Encyclopedia of Law and Economics
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Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

Edited by Gerrit De Geest

The second, expanded edition of the acclaimed Encyclopedia represents a major update of the most authoritative reference work in the field of law and economics and the nine print volumes are now released online as a single integrated product. The Encyclopedia provides balanced and comprehensive coverage of the major domain in law and economics, including: criminal law, regulation, property law, contract law, tort law, labor and employment law, antitrust law, procedural law, and the production of legal rules. Each theme or volume is overseen by a leading scholar and each of the 166 entries is prepared by an expert in the field, providing an in-depth and authoritative overview of the individual topic, combined with an exhaustive bibliography, allowing users to access and filter the entire corpus of literature in law and economics. As with the print edition, the Encyclopedia is unique in serving both as an entry point and a platform for advanced research. The online edition is enhanced with Elgaronline’s powerful search tools, facilitating the search for key terms across the entire Encyclopedia, whilst the browse function allows users to move seamlessly between the volumes. These elements combine to create a powerful research tool for any researcher or scholar in the field of law and economics.

Encyclopedia

eISBN:
9781782547457
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781782547457
Pages:
4579
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Index: Index

Encyclopedia Chapter

Category:
Encyclopedia Chapter
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781849805285.00018
Copyright:
© The Editor and Contributors Severally 2009-2017
Subjects: Economics and Finance, Law - Academic, Law and Economics

[In: Volume 4, Keith N. Hylton (ed) Antitrust Law and Economics]

  • 3M Co. v. LePage’s Inc. 203
  • 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy 41
  • AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd 163–164
  • Abbott, Alden F. 183–212
  • Adelman, M. 119
  • Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc. 162, 175–176
  • Albrecht v. Herald Tribune 217
  • Alcoa (United States v. Alum. Co. of America) 74, 79, 85–86, 87, 88, 105, 108
  • American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States 41
  • American Federation of Tobacco Growers v. Neal 106
  • American Sugar Refining Company 125
  • American Tobacco Co. v. United States 39, 79, 126
  • Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Goodman 41
  • antitrust analysis of exclusive dealing see exclusive dealing and tying arrangements, antitrust analysis of
  • antitrust enforcement, economics of 1–22
    • and allocative efficiency 2
    • Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp. 19
    • Ashley Creek Phosphate Co. v. Chevron USA, Inc. 20
    • Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters 19
    • Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 16, 17
    • Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures 20
    • Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System 19
    • Brunswick Corp v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. 12
    • California v. ARC America Corp. 13
    • and cartel collusion 7–9, 13, 15
    • ‘cease and desist’ orders 9
    • consent decrees 9–10
    • and consumer welfare 2, 6, 11–16
    • criminal or civil enforcement ratio 7–9
    • and customer standing to sue 13
    • damages and concealment of anticompetitive behavior 15
    • damages rules 14–16
    • and deterrence 2, 14–16
    • ‘direct injury’ rule 12–13
    • and direct purchaser 13–14
    • enforcement goals 2–5
    • false negatives, inclination towards 4–5
    • false positives, costs of 4, 7, 8
    • false positives, jurors over-inclusion of 4
    • federal or state enforcement 6–7
    • and firm-specific control 3, 12, 13–14
    • Hanover Shoe Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. 13–14
    • Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. 18
    • Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corporation 19
    • Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois 13–14
    • incarceration, incidence of 9
    • injunctions and administrative solutions 9–11
    • Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 17
    • merger review 10–11
    • MindGames, Inc. v. Western Publ’g Co. 20
    • and new entrants 16
    • overdeterrence and underdeterrence 3–5, 7, 8
    • ‘Paramount decrees’ 9
    • and patent pools 11
    • price fixing 7–9, 13, 15
    • private enforcement 11–16
    • public enforcement 5–11
    • rate-setting proceedings and consent decrees 10
    • Six West Retail Acquisition, Inc. v. Sony Theatre Management Corp. 19
    • Swift & Co. v. United States 19
    • United States v. Broadcast Music, Inc. 19
  • p. 282antitrust, monopoly power in see monopoly power in antitrust, economics of
  • antitrust and patent litigation 270–272, 278–279
  • Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp. 19
  • Aoki, R. 172, 180
  • Areeda, P. 84, 86, 107, 108, 109, 130–132, 139, 141, 145, 146, 149, 150, 151, 162, 169, 171, 172, 175, 176, 178, 179, 193, 206
  • Ashley Creek Phosphate Co. v. Chevron USA, Inc. 20
  • Asker, J. 198
  • Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. 86–87, 108, 109, 160, 161, 162
  • Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters 19
  • Associated Press v. United States 53, 61–62, 99, 159, 160, 175
  • Attheraces Ltd v. British Horseracing Board Ltd. 167, 179
  • In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig. 39
  • Cabral, L. 124
  • California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. 41
  • California v. ARC America Corp. 13
  • Canterbury Liquors & Pantry v. Sullivan 41
  • Carbajo, J. 204
  • Cardi, W. 19
  • Carlton, D. 29, 32, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 79, 149, 201, 203, 204, 205, 207
  • Carruthers, Celeste K. 64–81
  • Carstensen, P. 231
  • Cascade Health Solutions v. Peace Health 148–149, 203
  • Cass, R. 89, 97, 108, 109, 111
  • Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc. 30–31, 32, 34
  • Caves, R. 275
  • p. 283 CDC Techs., Inc. IDEXX Labs, Inc. 207
  • Cement Mfrs. Protective Assn. v. United States 41
  • Chamberlin, E. 38
  • Chen, A. 230
  • In re Citric Acid Litig. 42
  • City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc. 39, 40
  • Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst. 38, 40
  • Clark, J. 92
  • Coase, R. 60
  • Coca-Cola v. Harmar 200
  • Commercial Solvents 163
  • Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp. 144, 199, 207
  • Consten and Grundig v. Commission 231
  • Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. 39
  • Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. 217
  • Cooper, D. 125, 130, 131
  • Cooper, J. 111, 205
  • Cooper, T. 37
  • Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp. 37
  • Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Maleng 41
  • Cotter, Thomas F. 109, 157–182
  • Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atlantic Corp. 109
  • Cowling, K. 252
  • Crane, Daniel A. 1–22, 130
  • Dansby, R. 252
  • Darcy v. Allen 84
  • DeBow, M. 18
  • Deesen v. Professional Golfers’ Association (PGA) 50, 61
  • DeGraba, P. 204
  • Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp. 202
  • Demsetz, H. 253
  • Deneckere, R. 221
  • Deng, F. 107
  • Denger, M. 141
  • DeSanti, S. 38
  • Devlin, A. 38
  • Dick, A. 38, 255
  • Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, Co. 216–217, 218, 220, 222, 225
  • Duplan Corp. v. Deering Miliken, Inc. 275
  • E. Bement & Sons v. National Harrow Co. 230
  • Eagles, I. 167, 177
  • Easley, D. 122
  • Easterbrook, F. 19, 89, 102, 117, 118–119, 125, 126, 129, 130, 134, 139
  • Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Association v. United States 32–33, 60
  • Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services 79, 108
  • Eckhard, W. 20
  • Edlin, A. 133
  • E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC (Ethyl) 33
  • El Aguila Food Products v. Gruma 200
  • Elhauge, E. 90, 98, 133, 145, 146
  • Elzinga, K. 40, 119, 125, 141
  • Encaoua, D. 252
  • England, Darcy v. Allen 84
  • Epstein, R. 9, 18, 108
  • essential facilities doctrine 157–182
    • AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd 163–164
    • Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc. 162, 175–176
    • Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. 160, 161, 162
    • Associated Press v. United States 159, 160, 175
    • Attheraces Ltd v. British Horseracing Board Ltd. 167, 179
    • Commercial Solvents 163
    • competitive price, courts ability to determine 169
    • and dominant position abuse
    • 166–167
    • and duplication of facility 169–170
    • and EC law 162–168
    • and ‘exceptional circumstances’ 168, 172
    • expansion beyond two markets 172–173
    • p. 284false positives, false negatives and administrative costs, minimizing 171–172
    • Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz 178
    • and forced access 171
    • Gamco, Inc. v .Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., Inc. 161
    • Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc. 174, 176
    • IMS Health GmbH v. NDC Health GmbH 165–166, 168, 173–174
    • and intellectual property rights (IPRs) 163–167, 168, 169–170, 173–174
    • Intergraphic Corp. v. Intel Corp. 162
    • International Audiotext Network, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. 174
    • Jamsports & Enter. LLC v. Paradama Prods., Inc. 176
    • Lorain Journal Co. v. United States 175
    • low marginal cost undertaking 170–171
    • lower court decisions 161–162
    • and market power 159
    • MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T 161–162
    • Microsoft v. Commission 167–168
    • monopoly and refusal to deal 159–161, 172
    • Oskar Bronner GmbH v. Mediaprint 165, 166–167
    • Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States 159–160, 161, 170
    • overview 158–168
    • and price fixing 158–159
    • refusal to grant access to indispensible product 166–167, 172–173
    • role of 157–158
    • RTE and ITP v. Commission (Magill II) 164–165, 166, 168, 173–174
    • scholarly commentary 169–174
    • as second-best solution 170–171
    • shared access rule 170–171
    • and Sherman Act, Section 2 159–160, 161, 172, 176
    • and social welfare increase 169, 170, 171–172
    • software and refusal to license ‘interoperability information’ 167–168
    • symmetric duopoly with two vertically integrated firms 165
    • Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher 174
    • Trinko (Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko) 160–161, 169
    • Twin Labs., Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness 175–176
    • United States v. Griffith 175
    • United States v. Terminal Railroad Association 158–159, 160
    • upstream monopolist eliminating downstream competition 162, 172–173
    • and US Supreme Court decisions 158–161
  • Europe
    • AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd 163–164
    • Attheraces Ltd v. British Horseracing Board Ltd. 167, 179
    • Commercial Solvents 163
    • competition and free trade agreement 229
    • competition policy 228–229
    • Consten and Grundig v. Commission 231
    • EC Treaty, Article 81 227, 228–229
    • EC Treaty, Article 82 82, 162–163, 166, 167, 168
    • and essential facilities doctrine 157–158
    • IMS Health GmbH v. NDC Health GmbH 165–166, 168, 173–174
    • Microsoft v. Commission 167–168
    • and minimum resale price maintenance 229
    • Oskar Bronner GmbH v. Mediaprint 165, 166–167
    • RTE and ITP v. Commission (Magill II) 164–165, 166, 168, 173–174
    • vertical agreement exemptions 227–228
    • vertical restraints 216, 227–229
  • Evans, D. 111, 129, 204, 205
  • Evans, W. 253, 255
  • exclusive dealing and tying arrangements, antitrust analysis of 183–212
    • p. 2853M Co. v. LePage’s Inc. 203
    • Barry Wright v. ITT Grinnell 199
    • Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. 199
    • bundling and loyalty discounts 185–186
    • Cascade Health Solutions v. Peace Health 203
    • category management contracts and exclusive dealing 198
    • CDC Techs., Inc. IDEXX Labs, Inc. 207
    • choice provision costs 190
    • and Clayton Act, Section 3 192
    • Coca-Cola Co. v. Harmar Bottling Co. 200
    • competitive harm theories and exclusive dealing 194–196
    • competitive harm theories and tying and bundling 187–189
    • Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp. 199, 207
    • and consumer welfare 187–189, 191, 194, 198, 200
    • contract duration effects and exclusive dealing 193–194
    • coordination problems between buyers and anti-competitive exclusion 195–196
    • dealer free-riding and exclusive dealing 197, 198
    • dealer loyalty and exclusive dealing 197
    • Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp. 202
    • downstream competition and exclusive dealing 195–196
    • economic analysis of exclusive dealing 194–200
    • economic analysis of tying and bundling 186–191
    • economies of scale and exclusive dealing 196
    • El Aguila Food Products v. Gruma 200
    • empirical evidence and exclusive dealing 198–200
    • empirical evidence and tying and bundling 190–191
    • exclusive dealing 191–200
    • Fox Motors, Inc. v. Mazda Distribs. (Gulf), Inc. 202
    • FTC v. McCormick 199, 200, 208
    • Hendricks Music Co. v. Steinway, Inc. 208
    • Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink 202
    • International Salt Co. v. United States 184, 203
    • Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde 184, 185, 192
    • Joyce Beverages v. Royal Crown Co. 197
    • Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. 203
    • legal analyses of tying and bundling 184–186
    • legal analysis of exclusive dealing 191–194
    • LePage’s v. 3M 185, 195, 203
    • Lorain Journal Co. v. United States 192
    • loyalty discounts and exclusive dealing 198–200
    • and market power 184, 187, 193
    • Menasha Corp. v. News Am. Mktg. In-Store, Inc. 206
    • monopolist capturing producer’s profits 188
    • Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc. 202
    • N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States 201
    • Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents 202
    • Omega Envtl. Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc. 207
    • ‘one monopoly profit argument’ and tying and bundling 187–188
    • Ortho Diagnostic Systems v. Abbott Labs 203
    • Paddock Publ’ns., Inc. v. Chicago Tribune Co. 206, 207
    • and per se rules 184–185, 186
    • and preservation of insecure monopoly 188
    • procompetitive efficiencies and exclusive dealing 196–198
    • procompetitive efficiencies and tying and bundling 189–190
    • p. 286production costs and tying in single bundle 189–190
    • retail conspiracy, distribution access denied 195
    • R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Philip Morris Inc. 193–194, 199, 200
    • Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus. 197, 207
    • rule of reason analysis and exclusive dealing 193
    • rule of reason analysis and tying and bundling 186
    • Ryko Manufacturing Co. v. Eden Services 197
    • and Sherman Act 185, 192, 194
    • Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co. 192
    • Standard Oil Co. v. United States 184, 192
    • supplier access to the retailer’s loyal customer base and exclusive dealing 198
    • Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co. 192
    • technology exception to per se rule 185
    • Thompson Everett, Inc. v. Nat’l Cable Adver. 207
    • tying and bundling arrangements 183–191
    • United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States 192
    • United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises (Fortner II) 184
    • United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc. 197
    • United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp. 202
    • United States v. Loew’s, Inc. 185, 201
    • United States v. Microsoft Corp. 185, 202, 204
    • United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. 203
    • US Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc. 207
    • US Philips Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n 202
    • and vertical restraints 191
    • Wells Real Estate, Inc. v. Greater Lowell Bd. of Realtors 202
  • F. Hoffman–La Roche Ltd. v. Empagram S.A. 108
  • Farrell, J. 255, 256, 275
  • Fashion Originators’ Guild v. Federal Trade Commission 56–57, 58, 61
  • Faull, J. 108
  • Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute 33, 36, 40
  • Federal Trade Commission v. H.J. Heinz Co. 236
  • Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana Federation of Dentists 51–52, 61
  • Federal Trade Commission v. McCormick 199, 200, 208
  • Fisher, F. 80
  • Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz 178
  • In re Flat Glass 39
  • Fortner II (United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises) 184
  • Fox Motors, Inc. v. Mazda Distribs. (Gulf), Inc. 202
  • Friedman, J. 278
  • Frischmann, B. 172
  • Froeb, L. 255
  • Fudenberg, D. 121
  • Fumagalli, C. 196, 207
  • Gallini, N. 262, 275
  • Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., Inc. 161
  • Gandhi, A. 256
  • Gavil, A. 111
  • GE/Agfa example, horizontal mergers 248–249
  • Genesove, D. 40, 127, 255
  • Ghosh, Shubha 213–233
  • Gilbert, R. 261
  • Glazer, K. 206
  • Goldfarb et al. v. Virginia State Bar 61
  • Goldman, L. 37
  • Gomez, R. 128
  • Graham v. John Deere Co. 272
  • Granitz, E. 150, 207
  • Green, E. 252
  • Green, J. 261, 276
  • Greve, M. 18
  • Griffin, C. 91
  • Grimes, W. 202, 230
  • group boycotts law 46–63
    • p. 287and access denial to suppliers or customers 46–47
    • and ancillary restraints doctrine 49
    • Associated Press v. United States 53, 61–62
    • Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Association 50
    • Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System 49
    • Business Electronics v. Sharp 57–58
    • clothing design protection 56–57
    • and competition regulation among participating firms 46
    • and consumer welfare 47–49, 50, 51–53
    • Deesen v. Professional Golfers’ Association (PGA) 50, 61
    • Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Association v. United States 55–56
    • economic perspectives on 47–49
    • Fashion Originators’ Guild v. Federal Trade Commission 56–57, 58, 61
    • Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana Federation of Dentists 51–52, 61
    • ‘forbidden category’ and reasonable argument 57–58
    • Goldfarb et al. v. Virginia State Bar 61
    • horizontal agreement injuring competitor 54, 57–58, 59
    • intellectual property and increase in consumer welfare 48–49
    • Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde 61
    • Klor’s Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc. 57–58
    • member expulsion due to ownership change 53–55
    • Molinas v. National Basketball Association 61
    • Neeld v. National Hockey League 47–48
    • non-regulatory boycotts 55–59
    • Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationery and Printing Co. 51, 53–55, 58, 59, 61, 62
    • Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States 60
    • Powell v. National Football League 61
    • product necessity boycotts 51
    • and product quality 49
    • and professional qualifications 52
    • and profits 49
    • regulatory boycotts 49–55
    • and rule of reason 54
    • and Sherman Act, Section 2 46
    • Silver v. New York Stock Exchange 52–53
    • Smith v. Pro Football, Inc. 51
    • and sports teams 50–51
    • Toys ‘R’ Us v. Federal Trade Commission 58–59
    • United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. 37, 49
    • and vertical agreements 58–59
  • Gurrea, S. 37
  • Haddock, D. 37
  • Hahn, R. 18
  • Hanover Shoe Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. 13–14
  • Hanssen, F.A. 201
  • Hanssens, D. 231
  • Harrison, Jeffrey L. 46–63, 128
  • Hart, D. 231
  • Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. 18
  • Hay, G. 37, 40, 130, 139
  • Hazlett, T. 127
  • Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc. 174, 176
  • Heide, J. 198
  • Heidt, R. 61
  • Hemphill, C. 117, 141
  • Hendricks Music Co. v. Steinway, Inc. 208
  • Herfort, J. 141
  • In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig. 38
  • Holiday Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Philip Morris Inc. 40, 41, 42
  • Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corporation 19
  • Holt, C. 37
  • horizontal agreements
    • facilitating practices and concerted action 27, 32–34
    • injuring competitor, group boycotts law 54, 57–58, 59
  • horizontal mergers, analysis of market concentration in 234–260
    • p. 288Brown Shoe Co. v. United States 251
    • cartels and cheating, deterrence of 240–243, 244
    • cartels and consensus 239–240
    • cartels and market concentration, benefits of 240, 242–243
    • cartels and price-fixing 239, 243
    • and Clayton Act, Section 7 235, 236
    • competitive effects 238–249
    • coordinated competitive effects 238–245
    • differentiated product industry, competitive effects of 245–249
    • Federal Trade Commission v. H.J. Heinz Co. 236
    • GE/Agfa example 248–249
    • Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) as market concentration measure 238
    • market concentration in legal framework for merger analysis 235–236
    • market concentration measurement 238
    • market definition role and market concentration 237, 249
    • maverick firms and merger analysis 243–245
    • and Sherman Act, Section 1 239
    • unilateral competitive effects 245–249
    • unilateral competitive effects and consumer choice 248
    • unilateral competitive effects and price constraint removal 246–247, 249
    • United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc. 235–236
    • United States v. General Dynamics Corp. 235
    • United States v. Pabst Brewing Co. 251
    • United States v. Philadelphia National Bank 235, 236
    • United States v. Von’s Grocery Co. 251
    • Whirlpool/Maytag example 248
  • Hovenkamp, H. 17, 18–19, 139, 141–151 passim, 162, 169, 171–179 passim, 193, 202, 206
  • Hurwicz, J. 139
  • Hylton, Keith 17, 20, 37, 82–115, 161, 169, 174–175, 178, 179, 230
  • Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois 13–14
  • Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink 80, 202
  • IMS Health GmbH v. NDC Health GmbH 165–166, 168, 173–174
  • In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig. 39
  • In re Citric Acid Litig. 42
  • In re Flat Glass 39
  • In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig. 38
  • In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig. 42
  • Information Resources, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp 152
  • intellectual property law
    • and essential facilities doctrine 163–167, 168, 169–170, 173–174
    • and increase in consumer welfare 48–49
    • and vertical restraints, parallels between 215, 220, 226
    • see also patent litigation
  • International Audiotext Network, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. 174
  • International Salt Co. v. United States 184, 203
  • Ippolito, P. 231
  • Isaac, R. 128
  • Jacobson, J. 202, 206
  • Jacquemin, A. 38, 40, 252
  • Jamsports & Enter. LLC v. Paradama Prods., Inc. 176
  • Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde 61, 184, 185, 192
  • Joskow, P. 129, 131
  • Joyce Beverages v. Royal Crown Co. 197
  • JTC Petroleum Co. v. Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc. 35–36, 38
  • Jung, Y. 128–129
  • McAfee, P. 19
  • McChesney, F. 17
  • McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas Co. 151
  • McGee, J. 118, 119, 130, 139, 150, 151
  • McGowan, D. 175, 179
  • McGowan, J. 80
  • McKenzie-Willamette Hospital v. Peace Health 152
  • Magill II (RTE and ITP v. Commission) 164–165, 166, 168, 173–174
  • Maple Flooring Mfg. Assn. v. United States 41
  • Marquardt, P. 162, 173, 179
  • Marvel, H. 40, 208, 221
  • Marx, L. 124
  • Mason, E. 91, 92, 110–111
  • Mathewson, F. 221
  • Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 17, 27, 30, 33, 34, 108, 117, 139–140, 144, 151
  • MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T 161–162
  • Meese, A. 224
  • Melamed, A. 90–91, 97, 109
  • Menasha Corp. v. News Am. Mktg. In‑Store, Inc. 206
  • mergers, horizontal see horizontal mergers, analysis of market concentration in
  • Merges, R. 276
  • Meurer, Michael J. 261–277
  • Microsoft v. Commission 167–168
  • Milgrom, P. 121, 122, 123–124
  • Miller, J. 127
  • Miller v. Hedlund 41
  • Mills, D. 125, 141
  • Milne, R. 39
  • MindGames, Inc. v. Western Publ’g Co. 20
  • Molinas v. National Basketball Association 61
  • monopolization standards, law and economics of 82–115
    • ‘abuse standard’ 84
    • Alcoa (United States v. Alum. Co. of America) 85–86, 87, 88, 105
    • American Federation of Tobacco Growers v. Neal 106
    • p. 290anticompetitive act, defining 98
    • Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. 86–87, 108, 109
    • assessment in light of error 100–107
    • Associated Press v. United States 99
    • balancing test approach 85–87
    • baseline probabilities and ex post error rates 104–105
    • Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. 86, 90, 105, 109
    • common law background 84
    • consumer harm test 93, 94–95, 98, 100–101, 105, 106
    • Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atlantic Corp. 109
    • Darcy v. Allen 84
    • and distribution of error costs 83
    • dominant firm changing product design to enhance competition 98, 102–103
    • Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services 108
    • efficiency measurement 11, 90, 95–96, 97–98, 99–100, 104, 106
    • equally-efficient-competitor test 89, 99–100
    • error costs and market constraints 102–103, 105–106
    • and error probabilities in antitrust 89
    • errors and biases, types of 100–102
    • ‘essential facilities’ 86–87, 106
    • and European Community Treaty, Article 82 82
    • exclusionary act and efficiency 90
    • exclusivity contract example 93–94, 96–97, 101, 103
    • and expected cost of errors 102–103, 105–107
    • F. Hoffman–La Roche Ltd. v. Empagram S.A. 108
    • false acquittal versus false conviction costs 102–105, 106, 107
    • future of 105–107
    • history of 83–87
    • incompatible design change example 98, 101
    • market performance test 91–92
    • Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 108
    • modeling 92–100
    • new entrants, encouragement of 102, 103, 106
    • ‘no-economic-sense’ test and unlawful monopolization 91, 99
    • and predatory pricing 86
    • profit decomposition analysis 98–99, 102–103
    • and profit-sacrifice test 87, 90–91, 97–98, 99
    • proposed monopolization standards 87–92
    • and rent seeking 89, 102, 103–104
    • sacrifice-plus-recoupment test 91
    • and Sherman Act, Section 2 82,
    • 83–87
    • and specific intent approach 82, 83, 84–85, 88–89, 91, 101, 105, 106
    • and specific intent approach, modeling 96–100
    • Standard Oil Co. v. United States 84–85
    • Trinko (Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of V. Trinko) 86–87, 105, 106
    • United States v. Alum. Co. of America 108
    • United States v. American Tobacco Co. 108
    • United States v. Microsoft Corp. 87, 108, 111
    • United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. 109
    • United States v. US Steel Corp. 108
    • welfare balancing approach 82–83, 86, 87, 88–89, 90, 91–92, 100, 101–102, 104, 105
    • welfare balancing approach, modeling 93–96, 114–115
    • welfare tradeoff considerations 83, 94, 103
  • monopoly power in antitrust, economics of 64–81
    • Alcoa (United States v. Alum. Co. of America) 74
    • American Tobacco Co. v. United States 79
    • capital costs as entry barrier 76
    • circumstantial evidence of monopoly power 74
    • p. 291consumer preference and entry barriers 76
    • consumer surplus and perfect competition 65
    • direct evidence of monopoly power 73–74
    • and dominant firms 71–73
    • Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services 79
    • entry barriers, importance of 75–76
    • exclusion of rivals as evidence of monopoly power 73–74
    • Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink 80
    • Kellogg 80
    • Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. 33–34, 64
    • Lerner Index and measurement of monopoly power 68–70, 73, 74
    • market definition, importance of 76–77
    • and market equilibrium 65–66, 74
    • monopoly power in antitrust law 73–77
    • monopoly power in economics 65–70
    • and patents 80
    • and perfect competition 65
    • product differentiation problems 75
    • and profit maximizing firm 65, 66–68, 75
    • and Sherman Act, Section 2 64
    • social welfare maximization and perfect competition 65–66, 75
    • Spectrum Sports v. McQuillian 77
    • United States v. Aluminum Company of America 79
    • United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (Cellophane) 73, 74, 79
    • United States v. Grinnell Corp. 64, 74, 77
    • Walker Process Equip. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp. 77
  • Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. 39, 217
  • Motta, M. 196, 207, 253
  • Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc. 202
  • Mullin, W. 40, 127, 255
  • Mumford, M. 125, 141
  • Murphy, K. 200, 208, 221
  • N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States 201
  • Nagata, E. 38
  • Nalebuff, B. 204–205
  • Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents 202
  • Neeld v. National Hockey League 47–48
  • Nikpay, A. 108
  • Nordhaus, W. 261
  • Norfolk Monument Co. v. Woodlawn Mem’l Gardens, Inc. 39
  • Normann, H. 128
  • Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationery and Printing Co. 51, 53–55, 58, 59, 61, 62
  • Pace, J. 39
  • Paddock Publ’ns., Inc. v. Chicago Tribune Co. 206, 207
  • Padilla, A. 111, 129
  • Page, William H. 19, 23–45, 175, 179
  • Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States 60
  • Parkin, M. 78, 79
  • patent litigation 261–276
    • and antitrust 270–272, 278–279
    • Duplan Corp. v. Deering Miliken, Inc. 275
    • Graham v. John Deere Co. 272
    • investment in research model 267, 268–270, 278–279
    • p. 292licensing and litigation model 262, 263–267, 268–270
    • and monopoly power 80
    • nonobviousness standard and optimal validity probability 263, 272–274
    • optimal patent policy 267–270, 278–279
    • and patent validity probability 261–263, 270–272
    • profits and licensing 262
    • settlement of patent litigation model 264–266
    • and social welfare 268–270, 279
    • US patent law, Section 103 272
    • see also intellectual property law
  • Pautler, P. 127
  • Pearlstein, D. 41
  • Perloff, J. 79, 201, 205
  • In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig. 42
  • Piraino, T. 38
  • Pitofsky, R. 17, 162, 172
  • Plott, C. 128
  • Podolny, J. 126
  • Poitevin, M. 121
  • Porter, R. 252
  • Posner, R. 6, 17, 18, 25, 30, 37, 38, 61, 78, 79, 89, 99, 129, 204
  • Powell v. National Football League 61
  • predatory pricing, law and economics of 116–156
    • above-cost safe harbor rule 117, 125, 130, 132, 140–141, 143, 144–149
    • airline cases and opportunity cost 145–146
    • antitrust law 129–138
    • antitrust law and predation 138–149
    • Areeda–Turner test and cost-based rules 130–132, 139, 141
    • Barry Wright v. ITT Grinnell 151
    • below-cost dumping and state-run firms 127
    • Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. 38, 117, 125, 130, 132, 140–142, 143, 144–149
    • Brooke Group rule, challenges to 142, 145–149
    • cartel, inducing rival to join 125
    • Cascade Health Solutions v. Peace Health 148–149
    • ‘chain store paradox’ 119, 122
    • complete information model in intermediate goods markets 124
    • Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp. 144
    • and cost thresholds 140
    • courts and predation 138–141
    • and direct calculation of marginal cost 127
    • ‘dynamic’ predation rules, harmful effects of 132–133, 145
    • economic analysis of legal rules 129–130
    • economics of 117–129
    • and error costs 129–130
    • and exclusionary pricing behavior 140–142, 143–144
    • experimental evidence 128–129
    • false positives, high costs of 140
    • financial constraints based on asymmetric information 121
    • financial predation and the long purse 120–121, 126
    • financially constrained entrant 120–121
    • and firms’ attempts to control agency costs 121
    • and horizontal price fixing 130
    • Information Resources, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp 152
    • learning curve model of equilibrium predation 124, 135, 136
    • LePage’s v. 3M 147–148, 149
    • litigated cases, empirical studies of 124–129
    • litigated cases, measurement of success of 125
    • lowered prices to deter competitor 123–124, 125
    • lowered prices to deter entry 123, 128–129
    • loyalty discounts, market share discounts 144–145
    • McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas Co. 151
    • McKenzie-Willamette Hospital v. Peace Health 152
    • and managers’ compensation 127–128
    • p. 293and market power 118, 131, 134–135, 139
    • Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 117, 139–140, 144, 151
    • models supporting credible commitment 119
    • and monopolization standards 86
    • as monopolizing method 118, 142–144
    • multi-product firms and bundling 146–149
    • and multi-product price discounts 148–149
    • multiple markets and reputation 121–122, 127–129, 132
    • and optimal antitrust rules 130–138
    • Ortho Diagnostic Systems v. Abbott Labs 152
    • and price fixing 118
    • price theory and predation 118–119
    • price-cost comparisons as presumptive test 139–140
    • as profit sacrifice 133–138
    • profitable predation, lack of evidence for 119
    • and recouping investment in below-cost prices 140–141
    • regression analysis to test models 126–127
    • regulation and public ownership effects 127
    • and Robinson-Patman Act, Section 13 138, 139, 140
    • and Sherman Act, Section 2 138, 140–141, 147–148
    • ‘signal jamming’ model 121
    • signaling models 122–124
    • SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co. 147, 148
    • and social characteristics of entrants 126
    • Spirit Airlines v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. 145–146
    • Standard Oil Co. v. United States 118, 119
    • and strategic theory 119–124, 132–133
    • sub-markets and joint and common costs 146
    • uncertainty of 119, 122–124, 129–130
    • US v. AMR Corp. 145–146
    • Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co. 139
    • Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd. v. British Airways plc 152
    • welfare effects 117, 124, 129, 130, 134, 135–138, 143–144
    • Weyerhaeuser v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co. and predatory buying 142–144
    • William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co 151
  • Priest, G. 126, 275, 276
  • Qureshi, A. 202
  • Rasmussen, E. 195–196
  • Reinganum, J. 276
  • Rey, P. 204
  • Riordan, M. 124
  • Ritter, C. 180
  • R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Philip Morris Inc. 193–194, 199, 200
  • Roberts, J. 121, 122, 123–124
  • Robinson, G. 109
  • Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus. 197, 207
  • Romaine, R. 92, 109
  • Rosch, J. 232
  • RTE and ITP v. Commission (Magill II) 164–165, 166, 168, 173–174
  • rule of reason
    • and exclusive dealing 193
    • and group boycotts law 54
    • and tying and bundling 186
    • and vertical restraints see vertical restraints, competition and the rule of reason
  • Ryko Manufacturing Co. v. Eden Services 197
  • Sá, N. 252
  • Salinger, M. 111, 204, 205
  • Saloner, G. 119, 121, 122, 123, 130, 133, 135
  • Salop, S. 37, 92, 93, 98, 101, 108, 109, 110, 122, 124, 144, 179, 207, 258
  • Sappington, D. 128
  • Sass, T. 198
  • Saving, T. 79
  • Scharfstein, D. 121, 124
  • p. 294Scheffman, D. 37, 110, 116, 134, 207
  • Scherer, F. 130, 180
  • Schmalensee, R. 253
  • Schoen, D. 17
  • Schwartz, M. 134, 205
  • Scotchmer, S. 261, 276
  • Scott Morton, F. 126
  • Segal, I. 195–196
  • Selten, R. 119
  • Shaffer, G. 42, 124
  • Shapiro, C. 37, 122, 124, 206, 229, 244, 247, 253, 255, 256, 257, 261, 262
  • Shepard, A. 275
  • Sherman Act, Section 1, facilitating practices and concerted action under 23–45
    • 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy 41
    • agreement, definition and proof of 26–29
    • Am. Column & Lumber Co. v. United States 41
    • Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States 39
    • Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Goodman 41
    • background 23–26
    • basing-point pricing 36
    • Battipaglia v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth. 41
    • Beer & Pop Warehouse v. Jones 41
    • Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 26, 28, 38
    • Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Sask. 39
    • Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. 38
    • California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. 41
    • Canterbury Liquors & Pantry v. Sullivan 41
    • and cartels 24, 29, 31, 34
    • Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc. 30–31, 32, 34
    • category restraints of trade, limitation of 24
    • Cement Mfrs. Protective Assn. v. United States 41
    • City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc. 39, 40
    • Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst. 38, 40
    • Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. 39
    • Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp. 37
    • Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Maleng 41
    • Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Association v. United States 32–33
    • E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC (Ethyl) 33
    • and exclusive dealing and tying arrangements 185, 192, 194
    • facilitating practices 29–36
    • FTC v. Cement Institute 33, 36, 40
    • Holiday Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Philip Morris Inc. 40, 41, 42
    • and horizontal agreements 27, 32–34
    • In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig. 39
    • In re Citric Acid Litig. 42
    • In re Flat Glass 39
    • In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig. 38
    • In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig. 42
    • and independent action 27–28
    • and individual self-interest 28
    • information exchange agreements 32–33
    • JTC Petroleum Co. v. Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc. 35–36, 38
    • Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. 33–34
    • Maple Flooring Mfg. Assn. v. United States 41
    • Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 27, 30, 33, 34
    • Miller v. Hedlund 41
    • Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. 39
    • Norfolk Monument Co. v. Woodlawn Mem’l Gardens, Inc. 39
    • oligopoly and collusion 24–25, 30, 34
    • and parallel conduct 27–29, 30, 33–36
    • ‘plus factor’ evidence and exclusion of independent evidence 27, 28
    • and price fixing 24–25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 32–33, 35–36
    • price lists, liquor ‘post and hold’ 32
    • pricing transparency, dealing agreements to increase 30–32
    • p. 295and private communication 29
    • and public price posting 35
    • and resale price maintenance 31, 33–35
    • search or transaction costs, reducing 26
    • Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United States 31, 32
    • TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer 41
    • Theater Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp. 27–28, 35, 40
    • Todd v. Exxon Corp. 39, 41
    • trade restrictions and unenforceability of Act 27
    • United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. 37
    • United States v. Am. Linseed Oil Co. 41
    • United States v. Citizen & S. Nat’l Bank 41
    • United States v. Container Corp. of Am. 32, 35
    • United States v. Gen. Motors Corp. 38
    • United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. 38
    • United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n 37, 38
    • and vertical agreements 31, 34
    • Virginia Vermiculite, Ltd. v. Historic Green Springs, Inc. 39
    • and wholesale price publishing 35–36
    • Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA 40, 42
  • Sherman Act, Section 2
    • early development, and monopolization standards
    • 84–85
    • and essential facilities doctrine 159–160, 161, 172, 176
    • and exclusive dealing and tying arrangements, antitrust analysis of 192, 194
    • and group boycotts law 46
    • modern, and monopolization standards 85–87
    • and monopolization standards 82, 83–87
    • and monopoly power in antitrust 64
    • and predatory pricing 138, 140–141, 147–148
  • Shughart, W. 17
  • Sidak, J. 109, 128, 173, 174
  • Silver v. New York Stock Exchange 52–53
  • Simpson, J. 196, 207
  • Six West Retail Acquisition, Inc. v. Sony Theatre Management Corp. 19
  • Slade, M. 38, 40
  • Small, J. 172, 180
  • Smith, V. 128
  • Smith, A. 65
  • Smith v. Pro Football, Inc. 51
  • SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co. 147, 148
  • Snyder, C. 121
  • Snyder, E. 19
  • Southern Bell Company case 127
  • Spectrum Sports v. McQuillian 77
  • Spence, A. 111
  • Spirit Airlines v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. 145–146
  • Spratling, G. 18
  • Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co. 192
  • Standard Oil Co. v. United States 84–85, 118, 119, 184, 192
  • State Oil v. Khan 217, 220
  • Stein, A. 17
  • Stempel, S. 37
  • Stigler, G. 17, 36–37, 38, 39, 79, 92, 201, 252
  • Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United States 31, 32
  • Sullivan, E. 19
  • Sullivan, L. 230
  • Suslow, V. 253, 254
  • Sutton, J. 252
  • Swift & Co. v. United States 19
  • Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co. 192
  • Telser, L. 120, 121
  • Temple Lang, J. 173, 177, 180
  • Tesler, L. 231
  • Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher 174
  • TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer 41
  • Theater Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp. 27–28, 35, 40
  • p. 296 Thompson Everett, Inc. v. Nat’l Cable Adver. 207
  • Thorelli, H. 232
  • Tirole, J. 121
  • Todd v. Exxon Corp. 39, 41
  • Tom, W. 206, 208
  • Toys ‘R’ Us v. Federal Trade Commission 58–59, 214
  • Trinko (Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko) 86–87, 105, 106, 160–161, 169
  • Tullock, G. 89, 94–95, 103
  • Turner, D. 25, 30, 34, 38, 42, 86, 108, 130–132, 139, 141
  • Turney, J. 177
  • Twin Labs., Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness 175–176
  • Twombly (Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly) 16, 17, 26, 27, 28, 38
  • tying arrangements see exclusive dealing and tying arrangements, antitrust analysis of
  • United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States 192
  • United States
    • antitrust enforcement, economics of see antitrust enforcement, economics of
    • Antitrust Modernization Commission 14, 185–186
    • Clayton Act 6, 7, 18, 23, 64, 192, 235, 236
    • decentralization of antitrust enforcement 1, 5–11
    • essential facilities doctrine see essential facilities doctrine
    • exclusive dealing and tying arrangements see exclusive dealing and tying arrangements, antitrust analysis of
    • FTC Act 18
    • Georgetown Study of Private Antitrust Litigation 11
    • group boycotts law see group boycotts law
    • Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act 3, 10–11
    • monopolization standards, law and economics of see monopolization standards, law and economics of
    • monopoly power in antitrust, economics of see monopoly power in antitrust, economics of
    • National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) 6–7
    • patent litigation see patent litigation
    • predatory pricing law see predatory pricing, law and economics of
    • Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) 19
    • Robinson-Patman Act 7, 18, 138, 139, 140
    • Sherman Act see Sherman Act, Section 1; Sherman Act, Section 2
    • vertical restraints see vertical restraints, competition and the rule of reason
  • United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises (Fortner II) 184
  • United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. 37, 49
  • United States v. Alum. Co. of America (Alcoa) 74, 79, 85–86, 87, 88, 105, 108
  • United States v. Am. Linseed Oil Co. 41
  • United States v. American Tobacco Co. 108
  • United States v. AMR Corp. 145–146
  • United States v. Arnold, Schwinn, & Co. 217
  • United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc. 235–236
  • United States v. Broadcast Music, Inc. 19
  • United States v. Citizen & S. Nat’l Bank 41
  • United States v. Colgate 217
  • United States v. Container Corp. of Am. 32, 35
  • United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc. 197
  • United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (Cellophane) 73, 74, 79
  • United States v. Gen. Motors Corp. 38
  • United States v. General Dynamics Corp. 235
  • United States v. Griffith 175
  • p. 297United States v. Grinnell Corp. 64, 74, 77
  • United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp. 202
  • United States v. Loew’s, Inc. 185, 201
  • United States v. Microsoft Corp. 87, 108, 111, 185, 202, 204
  • United States v. Pabst Brewing Co. 251
  • United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. 38, 203
  • United States v. Philadephia National Bank 235, 236
  • United States v. Terminal Railroad Association 158–159, 160
  • United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n 37, 38
  • United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. 109
  • United States v. US Steel Corp. 108
  • United States v. Von’s Grocery Co. 251
  • US Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc. 207
  • US Philips Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n 202
  • Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co. 139
  • Vakkur, N. 19
  • Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko 86–87, 105, 106, 160–161, 169
  • vertical restraints, competition and the rule of reason 213–233
    • Albrecht v. Herald Tribune 217
    • Business Electronics v. Sharp 217
    • competitive norms 224–227
    • Consten and Grundig v. Commission 231
    • and consumer welfare 219, 224
    • Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. 217
    • contracts and territorial restrictions 222, 224–225
    • and distribution channel control 226
    • Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, Co. 216–217, 218, 220, 222, 225
    • E. Bement & Sons v. National Harrow Co. 230
    • economic theory 221–224
    • EU comparison 227–229
    • and exclusive dealing and tying arrangements 191
    • and free-riding 222, 223, 226
    • future after the rule of reason 229–230
    • horizontal and vertical arrangements, distinction between 214
    • and intellectual property law, parallels between 215, 220, 226
    • Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc. 213, 214–215, 216–227
    • and market forces 224–225
    • minimum resale price maintenance 214–227
    • minimum resale price maintenance, anti-competitive uses 218, 219, 220, 222–223
    • minimum resale price maintenance, pro-competitive benefits 218, 219, 220–221, 222–223
    • minimum resale price maintenance, quality and service, effects on 224–225
    • Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. 217
    • and per se rule 217, 218–221, 222, 225, 226
    • and rivalry in production and distribution chain 215
    • rule of reason versus per se rules 219–221
    • and Sherman Act, Section 1 217
    • State Oil v. Khan 217, 220
    • Toys ‘R’ Us v. Federal Trade Commission 214
    • United States v. Arnold, Schwinn, & Co. 217
    • United States v. Colgate 217
    • vertical restraints as a possible misnomer 213–216
  • Vickers, J. 90, 109
  • Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd. v. British Airways plc 152
  • Virginia Vermiculite, Ltd. v. Historic Green Springs, Inc. 39
  • Vistnes, G. 204
  • Vita, M. 37, 205
  • Vives, X. 40