    • vicarious liability 143

  • care 14, 24–7, 29–30, 36, 56–7, 71–2

  • damage compensation, of 36

  • due care, of 36

  • enforcement 138

  • externalities 16

  • funeral 160, 161

  • information 309–10, 314, 417

  • innovation and production 304–5

  • litigation 24, 36, 57, 74, 297

    • damages, and 154–6, 179

    • economic loss, pure 203–4

    • joint and several liability 104, 115, 128

    • punitive damages 23, 240–41

    • vicarious liability 137

  • medical malpractice 346

  • mitigation 156

  • monitoring 136

  • preventions and precautions 4, 5, 12, 22, 241, 346, 391–2, 453

  • primary 153, 216–17, 225

  • secondary 153, 217, 225, 437

  • social and welfare 12, 13, 37, 93, 154, 346

  • strict liability, and 19

  • tertiary costs 153, 217, 225, 436–7

  • p. 503transaction 16, 30–31, 250–51, 347, 409–10, 480

    • harmonizing tort law 438, 441, 446–7

  • Courbage, C. 418

  • courts 409

    • due care level see under due care errors 13, 19, 56, 89–90, 93–4, 143, 252, 319, 380

      • damages 155, 159, 166–7, 171–2

      • evidentiary uncertainty, and 59–66, 77

      • punitive damages 230, 233

  • Cousy, H. 264

  • Cowell, J. 265

  • Coyte, Peter 342, 352, 357–8, 361

  • Craig, Andrew 305

  • Craswell, Richard 13, 91, 155, 319

    • harmonizing tort law 437, 440

    • punitive damages 232, 240

  • Crevier, Stephanie 63

  • crime and criminal liability 22, 385

    • corporate civil liability, and 145–7, 398

    • vicarious liability, and 134, 141–3

  • Croley, Steven 137, 164, 308, 381, 406

    • non pecuniary loss 216, 217, 220, 222–5

  • Cross, Gary 294

  • Crouch, Edmund 437

  • Cummins, J. David 307, 413, 476,

  • Curran, Christopher 17, 54, 58–60, 77

  • ‘customary practice test’ 263

  • customers see consumers 237, 240

• damage 3, 29–30, 255–7

• damages and compensation 12, 14, 37, 153–84

  • assessment of losses 159–60

  • basis of compensation 170–71

  • behavioral incentive, as 153, 155, 160, 165–6, 177, 178–9

  • chance, loss of 176–8

  • compensation mechanisms 267–9

  • compensatory 12

    • not perfectly 11–12, 21, 38

    • products liability, and 318–19

  • costs of 36

  • economic loss, pure 168–70

  • empirical research 181–2

  • environmental liability 255–7

  • fairness in 73

  • fatal accidents 160–63, 182

    • optimal amount

      • injurers should pay 160–61

      • relatives should receive 162–3

  • full compensation of harm 156–8

  • future 171–2, 182

  • harm equaling 229–31

  • indirect 411

  • limitation and moderation of 174–6

  • medical malpractice 344–5

  • mitigation of losses 173–4

  • multiple tortfeasors 178–80

  • no-fault compensation system 409, 411

  • non-pecuniary losses

    • compensation for 163–5

    • pecuniary losses, and 158–9

  • optimal see under punitive damages

  • over-compensation 3, 14–15, 37

    • deterrence and 8

  • principles, assessment of 182–3

  • punitive damages see punitive damages

  • secondary accident cost reduction 180–81

  • uncompensated losses 165–6

  • under-compensation 14–15, 21, 29, 30, 37, 97, 182, 417, 419

  • wealth of defendants 172–3

  • workers compensation 480–82

• dangerous

  • activities, abnormally 27, 34, 220, 398, 437–8

• see also catastrophic

• Danzon, Patricia 164, 318, 381, 412–13

  • empirics 463–4, 468, 472, 485, 489

  • medical malpractice 342–6, 351–2, 354–5, 357–61, 364

• D’Arge, R. 251

• Dari-Mattiacci, Guiseppe 16, 57, 95, 140, 435

  • damages 168, 169–70, 175, 176

  • economic loss, pure 203, 204, 205, 206, 207

• Daughety, Andrew 241, 295, 305, 319

• Davis, R. K. 256

• Dawar, N. 293

• De Bievre, A. F. M. 273

• p. 504De Geest, Gerrit 57, 175, 176

• De Smedt, K. 270

• decentralisation effect of strict liability and negligence 24–7

• deductibles see partial under insurance

• Dee, Thomas 478

• defective rationality 137

• defects see under products liability

• defences

  • comparative negligence rule 18–19, 38

  • contributory negligence 3, 18, 20, 38, 48–52

  • relative negligence 3, 20

• defensive medicine 354–6, 458, 472, 486–8

• Dehejia, Rajeev 413, 457, 476–8

• Delgado, Richard 94, 95

• delictual liability 344

• Demougin, Dominique 28–30

• Demsetz, H. 406

• Denmark 362

• Derrig, Richard 408, 413, 476

• design defects see product liability Designated Compensable Event 350, 364

• deterrence 8, 29, 37–8, 153, 210, 453–4

  • comparative negligence 73, 76

  • contracts and liability 30–31

  • corporations, and 146

  • damages, and 160, 162–3, 167, 177, 179

  • environmental liability 249, 252–3, 256–7, 259

  • errors, and 93–4

  • joint and several liability 118, 119–25

  • legal rules, of 13

  • liability insurance 308, 379–80, 382, 385–6

  • medical malpractice 344, 485

  • non pecuniary loss 220

  • punitive damages 228–31, 237–8, 468–9

  • over 13–15, 37, 146, 158, 259, 353–4

    • standard of care, changes in 262–3

  • strict liability 23

  • theory of 229–31

  • under 13–15, 29–30, 37–8, 94, 97, 146

    • damages, and 160

    • environmental liability 252–3, 256–7, 266

    • no-fault liability 413, 415, 418–20, 424–6

• development see innovation

• DeVille, Kenneth 342

• Devlin, Nancy 162

• Devlin, Rose 409, 412–13, 475–6, 489

• Dewar, Marvin 342

• Dewees, Nancy 181–2, 269, 302, 384–5

  • empirics 456, 484

  • no-fault compensation 410, 413

  • medical malpractice 342, 352–3, 355, 357–8, 361–3

• Dhankhar, Praveen 487

• Diamond, Peter 56, 238

• difference principle see partial liability

• Dionne, Georges 413

• disaster insurance and relief 267, 269

• disclosure 313–15

• Djamaludin, I. 295

• doctors see under consumers

• Dodge, Joseph 158

• Doherty, N. 267

• Donohue, John 488–9

• Dowdell, T. D. 303

• Drake, J. 256

• Dranove, David 486

• Dubay, Lisa 486–7

• Dubin, J. A. 272

• due care 6, 17

  • causation, and 89–91

  • costs of 36

  • courts, and 20, 25, 27, 36, 38

  • efficient standard of care 47, 54

  • experts 25

  • inducing 46

  • legal standards, uncertainty of 13–15

  • medical malpractice 351, 485

  • negligence 87

    • comparative 18–19, 54–8

    • contributory 54–8

  • public information 27

  • reasonable man 25–6, 47

  • socially optimal level see optimal level

  • standard of care 47–8, 58

    • changes in 262–3

  • stochastic, losses and 66–7

  • strict liability 10, 87–9

• p. 505Duff, David 181–2, 269, 302, 384–5, 456

  • no-fault compensation system 410, 413

  • medical malpractice 342, 352–3, 355, 357, 363,

• Duggan, Anthony 166

• Dunford, R. 272

• Dunn, Richard 465

• Dworkin, Ronald 23

• Eads, George 303

• Earnhart, D. 253, 262

• earnings, loss of see under loss

• Easterbrook, Frank 112, 379, 395, 398

• Eaton, Thomas 240, 465, 469

• Eckert, A. 253, 270

• economic loss, pure 8, 14, 168–70, 201–11, 435, 441

  • categories of cases 202–3

    • analysis of 209–11

  • definition 201

  • intentional versus negligent torts 209

  • justifications for 203–4

  • private versus social loss 204–6

  • products liability, and 318

  • professional advice cases 202–3, 210–11

  • public service, closure of cases 202, 210

  • ricochet loss cases 202, 209

  • strict liability versus negligence 207–9

  • transferred loss cases 202, 209–10

• economic rationale of insurance 377–84

• Edlin, Aaron 61

• efficiency equivalence theorem 19

• Efroymson, R. A. 256

• ‘eggshell skull’ doctrine 101 66

• Egon, Zehnder International 303, 305

• Eisen, Roland 377, 379, 388–9

• Eisenberg, Theodore 166, 228, 469

• Ekelund, R. B. 273

• Ellis, Dorsey 1, 232–3, 234

• empirics of tort 74–7, 453–90

  • cost-benefit analysis 488–90

  • empirical analysis, pre-requisites for 456–61

    • data 458–9

    • methods 459–61

    • variation 456–8

  • safety effects 473–88

    • automobile accidents 474–9

      • no-fault 474–7

      • other changes in liability rules 477

      • other safety measures 477–9

    • industrial accidents 479–82

      • workers compensation 480–82

    • medical malpractice 485–8

      • defensive medicine 486–8

    • products liability 482–5

      • asbestos 484–5

      • empirical findings 483–4

  • tort litigation system 461–71

    • administrative costs 470–71

    • base rate 462–3

    • claiming rate 463–5

    • disposition of claims 465–8

    • punitive damages 468–70

  • tort reform, effects of 471–3

• employment 236, 239

  • scope of and liability see vicarious

• Endres, Alfred 8, 18, 379, 389, 391

  • environmental liability 249, 251–3, 263–4, 266, 269

  • product liability 299, 301, 305

• England see United Kingdom

• Enron 145

• environmental liability 110–11, 182, 247–76

  • assessment of 274–6

  • compensation mechanisms 267–9

  • damage and damages 255–7

  • environmental federalism, and 269–70

  • goals 249

  • insurance of 263–7, 397–8, 399

    • adverse selection 265

    • causal uncertainty 266

    • compulsory 266–7

    • disaster 267

    • latency and retroactive liability 265, 396, 397

    • moral hazard 264–5

  • latency 261, 265

  • lenders and producers, liability of 260–61

  • marine oil pollution 268, 269, 272–4

  • p. 506moving beyond original polluter 257–61

    • causal uncertainty 257–8, 259

    • channelling of liability 260, 273

    • joint and several liability 258–60

  • negligence versus strict liability 252–3

  • nuclear risk 260, 268–9, 270–72

  • regulation

    • compliance and liability 254–5

    • criteria 253

    • influence on liability, and 253–5

    • liability and incentive based instruments 255

    • tort system, combined with 253–4

    • violation of regulation and liability 254

  • retroactive liability 261–3, 266

    • latency, and 265

  • standard of care, changes in 262–3

  • risks 35

  • vicarious liability, and 143

• Epple, D. 272, 290

• Epstein, Richard 85, 96, 104, 417, 422, 455

  • environmental liability 267, 269

  • medical malpractice 342–3, 349, 350, 365

  • products liability 297, 317

  • vicarious liability 136–7

• equilibrium, convergence to 72–3

• equivalence theorem 19

• errors 60, 347

• court see court

• Estep, E. 258, 272

• Europe 46, 51, 402, 485

  • economic loss, pure 201, 203, 209, 210

  • European Union 31, 270, 442

    • liability insurance 384, 393–4

    • product liability 287, 308–9, 318

  • tort law systems, harmonization and 438, 439–47

• Evans, William 221

• evidentiary

  • privileges 143

  • uncertainty and court error 59–66, 77

• excess and deductibles see under insurance

• ‘exclusionary rule’ 201, 207–9, 435

• exogenous solvency 124–5

• experts 25

• externalities 16, 88, 158, 163, 169, 295, 439

  • cross-border externalities 444–5

  • pollution 249–51

• Exxon Valdez 273

• fairness and joint liability 125–30

• ‘false positives’ and ‘false negatives’ 353–4, 364, 385, 464, 482

• Farber, Henry 342, 353–4, 465, 468

• Farber, Michael 94

• fatal accidents 352, 413, 415, 484

  • damages 160–63, 181–2,

  • products liability 287, 302, 304

• Faure, Michael 54, 95, 224, 402

  • damages 159, 174, 179

  • environmental liability 248, 251–2, 254, 257–8, 261, 263–4, 266–71, 273, 276

  • harmonizing tort law 435–6, 439–40, 442–3, 445

  • medical malpractice 342, 344–5, 347, 365

  • no-fault compensation schemes 417–19, 420, 422, 424, 426

  • products liability 315

• Fedtke, Jorg 436

• Fees, Eberhard 27, 259

• Feinstein, J. S. 270

• Feldman, Allan 156

• Feldman, Roger 342–3

• Feldthusen, Bruce 203, 413

• Felsteiner, William 461

• Fenn, Paul 261, 315, 418

• Ferguson, William 76, 77

• financial caps 256–7, 393–4, 399, 418–21, 424–6, 457–8, 473

• Finland 362, 411

• Finsinger, Jorg 9, 11, 268

• Fiore, K. 272

• firms see corporations

• first party insurance see under insurance

• Fischel, Daniel 144–6, 379, 395, 398

• Fischer, Charles 177

• Fishback, Price 480

• Flanigan, George 76, 77

• p. 507Fluet, Claude 28–30

• foreseeability

  • causation, and see under causation

  • contract law, in see under causation

  • tort law, in see under causation

• France 3, 51, 385, 412, 424, 435, 437, 441

  • medical malpractice 342, 344, 350–52, 362–4

  • see also medical malpractice

• Franklin, Marc 410

• Franzoni, Luigi 145

• Frasca, Ralph 176–7

• Fraser, Clive 164

• Frech, H. E, 318

• Freeman, P. 264

• Frey, B. S. 251

• Friedman, Daniel 63, 163–4, 167, 221

• Frontier Insurance Group 359

• Froot, Kenneth 307

• Frost, C. 249, 270

• Galanter, Marc 181, 455, 461

• Galligan, Thomas 233, 238

• Garber, Steven 303, 483

• Gardner, Steven 50

• Garoupa, Nuno 16, 95

• gatekeepers 139, 144–5

• see also professional advice

• Gaudry, Marc 413, 475

• Geistfeld, Mark 164

  • products liability 288, 295, 297–8, 308–9, 311, 314, 317–18

• Germany 3, 7, 51, 226, 344, 384, 435

• Gigerenzer, Gerd 35

• Gilead, Israel 435

• Gimpel-Hinteregger, M. 249

• Goldberg, Victor 178, 204, 273, 291

• Gollier, C. 269

• Gomez, Fernando 168–9, 204, 435

• Gotanda, John 228

• Government 139

• Gowda, R. 264

• Grabowski, Henry 409

• Grady, Mark 47, 85, 89–90, 101, 155

• Graf von der Schulenburg, J, 386, 388

• Graham, Daniel 164, 220, 222, 302–3, 305

• Grayston, Richard 474

• greater degree of blame exception 50

• Greene, William 461

• Greenwald, B. 355

• Grimaud, D. 264

• Gron, A. 269, 486

• Grossman, D. A. 276, 296

• Grossman, Michael 477–8

• guarantee funds 268

• Guppy, A. 35

• Haazen, Olav 441

• Haddock, David 17, 54, 58–60, 77, 234

• Hagen, Stuart 487

• Hamada, Koichi 289

• Hamdani, Assaf 139

• Hand, Learned 6, 32, 47–8, 351

• Haneman, W. M. 256

• Hankey, S. 265

• Hansmann, Henry 140, 396

• Hanson, John 164, 381, 406

  • non pecuniary losses 216, 217, 220, 222–5

  • products liability 292, 292–3, 308

• Hansson, I. 267

• harm, damages equaling 229–31

• harmonization see tort law

• Harrington, Scott 476

• Harris, Catherine 342, 351, 353, 465, 468

• Harrison, D. 256

• Hart, H.L.A. 83, 85

• Hartlief, T. 252, 267, 424, 437, 439, 442, 443

• Harvard Medical Practice study 341, 352, 353, 355, 459, 463

• Hausman, J. A. 256

• Havighurst, Clark 364

• Hay, Bruce 304, 318

• Hay, J. 273

• Hazen, O. A. 265

• Heal, Geoffrey 290

• health

  • damages, and 158

  • healthcare measures, value of 161–2

  • insurance see under insurance

  • medical malpractice see medical malpractice

  • risks 35

• hedonic price technique 155–6

• Hege, U. 259

• p. 508Heine, G. 273, 426

• Helland, Eric 182

• Hellwig, Martin 383, 386, 388, 390

• Henderson. James 288, 300, 312

• Hendrickx, Ruud 273, 274, 436

• Hensler, Deborah 181, 287, 316, 406, 459, 462

• Hersch, Joni 154, 303, 409

• Hershey, Nathan 354

• heterogenous agents and parties 67–72

• Heyes, A 248, 272

• Higgins, Richard 302, 457, 482, 484

• history of liability 3, 406, 456–8, 471

• Hoch, I. 256

• Hoerger, Thomas 468

• Hoffer, George 303

• Hogarth, H. R. 265

• Honore, Tony 83, 85, 86

• Housmann, Michael 354

• Hsieh, Chee Ruey 353

• Howells, Geraint 443

• Hu, J. 426

• Huber, Peter, 302

• human life, value of 160–63, 223–4

• Hurst, Ady 353

• Huybrechts, M. A. 426

• Hyde, C. E. 259

• Hylton, Keith 154, 167, 241, 254, 301

• Hyman, David 345, 352, 353, 354

  • medical malpractice 349

• Iceland 362

• immunity 143

• imperfectly competitive markets 290–91

• incentives to take care 53–73, 412, 415, 424, 473–88, 485–6

  • environmental liability 255, 269

  • liability insurance 389–90, 393–5

  • medical malpractice 344–5, 349–50

• see also behavioural incentives

• independent

  • contractors 139–49

  • probabilities 113–15

• industrial accidents see workers

• information 97, 101, 422

  • asymmetry 386–8, 390–91, 410, 485

  • concealing and liability 138, 142

  • consumers, and 291–3, 301, 309–11, 317, 468, 482–3

  • costs see under costs

  • insurance, for 263, 268

  • liability rules revealing 70–72

  • mechanisms in products markets 293–5

  • medical malpractice 346–7

    • patients 341

  • misleading, capital markets in 206

  • perfect information 56–8, 60, 72, 77

  • safety technologies 27–8, 38

  • warning defects 313–15

• see also preventions; safety

• Ingberman, Daniel 125, 175, 259, 261, 263

  • products liability 296, 312, 316

• innovation and productivity 304–6

  • induced innovation 305

  • research and development 305–6, 417, 483–4

• insolvency see solvency

• insurance 4, 12, 16, 21, 57, 97, 267, 453

  • automobile 412–13

  • bonus-malus 348

  • ‘claims made policy’ 265

  • co-insurance 348, 384, 426

  • compulsory 266–7, 299, 362, 397–8, 408, 421–2, 425–6

  • costs and warranty liability 297–8, 309

  • damages, and 158, 174, 180–81

  • disaster 267

  • efficient distribution, and 220–21

  • environmental liability 256, 263–7

  • excess and deductibles 348, 391–2

  • first party 12, 297–8, 402, 457

    • liability insurance 377, 381, 384–5

    • medical malpractice 345, 350–51

    • no-fault compensation system 406, 408, 410, 412, 421–2, 475

  • health 292–3, 297, 385

  • insolvency 268

  • joint and several liability 129–30

  • liability see liability insurance

  • ‘long tail risk’ 261, 265, 360

  • markets 19

  • medical malpractice 343, 345, 348–9, 350–51, 357–60, 486

  • non-pecuniary loss 163–4, 217, 220–23, 225

  • p. 509pain and suffering see pain and suffering

  • pecuniary loss 163

  • products liability 3, 225, 296–300, 305, 306–8, 315

  • punitive damages 241

  • re-insurance 384

  • risk aversion see under risk aversion

  • self 362, 379, 402, 408, 410, 423, 486

  • social 12

  • terrorism 307, 359

  • third party 73, 297–8, 350–51, 377, 410, 421–2

  • underwriting, and 359–60, 383

• see also compensation mechanisms

• Insurance Information Institute study 354

• intellectual property 170–71

• intentional harm or tort 3, 50, 143, 400

  • negligence, and 209

• interest 157, 360, 394, 458

• International Organization for

• Standardization 217

• Italy 342, 344, 438

• Jackson, Howell 145

• Jarrell, Gregg 303

• Jeffries, John 172, 239

• Johnson, Gary 12, 253, 254, 255

• Johnson, Joseph 76, 77

• Johnson, Rollin 305

• Johnson, William 406

• joint and several liability 109–30, 458

  • deterrence 118, 119–25

    • endogenous solvency 124–5

    • full solvency 120–22

      • negligence 120–21

      • strict liability 122

    • limited, exogenously determined solvency 122–3

  • environmental liability 258–60

  • fairness 125–30

  • insolvency, division of burden 128–9

  • insurance 129–30

  • legal regimes 10

  • litigation costs 128

  • plaintiff’s recovery

    • division of 126–7

    • size 126

  • settlements, effects of 112, 127–8

  • several only liability 112

  • two defendants, 113–17

    • effects of limited solvency 116–17

    • independent probabilities 113–15

    • more than 117–18

    • perfectly correlated probabilities 115

• joint tortfeasors, causal

  • apportionment see under

  • causation

• Jolls, Christine 35

• Jones, P. 317

• Jost, Peter 174, 266, 397

• judgment-proof

  • agents 143, 144, 146

  • tortfeasors 29–30, 38, 68, 97, 139, 175–6, 394, 421

• judicial moderation and damages 174–6

• Jung, M. 262

• juries 50, 60, 73, 74, 314, 318, 399, 467 469

• Kabler, Brent 413, 476

• Kaestner, Robert 486–7

• Kahan, Marcel 7, 26, 47, 90–91, 120

  • damages 155, 158, 159, 176, 241

• Kahneman, Daniel 292

• Kakalik, James 409, 410, 413, 470, 488–9

• Kalss, Susanne 207

• Kanning, Arnold 436

• Kaplow, Louis 172, 234, 438

  • causation 94, 101, 102,

  • environmental liability 261, 269

  • non pecuniary losses 221, 224,

  • products liability 315

• Kapp, W. 251

• Karpoff, Jonathan 147, 166, 470

• Karten, W. T. 264

• Katzman, M. 265, 266

• Kavanaugh, Karen 480

• Kaye, David 92, 98, 257

• Keeton, R. 406, 412,

• Keeton, W. P. 1, 83

• Kelman, Mark 98

• Kennedy, Duncan 437, 440

• Kerkmeester, Heico 257, 436

• p. 510Kessler, Daniel 306, 342, 356, 486–7

• Ketchum, L. 272

• Khan, M. Mahmud 487

• Khanna, V. S. 147

• Kim, Jeonghyun 58, 156

• King, Elizabeth 177

• Kirmani, A. 294

• Klee, Elizabeth 124, 125

• Kleffner, A. 267

• Klein, Benjamin 293, 466

• Klerman, Daniel 111, 112

• Klevorick, Alvin 306

• Klevorick, K. S. 412

• Klick, Jonathan 356, 486

• Knoll, Michael 157

• Kochanowski, Paul 413, 476

• Koenig, Thomas 469

• Kolstad, Charles 12, 253, 254, 255

• Kornhauser, Lewis 32

  • damages 178, 179

  • environmental liability 259, 260

  • joint and several liability 109–30

  • vicarious liability 135, 136

• Kotowitz, Yehnda 386

• Kotz, Hein 3, 177

• Kraakman, Reinier 396

  • vicarious liability 138, 140, 143, 144, 145

• Kramer, Larry

• vicarious liability 136, 137, 139, 143

• Krier, James 159

• Krueger, Alan 480

• Kruskal, William 98

• Krutilla, J. V. 256

• Kunreuther, H. 261, 264, 265, 267, 307

• Kysar, Douglas 292

• Landeo, Claudia 241

• Landes, Elizabeth 413

• Landes, William 4, 10, 32, 204, 216, 310, 342

  • causation 84–5, 87–90, 94, 96, 99, 101–2, 104

  • damages 154, 168, 175, 179

  • empirics 453, 455, 476, 488–9

  • environmental liability 256–7, 258

  • joint and several liability 112, 119

  • punitive damages 229, 234

• Langevoort, Donald 138

• Laroque, Francois 344

• Lasagna, Louis 305

• last clear chance doctrine 50

• latency 261, 265

• Latin, Howard 292, 314

• Laurent, C. 421

• law of large numbers 382–3, 400

• Lawrence, B. A. 287

• lawyers see gatekeepers

• least-cost avoider 53–8, 63–4, 84

• Leape, Lucian 463

• Lee, Han-Duck 473

• Leebron, David 396

• Leffler, Keith 293

• legal

  • aid 182

  • malpractice 178, 210

• Legrand, P. 444

• lenders and producers, liability of 260–61

• Levmore, Saul 92–3, 94

• Lewis, Christopher 307

• Lewis, Richard 171–2, 175, 261, 401

• liability insurance 377–402, 454

  • definition 377

  • compensation as purpose of 384–6

  • economic problems of 386–93

    • adverse selection 388–9

    • asymmetric information and imperfect insurance 386–8

    • moral hazard 389–93

      • incentives, destruction of 389–90

      • informational asymmetry 264, 390–91

      • insurance, partial 391–2

      • levels of activity 392–3

  • economic rationale of 377–84

    • demand for insurance 377–82

      • deterrence function, consequences of 379–80

      • insuring liability for fault 380–81

      • non-pecuniary losses 381–2

      • risk aversion 377–9

    • supply of insurance 382–4

      • pooling: law of large numbers 382–3

      • sub-division of risk 383–4

  • economic virtues of 393–8

    • alternative means 398

    • p. 511limited liability 393–8

      • activity levels 397

      • compulsory insurance 397–8

      • incentives to

        • take care 394–5

        • insure 395–7

    • impact, tort law on 401–2

    • limits of insurance: insurability elements of 399–400

      • flexible concept, as 400–401

  • Liang, Bryan 342

  • Liang, Lan 477

  • Libecap, G. D. 273

  • Lidgren, K. 261

  • Liedtke, P. M. 418

  • Likens, Thomas 477, 479

  • Lillard, Lee 468

  • limited liability 139–40, 393–8

  • Liston-Heyes, C. 272

  • Litan, Robert 302

  • litigation costs see under costs

  • Little, Joseph 73

  • Lloyds 383, 401

  • Localio, A. R. 464, 465, 487

  • Logue, Kyle 293

  • Lomas, O. 273

  • ‘long tail risk’ 261, 265, 360

  • Lopuci, Lynn 296, 394

  • loss 3

    • assessment of 159–60

    • chance, of 176–8

    • earnings and wages 157, 171

    • emotional and psychological 163, 233

    • future 171–2

    • income 161

    • life, of see human life

    • mitigation of 156–7, 173–4, 207

    • private 204–6, 206–7, 210

    • social welfare 157, 167, 168, 182, 210, 379, 389

      • private, and 204–6, 206–7

  • Lott, John 147, 166, 182, 470

  • Loughran, David 413, 477

  • Ludeke, A. 299

  • lump sum 171–2

  • Lund, Adrian 413, 476

• MacLeod, W. Bentley 139

• MacKay, Murray 303

• MacMinn, R. D. 306

• Magaddino, Joseph 413, 476

• Magat, Wesley 313

• Magnus, Ulrich 160, 170, 437, 440, 441, 442

• Mahshigian, L. 406

• Makdisi, J. 258

• Maler, K. G. 256

• Mankiw, N. Gregory 206

• Manning, Richard 182, 304, 483

• marine oil pollution 268, 269, 272–4, 425–7

• Marino, Anthony 95, 291

• Markesinis, Basile 342

• marketplace and transactions 167, 206, 209

  • constraints 139

  • damages, and 234–5, 240

  • imperfectly competitive 290–91

  • informational mechanisms in 292–5

  • products liability, and 288–9, 292, 298

  • structure, private and social loss and 206–7

• Marks, Stephen 90

• Martin, Robert 305

• Mary Carter agreements 112

• Mason, M. 426

• Mason, Robin 296

• mass exposure torts see under catastrophic

• Mast, Brent 477, 479

• Mattei, Ugo 436

• Mayers, David 379

• McAfee, D. 253, 270

• McChesney, Fred 234

• McClellan, Mark 342, 356

• McEwin, R. Ian 362, 475, 478

  • no fault compensation system 406, 409–11, 413–15, 421–2

• McGuire, E. Partrick 303

• McLeod, Bentley 342, 349

• McKeen, Roland 287, 291

• Meddler, F. 272

• Medical Adversity Insurance 364

• medical malpractice 178, 181, 238, 341–65, 462–8, 485–8

  • assessment 364–5

  • crisis, in 356–60

    • proposals to end 360–64

      • tort reforms 360–62

  • p. 512defensive medicine 354–6

  • definition 341, 342, 351, 353

  • insurance and underwriting 359–60

  • liability

    • development 342–3

    • economic analysis of 343–9

      • doctor-patient relationship 343–4

      • incentive and compensation 344–5

      • law and economics approach 346–7

      • tort law, regulation and insurance 347–9

  • negligence versus strict liability 349–51

  • no-fault compensation schemes 410–11

  • standard of care 351

  • tort system, relevance of 351–4

• Medoff, Marshall 413, 476

• Melamed, A. Douglas 234, 342, 438

• Mello, Michelle 342, 472, 486

• Merolla, A. Todd 296, 306

• Meszaros, J. 265

• Metzloff, Thomas 351, 353

• Miceli, Thomas 122, 155, 241

  • causation 85, 86, 99

  • damages 167, 172

  • negligence and strict liability 25, 26, 29

• Michelman, F. I. 251

• Miller, C. 258

• Miller, Dan 351, 359

• Mills, Don 459, 463

• minimum asset requirement 398

• Mishan, E. J. 251

  • mitigation of loss see under loss

• mobility, tort law as obstacle to 442–3

• moderation of damages 174–6

• monitoring see under precautions

• Monti, A. 249

• Moore, Michael 305, 481, 483

• moral hazard 264–5, 297, 348, 360, 381, 389–90, 397, 400, 481

• Moselly, R. 272

• Mueller, Marnie 343, 355,

• multiple

  • agents 136

  • parties see joint and several tortfeasors 32–3, 38, 178–80

• Murthy, D. N. P. 295

• Mustard, David 240, 469

• Nagel, Thomas 223

• Nash equilibrium 18, 22, 23, 64, 121

• National

  • Association of Insurance Commissioners 358

  • Health Service 344, 352

  • Institute for Clinical Excellence 162

• natural risks 406, 409, 422–3

• negligence

  • apportionment of 73

  • bilateral accidents see bilateral accidents

  • causation, and see under causation

  • comparative see comparative negligence

  • contributory see contributory negligence

  • costs 24

  • damages, and 154–6, 165–6, 176, 179–80

  • design defects see product liability due care see due care

  • economic loss, pure and 207–9

  • environmental liability 252–3

  • exclusionary rule 207

  • history 3

  • information generating consequence 27–8, 38

  • insurance 380–81

  • intentional, negligent torts and209

  • joint and several liability see under joint and several

  • judgment-proof tortfeasors 29–30, 38

  • liability, magnitude and scope 87

  • medical malpractice 349–51

  • products liability 300–301, 309–16

  • punitive damages 230

  • reasonable care see due care recovery rule 207

  • relative 3, 20, 21

  • strict liability, and 3–38

    • summary of 36–8

  • p. 513unilateral accidents see unilateral accidents

  • vicarious liability, and 134, 141–2, 142–4

• Nell, Martin 34

• Nelson, B. J. 256

• Net Environmental Benefit Analysis 256

• New Zealand 262, 406, 408, 411

  • universal no-fault system 413–16, 474–5

• Nichols, E. 270

• Nikitin, Maxim 241

• no-fault compensation system 262–4, 406–27, 436, 457, 474–7

  • advantages 409–11

    • higher compensation 409

    • lower

      • insurance premiums 410–11

      • transaction costs 409–10

  • automobile insurance 412–13

  • definition of 407–8

  • disadvantages 411–12

  • protection of victims, priority of 407–16

  • strict liability, and 416–22

  • universal no-fault system 413–16

• no-liability rule 6, 22

• Noll, Juergen 296

• Nollkaemper, A. 276

• non-legal sanctions see sanctions

• non pecuniary losses 3, 158–9, 160, 163–5, 215–26, 399

  • awards, risk of high 224–5

  • definition 215

  • insurance 381–2

  • justification for compensating 217–18

    • insurance

      • demand for 222–3

      • efficient distribution, and 220–21

      • no demand for 221

  • prevention 218–20

  • valuation 223–4

  • tort law and economics 216–17

• non-profit corporations 139

• Norway 362

• nuclear risk 260, 268, 269, 270–72, 421, 423–5

• Nussim, Jacob 159–60, 175

• Oates, Wallace 22, 251

• occupational diseases 182

• see also asbestos; workers O’Connell, Jeffrey 406, 410, 412, 413

• O’Connell, Paul 307

• Ogburn, Paul 353

• Ogus, A. 253–4, 344, 436–7, 439, 441, 444–5

• Ohl, C. 269

• Oi, Walter 299

• oil pollution see marine oil

• Olsen, Reed Neil 343

• ONIAM 364

• optimal damages see under punitive damages

• optimal level of care

  • causation, and 86–7, 94

  • contributory and comparative negligence 54–8

  • damages, and 12, 153–6, 158, 178, 179–80

  • economic loss, pure 207–9

  • environmental liability 255–7

  • medical malpractice 344–5, 346, 351

  • risk spreading 153

  • strict liability and negligence 6–10, 13, 16–31, 36–8, 417

  • vicarious liability see vicarious

• optimality condition 5, 11–12, 19–20

• optimistic behaviour 35–6, 38

• Orr, Daniel 19, 63–5

• Ostrom, Brian 471

• Ott, Claus 205, 263, 381, 436

  • damages 154, 156, 168, 171, 175

  • strict liability and negligence 5, 7, 15, 27

• over-compensation see under damages

• over-compliance and investment in care 13, 94, 472

• over-deterrence see under deterrence

• Owen, David 272, 310

• Pace, Nicholas 409, 470, 488–9

• pain and suffering 181, 233, 297, 318–19, 474

• Painter, Christopher 397

• Palmer, G. 406, 414, 415

• Palmer, Vernon 201, 202, 203, 209, 211, 435

• Panayotou, T. 262

• p. 514parasitic loss 201

• partial insurance see under insurance patients see under consumers

• Parisi, Francesco 140, 435

• Parker, Jeffrey 146

• Parkin, David 162

• partial liability 7, 26

• Pate-Cornell, M. E. 270

• Patell, James 157

• Pauly, Mark 9, 390

• pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses 158–9

• Peeples, Ralph 342, 351, 353

• Peirce, Ellen 164

• Peltzman, Sam 303

• perfect information see under information

• perfectly correlated probabilities 115, 120

• periodic payments 171–2

• pessimistic behaviour 35–6, 38

• Peterson, Mark 467

• PHICO 359

• Phillips, Richard 476

• Physicians Insurers Association of

• America 357

• Pigou, A. C. 22, 250

• Pinna, Andrea 363, 438

• Png, I. P. L. 241

• Polborn, Mattias 397

• Polinsky, A. Mitchell 13

  • damages 154, 156, 159, 164, 170, 172

  • joint and several liability 112, 141, 144

  • medical malpractice 342, 349

  • punitive damages 166, 167, 232–3, 236, 238, 239–41, 469

  • products liability 300, 318, 319

  • vicarious liability 136, 141, 144

• pollution see environmental

• Pomata, Gianna 342

• Pommerehne, W. W. 256

• pooling of risks 382–3

• Popp, David 305

• Porat, Ariel 96, 99, 100, 158, 179–80

• Porrini, D. 254, 261

• Posner, Eric 136, 139, 161, 162, 163

• Posner, Richard 204, 310, 406

  • causation 84–5, 87–90, 94, 96, 99, 101–2, 104

  • contributory and comparative negligence 49, 53, 56, 57

  • damages 154, 156, 168, 175, 179

  • empirics 453, 455

  • environmental liability 251, 256–7, 258

  • joint and several liability 112, 119

  • medical malpractice 342, 346, 349

  • non pecuniary loss 216, 219, 221

  • punitive damages 229, 232, 234

  • strict liability and negligence 4, 6, 7, 10, 27, 32, 37

• Pozzo, B. 252

• precautions and preventions 7–10, 11, 19, 21, 47, 386, 390

  • contributory negligence, and 49, 60

  • costs of see under costs

  • damages 159

    • equaling harm 229–31

  • economic loss, pure and 206, 207–9

  • environmental liability 259, 264

  • level of 229–31

  • monitoring and regulating 220, 259, 390–91, 396

    • vicarious liability, and 136–44, 146

  • non pecuniary loss 216, 218–20

  • products, in 146

  • standard of care, changes in 262–3

• see also information; safety

• premiums 357–60, 410–11, 415, 422, 438, 472–3

  • liability insurance 378, 384, 386–9, 400–401

• Price, L. J. 293

• Priest, George 3, 164, 222, 241, 381, 406

  • empirics 456–7, 466, 471

  • environmental liability 265, 267, 269

  • no-fault compensation schemes 410, 422

  • products liability 287, 290, 297, 301–4, 306

• primary costs 153, 216–17, 225

• Prince, David 303

• principals and agents see agents; vicarious

• private loss see under loss

• privilege 143

• p. 515producers and lenders, liability of 260–61

  • limited 139–40

• productivity and innovation 304–6

• products liability 63, 182, 225, 240, 287–320, 482–5

  • bystander injuries 317–18

  • consumer information about product risk 291–2

  • contracting and tort liability, efficiency properties of 289–90

  • damages

    • compensatory 318–19

    • punitive 319–20

  • defects

    • construction and manufacturing 310–11

    • design 311–12

    • requirement of 309–10

    • warning 313–15

  • doctrines of 308–20

  • empirics, liability and product safety on 301–4

  • European Union Directive 393–4

  • harmonization of laws 443–5

  • informational mechanisms in product markets 292–5

  • imperfectly competitive markets 290–91

  • innovation and productivity, impact of liability on 304–6

  • insurance 3, 385, 396, 482–5

    • costs and warranty liability 297–8

    • market for 306–8

    • regulatory problem 298–300

  • liability 315–16

    • enforceability of contractual waivers of 316–17

    • extended seller 315–16

  • negligence, and 31–2

  • product safety, consumers undervaluing 292–3

  • purpose 287–9

  • regulatory problem 298–300

  • strict liability 3, 31–2, 457

    • negligence, and, choice between 300–301

  • warranties 295–6

    • insurance costs and warranty liability 297–8

• professional

  • advice cases 202–3, 210–11

  • liability see chance under loss

• proof 29–30

• proportional liability rule see under causation

• prospective

  • causation see under causation

  • overruling 263

• Protection and Indemnity Clubs 268, 273, 426

• proximate cause 83–4

• see also causation

• public

  • compensation mechanism see

  • compensation mechanism information on safety technology 27–8, 38

  • service, closure of cases 202, 210

• Puelz, Robert 473

• punishment 228, 235, 238, 239, 385

• punitive damages 3, 12, 158, 166–8, 175, 182, 228–41

  • damages equaling harm 229–31

  • definition 228

  • deterrence, theory of 229–31

  • empirics 468–70

  • insurability 241, 399

  • litigation costs 240–41

  • optimal damages 237–8

    • harm underestimated, and 232–3

    • injurers escaping liability, and 231–2

    • marketplace, transacting and bargaining in, and 234–5

    • punishment, and 235–7, 239

    • socially illicit gains, and 233–4

  • products liability, and 319–20

  • reprehensible conduct 238

  • tax treatment 241

  • victims, strangers or customers as 240

  • wealth 239

• Quality Adjusted Life Years 161–2

• Querner, Immo 18

• Qian, Yingy 142

• race to the bottom 445–6

• Rachlinski, Jeffrey 437

• p. 516Radetzki, M. and M. 269

• Randow, von Philipp 11

• Rao, A. 294

• Rapp, Geoffrey 472,

• Rassmussen, David 477, 479

• rational choice, behavioural assumptions of 35–6

• Raviv, Artur 290

• Rawls, John 223

• Rea, Samuel 67–70, 77, 171, 381

• reasonable care see due care

• recovery see recovery under joint and several

  • plaintiffs 126–8

  • rule 207, 208

• regulating see monitoring under precautions

• regulation 253–5, 298–300, 317, 347–9, 398, 443, 485

• see also safety

• Rehme, D. 251

• Reilly, Bridget 50, 76, 457, 465, 476–8

• Reinganum, Jennifer 241, 295, 305, 319

• re-insurance see under insurance

• relative negligence see under negligence relatives 160, 162–3

• remoteness test 102–3

• reprehensible conduct 236, 238

• research and development see innovation

• retroactive liability 261–3, 265, 266

• retrospective causation see under

• causation

• Reuter, Peter 303

• Revesz, Richard 109–30, 178, 179, 224, 248

  • environmental liability 259, 260, 268

• Reynolds, R. A. 355

• Rhoads, T. A. 251

• Richter, Andreas 34

• ricochet loss cases 202, 209

• right of contribution see contribution

• Riley, John 293

• Ringleb, Al 124, 296, 306

• risk

  • allocation of 33–5, 73

  • aversion 33–5, 135–6, 141, 180, 398, 401, 453

    • insurance, and 163, 174, 220–21, 239, 297, 377–80, 389, 392

    • based liability and safety regulation 96–7

• ‘risk utility test’ 32, 310, 311, 313, 314

• Rizzo, Mario 168, 257, 435

  • causation 86, 87, 98, 100

  • economic loss, pure 204, 205,

• Roberts, Karen 481

• Robinette, Christopher 51, 73, 76–7

• Robinson, Glen 94, 96, 258

• Rock, Steven 487

• Roe, Mark 97

• Rogers, W. V. Horton 134, 215, 217, 224

• Rogerson, William 293, 294

• Rogge, J. 265

• ‘role-type uncertainty’ 156

• Rolph, John 411

• Rose-Ackerman, Susan 22, 95, 98, 254, 255

• Rosenberg, David 27, 37, 93, 94, 257

• Rosenblatt, Roger 353

• Rossato, Andrea 436

• Rothschild, Michael 388

• Rothwell, G.S. 272

• Rowley, C. K. 272

• Rubin, Paul 225, 303–4, 317–18, 455, 458, 483–4

• Rubinfeld, Daniel 319

  • damages 154, 156, 165

  • environmental liability 256

  • negligence 52, 56, 70–72, 77

    • strict liability, and 19, 25

• Ruegg, M. 254

• Ruhm, Cristopher 477, 478

• Ruiz, Juan 168, 169, 204, 435

• rule of no liability 6, 17, 31

• Rundshagen, B. 269

• Ruser, John 480, 481

• Rustad, Michael 319

• Ruttan, Vernon 305

• safety 50, 57, 137, 301–6, 349, 390, 411, 413

  • products liability 289–95, 296, 297, 301, 484–5

  • regulation 254, 267, 417, 420–21, 423–4, 454–6, 477–9

    • risk-based liability, and 96–7, 220

• see also information; preventions

• Saffer, Henry 477, 478

• p. 517Sage, William 342, 354, 359, 360, 486

• Saks, Michael 455, 458, 461

• Samuelson, P. A. 383

• Sanchirico, Chris 165, 172

• sanctions and enforcement 143, 147, 239, 419

  • non-legal 158

  • private 138, 141, 237

• Sappington, David 175, 261

• Sarat, Austin 461

• satisfaction 3

• Schafer, Hans-Bernd 263, 381, 435–6

  • damages 154, 156, 167, 168, 169, 171, 177

  • economic loss, pure 203, 204, 205, 207

  • strict liability and negligence 5, 7, 15, 27

• Schauffler, Richard 465, 471

• Schelling, Thomas 224

• Schenzler, Christoph 50, 76, 457, 465, 476–8

• Schlanger, Margo 162

• Schmitt, Joan 473

• Schmitz, P. W. 254

• Schmookler, Jacob 305

• Schulze, W. 251

• Schwab, Stewart 15

• Schwartz, Alan 292, 295, 312, 317, 320, 381

• Schwartz, Gary 3, 57–8, 406

  • economic loss, pure 201

  • empirics 454, 455, 456, 457, 489

  • environmental liability 249, 252, 255

  • non pecuniary loss 222

  • products liability 303

  • vicarious liability 137

• Schwartz, Victor 406

• Schwartze, Raimund 264, 266, 267, 379, 389, 391,

• Schweizer, Urs 206, 207

• Sclar, David 354

• scope of liability 87

• secondary

  • accident cost reduction 180–81

  • costs see under costs

  • liability, strict see vicarious

• Segerson, Kathleen 29, 99, 122, 124, 172, 261

• self-insurance see under insurance

  • regulation 348

  • selection effect 24–7

• Sen, Amartya 223

• set-off110, 118

• Settle, C. T. M. Hurley 248

• settlements 110–18, 127–8, 182

• several only liability 112

• Shanley, Michael 467

• Shapiro, Carl 293

• shareholders and investors 139–40, 231, 237, 262, 379, 396–7, 398

• Shavell, Steven 112, 204, 438, 453

  • causation 54, 58–9, 85–91, 93–5, 97, 100–104

  • damages 154–60, 163–4, 168, 170, 172–5, 178–9, 180–81

  • environmental liability 251–4, 257, 262, 264, 266

  • medical malpractice 342, 345, 346, 347, 349

  • no-fault compensation system 409, 412, 417, 420, 421

  • non-pecuniary loss 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224

  • products liability 289, 300, 301, 310, 315, 318, 319

  • punitive damages 166, 167, 229, 232–4, 236, 238–41

  • strict liability and negligence 5, 10, 11, 13, 15, 22

  • tort law and liability insurance 377, 379–82, 384, 386, 389, 392, 394–8

  • vicarious liability 135, 136, 137, 141, 142

• Shepherd, George 306

• Shepherd, Joanna 225, 304, 458, 484

• Sher, Noam 349

• Sherland, Paul 51, 73, 76–7

• Shogren, J. F. 251

• Shukaitis, Marc 163

• Sigman, Hilary 117, 118, 249, 259, 261

• Silver, Charles 345, 352, 353, 354

• Simon, Marilyn 301

• Singh, Ram 158, 159

• Skogh, Goran 397, 418, 424

  • environmental liability 251, 261, 266, 267, 268, 271

• p. 518Sloan, Frank 303, 413

  • empirics 457, 465, 468, 473, 476–8, 485, 487

  • medical malpractice 349, 353, 356, 358

  • negligence 50, 76

• Slovic, Paul 267, 437

• Smith, Adam 218

• Smith, Clifford 379

• Smith, Michael 379

• Smith, R. T. 253, 270

• Smith, Steven 465

• Smits, Jan 436, 440, 442, 444, 445, 447

• social

  • costs see under costs

  • loss see under loss

  • welfare 33–4, 123, 172, 180, 206–7, 264, 439

    • effects of liability regimes 4, 33–5

    • illicit gains 167, 233–4

    • medical malpractice 344–5, 346

    • products liability 306, 316

• socially optimal level of care see optimal level

• solvency and insolvency 109, 112, 347, 418, 421–2

  • damages, and 174–6, 179, 397

  • environmental liability 252, 253, 259, 268

  • joint and several liability 116–17, 119–25, 120–26

  • vicarious liability 135, 136

• Spelman, William 461

• Spence, A. 291

• Spence, Michael 388, 482

• Spiegel, Menahem 234

• Spier, Jaap 98, 120, 203, 265, 276, 441

• Spier, Kathryn 318

• Spulber, Daniel 289, 291

• Stahel, W. R. 264

• Staiger, B. 249, 251, 252

• standard of care see due care

• Stein, Alex 96, 99

• Stewart, R 248, 268

• Stiglitz, Joseph 388

• stochastic due care and losses 66–7

• stock value 303–4

• Stone, Robert 305

• Stool, H. 228

• Stout, Emily 477

• Stout, Lynn 407

• St-Paul Travelers Companies 359

• Stratmann, Thomas 356, 486

• strict liability 402, 457

  • accidents see accidents; bilateral;

  • unilateral

  • causation, and see under causation

  • costs 24

  • damages, and 155–6, 165–6, 176, 178, 180

  • defences see defences

  • design defects see product liability

  • economic loss, pure and 207–9

  • environmental liability 252–3

  • exclusionary rule 207, 208

  • information 27, 38

  • insurance 380

  • joint and several liability see under joint and several

  • judgment-proof tortfeasor 29–30

  • liability, magnitude and scope of87

  • medical malpractice 349–51

  • negligence, and 3–38

    • summary of 36–8

  • no-fault compensation system, and 416–18

  • products liability 3, 31–2, 300–301, 308–11, 314–18

  • punitive damages, and 229–30

  • rule of 10–13

  • vicarious liability, and see vicarious

• Studdert, David 353, 409

  • empirics 459, 463–5, 468, 470, 472

• subdivision of risk 383–4

• Sudman, Michael 50

• Sugarman, Stephen 128

• Summers, John 175

• Sunstein, Cass 35, 161, 162, 163, 437

• superfund 249, 258, 259–60, 261, 266, 268, 275

• Suurmond, Guido 221

• Swan, Peter 413, 415, 475, 478

• Swazey, Judith 305

• Sweden 362, 363, 364, 411

• Switzerland 344

• Sykes, Alan

  • environmental liability 269

  • vicarious liability 135, 136, 137, 139, 142–6

• p. 519Tabbach, Avraham 159–60, 175

• Tabarrok, Alexander 182

• Takaoka, Sumiko 303, 305

• Takeda, Keith 110, 117, 118

• Talarico, Susette 240–41, 465, 469

• Tancredi, Laurence 364

• Taragin, Mark 353, 465, 468

• Tauchen, George 478

• taxes and tax laws 145, 157, 165, 172–3, 206, 241

  • environmental liability 254

    • Pigovian taxes 250

• ‘technological advancement test’ 263

• Teitelbaum, Joshua 35, 36

• terrorism 307, 359, 406, 409, 422–3

• tertiary costs see under costs

• Thaler, Richard 35

• ‘thin skull plaintiff rule’ 157

• third party

  • defendant 110

  • insurance see under insurance

• Thirtle, Colin 305

• Thomas, Eric 459, 463

• Thorpe, Kenneth, 357–8, 360, 361, 410, 473

• threshold

  • liability 258

  • probability rules see under causation

• Tiebout, Charles 439

• Tietenberg, T. 119, 179, 259

• Tillinghast-Towers Perrin 217, 459, 470–71

• Tirole, Jean 293

• Tol, R. S. J. 276

• tort law, harmonizing 435–47

  • cross-border externalities 444–5

  • domestic preferences 436–8

    • market for tort law systems 438–9

  • economic analysis and harmonization 440–41

  • European tort law systems, differences in 439–47

  • mobility, tort law as obstacle to 442–3

  • race to the bottom 445–6

  • regulatory competition 443–4

  • transaction costs, reduction of 446–7

• tort litigation system 461–71, 471–3

• transaction costs see under costs

• transferred loss cases 202, 209–10

• Trebilock, Michael 129–30, 181–2, 456

  • environmental liability 252–3, 260, 269, 271

  • liability insurance 384–5, 402, medical malpractice 342, 345, 352–3, 355, 357–8, 361–3

  • no-fault compensation system 406, 410, 412, 413, 417

  • products liability 302, 307

• Tribe, B. 258

• trilateral precaution accidents 208–9

• Tuckman, Bruce 241

• Tunc, A. 406, 412

• Tussing, A. Dale 487

• Twerski, Aaron 300, 312

• Ulen, Thomas 97, 219, 362, 436

  • contributory and comparative negligence 59–63, 66, 71, 77

  • damages 154, 155, 156, 159, 174

  • environmental liability 253, 254, 255

  • strict liability and negligence 7, 12, 15, 24

• uncertainty 24, 156, 252–3, 307–8, 453

  • causation, over 91–3, 96, 97, 176–7, 266, 272

    • environmental liability 257–8, 259

• under-

  • compensation see under damages

  • compliance and investment in care 13, 95

  • deterrence see under deterrence

  • investment 88–9

  • writers see gatekeepers; see under insurance

• unilateral accidents 5–15, 16, 36–8, 47–8, 349, 409

  • damages, and 154–5, 164

  • economic loss, and 207–8

  • environmental liability 252–3

  • legal standards of due care 13–15, 20

  • negligence 6–7

    • relaxing assumptions 7–10

  • non pecuniary loss 219

  • punitive damages 235

  • rule of no liability 6

  • strict liability 10, 20–22

    • relaxing assumptions 10–13

    • rule of 10–13

• unilateral care 63–5

• p. 520United Kingdom 3, 49, 51, 134, 211, 385, 437

  • medical malpractice 342, 344, 352, 357

  • see also medical malpractice

• United States 3, 46, 408

  • automobile accidents 412–13, 474–7

  • see also automobile

  • catastrophic risks 92, 423

  • see also catastrophic

  • compensation 157, 161, 171, 224, 225

  • see also damages

  • contributory and comparative negligence 49, 50, 51–2, 77

  • see also contributory negligence

  • corporate crime 134, 143, 145, 146

  • see also corporations; crime

  • data 458–9

  • Department of Transportation 413

  • economic loss, pure 201, 209

  • see also economic loss

  • empirics 455–8, 461–73, 480, 484–9

  • see also empirics

  • environmental liability 110–11, 253, 256, 261, 266

    • nuclear risk 269, 271–2, 276

    • oil pollution 272–3

  • see also environmental liability; marine oil; nuclear

    • insurance 224–5, 226, 385

  • see also insurance

  • juries, role of 74

  • see also juries

  • medical malpractice 342–3, 351–9, 361, 362

  • see also medical malpractice

  • products liability 287–8, 294, 296, 304, 306–10, 314, 318, 320

  • see also products liability

  • punitive damages 3, 228

  • see also punitive damages

  • standard of care 48

  • see also due care

  • vicarious liability 134

  • see also vicarious

• valuation

  • contingent 256

  • environmental damage 255–7

  • human life of see human life

• Value of a Statistical Life 161, 162, 224, 226

  • Year 161–2

• Van Aaken, Anne 167

• Van Boom, William 363, 438, 440

• Van Dam, Cees 51

• Van Damme, K. N. 426

• Van den Bergh, Roger 174, 266, 271, 424, 439–46,

• Van den Borre, T. 260, 271–2

• Van Egteren, H. 253, 270

• Van Mieghem, E. 272

• Van Randow, Philipp 219

• van Velthoven, Ben 221, 406, 413

• Van Wijck, Peter 158

• Venezian, E. C. 307

• van’t Veld, Klaus 306

• Veljanovski, Cento 342, 345

• Verheij, A. 248, 273

• Verheyen, R. 276

• Vertinsky, Ilan 437

• vicarious liability and corporate civil liability 27–8, 38, 134–47

  • alternative liability targets 144–5

    • gatekeepers 144

    • personal liability 144

  • criminal liability, and 145–7

  • definition 134

  • factors militating against 137–40

  • negligence and composite regimes 142–4

  • principal and agent liability, interaction between 140–42

  • standard case for 135–7

• Viney, Genevieve 342

• Viscusi, W. Kip 265, 361, 399, 437, 471, 473, 481, 483

  • damages 154, 161, 181

  • economic loss, pure 217, 221, 223–5

  • no-fault compensation schemes 409, 410

  • products liability 303, 305, 307–8, 310, 313, 319–20

• Visscher, Louis 166, 174, 272, 436, 440, 442–6

• Von Bar, Christian 51

• Von Weizsacker, Carl 206

• p. 521wages see under loss

• Wagner, Gerhard 437, 439–41

  • environmental liability 249, 266–7

  • liability insurance 386, 396, 398–9, 402

• Wagner, Wendy 315

• Waidmann, Timothy 486–7

• Waldman, Steven 313

• Wang, H. 273, 426

• warranties 295–8

• Watts, Alison 124

• wealth

  • defendants, of 171–2

  • injurers 239

    • lower than damage 29–30, 38

• Weber, Nathan 303

• Wehrung, Donald 437

• Weil, Roman 157

• Weinstein, Neil 35, 162

• Weir, Tony 203

• Weisbach, David 172

• Weiss, Mary 413, 476

• welfare effects of liability regimes see under social welfare

• Wheeler, Malcolm 146

• Whetten-Goldstein, Kathryn 477, 479

• Whinston, Michael 206

• White, G. 267

• White, Michelle 19, 457

  • empirics 468, 477, 484–5

  • medical malpractice 342, 352, 353, 354

  • negligence 67, 73, 74–5

• Wickelgren, Abraham 298

• Wiggins, Steven 124, 273, 296, 306

• Wildavsky, A. 270

• Wilde, Louis 295

• Wilkins, David 145

• Wilkinson, James 478

• Wilson, Charles 388

• Wilson, Richard 437

• Winkler, Daniel 76, 77

• Winter, Jan Kees 158, 260, 271

• Winter, Ralph 307

• Witt, Robert 379

• Wittman, Donald 17, 63, 72–3, 74, 99

  • damages 156, 170, 173

  • environmental liability 253

• Wohlschlegel, Ansgar 27

• Wojtowycz, Martha 487

• Wolinsky, Asher 294

• Wolson, Mark 157

• Woodhouse Royal Commission Report 414

• workers and workplaces 136, 182, 352, 362, 406, 456–7, 479–82

  • asbestos claims see asbestos

• Worldcom 145

• Worrall, John 480, 481

• Wren, J. 426

• Wright, Richard 89, 119, 125–6

• Yahya, M. 124, 125

• Yoon, Albert 472

• Young, Douglas 477, 479

• Young, Madelyn 413, 476

• Young, Robert 99

• Yun, John 167, 319

• Zador, Paul 413, 476

• Zeckhauser, R. 264

• Zelizer, Viviana 222

• Zervogianni, Eleni 153, 159

• Zolt, Eric 241

• Zuckerman, Stephen 355, 358, 410, 473,

• Zweifel, Peter 377, 379, 388, 389

• Zweigert, Konrad 3