[In: Volume 4, Keith N. Hylton (ed) Antitrust Law and Economics]

• 3M Co. v. LePage’s Inc. 203

• 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy 41

• AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd 163–164

• Abbott, Alden F. 183–212

• Adelman, M. 119

• Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc. 162, 175–176

• Albrecht v. Herald Tribune 217

• Alcoa (United States v. Alum. Co. of America) 74, 79, 85–86, 87, 88, 105, 108

• American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States 41

• American Federation of Tobacco Growers v. Neal 106

• American Sugar Refining Company 125

• American Tobacco Co. v. United States 39, 79, 126

• Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Goodman 41

• antitrust analysis of exclusive dealing see exclusive dealing and tying arrangements, antitrust analysis of

• antitrust enforcement, economics of 1–22

  • and allocative efficiency 2

  • Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp. 19

  • Ashley Creek Phosphate Co. v. Chevron USA, Inc. 20

  • Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters 19

  • Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 16, 17

  • Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures 20

  • Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System 19

  • Brunswick Corp v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. 12

  • California v. ARC America Corp. 13

  • and cartel collusion 7–9, 13, 15

  • ‘cease and desist’ orders 9

  • consent decrees 9–10

  • and consumer welfare 2, 6, 11–16

  • criminal or civil enforcement ratio 7–9

  • and customer standing to sue 13

  • damages and concealment of anticompetitive behavior 15

  • damages rules 14–16

  • and deterrence 2, 14–16

  • ‘direct injury’ rule 12–13

  • and direct purchaser 13–14

  • enforcement goals 2–5

  • false negatives, inclination towards 4–5

  • false positives, costs of 4, 7, 8

  • false positives, jurors over-inclusion of 4

  • federal or state enforcement 6–7

  • and firm-specific control 3, 12, 13–14

  • Hanover Shoe Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. 13–14

  • Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. 18

  • Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corporation 19

  • Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois 13–14

  • incarceration, incidence of 9

  • injunctions and administrative solutions 9–11

  • Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 17

  • merger review 10–11

  • MindGames, Inc. v. Western Publ’g Co. 20

  • and new entrants 16

  • overdeterrence and underdeterrence 3–5, 7, 8

  • ‘Paramount decrees’ 9

  • and patent pools 11

  • price fixing 7–9, 13, 15

  • private enforcement 11–16

  • public enforcement 5–11

  • rate-setting proceedings and consent decrees 10

  • Six West Retail Acquisition, Inc. v. Sony Theatre Management Corp. 19

  • Swift & Co. v. United States 19

  • United States v. Broadcast Music, Inc. 19

• p. 282antitrust, monopoly power in see monopoly power in antitrust, economics of

• antitrust and patent litigation 270–272, 278–279

• Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp. 19

• Aoki, R. 172, 180

• Areeda, P. 84, 86, 107, 108, 109, 130–132, 139, 141, 145, 146, 149, 150, 151, 162, 169, 171, 172, 175, 176, 178, 179, 193, 206

• Ashley Creek Phosphate Co. v. Chevron USA, Inc. 20

• Asker, J. 198

• Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. 86–87, 108, 109, 160, 161, 162

• Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters 19

• Associated Press v. United States 53, 61–62, 99, 159, 160, 175

• Attheraces Ltd v. British Horseracing Board Ltd. 167, 179

• In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig. 39

• Bain, J. 80

• Baker, Jonathan B. 39, 40, 234–260

• Bakos, Y. 205

• Barnett, T. 17

• Barry Wright v. ITT Grinnell 151,

• 199

• Battipaglia v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth. 41

• Baumol, W. 19, 131, 132

• Baxter, W. 205, 214

• Beard, T. 171, 172, 179

• Becker, G. 17

• Beckner, C. 179

• Beer & Pop Warehouse v. Jones 41

• Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 16, 17, 26, 27, 28, 38

• Beniot, J.-P. 120–121

• Bergman, M. 165, 170, 176, 178, 179

• Bernheim, D. 207, 255

• Besanko, D. 37

• Bierschback, R. 17

• Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures 20

• Black, O. 28–29, 40

• Blair, Roger D. 64–81, 144

• Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Association 50

• Blechman, M. 37

• Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Sask. 39

• Blum, W. 17

• BMI and ASCAP consent decrees 10, 11

• Bolton, P. 117, 121, 125, 126, 132, 139, 141

• Bork, R. 52, 56–57, 61–62, 111, 117, 207, 231

• Boudreaux, D. 130, 139, 141

• Bowman, W. 204

• boycotts see group boycotts law

• Bresnahan, T. 253, 255, 256

• Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System 19, 49

• Brodley, J. 17, 130, 139

• Bronsteen, P. 206

• Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. 38, 86, 90, 105, 109, 117, 125, 130, 132, 140–141, 143, 144–149, 199

• Brown Shoe Co. v. United States 251

• Brunswick Corp v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. 12

• Bryant, P. 20

• Brynjolfsson, E. 205

• Burns, M. 126

• Business Electronics v. Sharp 57–58, 217

• Cabral, L. 124

• California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. 41

• California v. ARC America Corp. 13

• Canterbury Liquors & Pantry v. Sullivan 41

• Carbajo, J. 204

• Cardi, W. 19

• Carlton, D. 29, 32, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 79, 149, 201, 203, 204, 205, 207

• Carruthers, Celeste K. 64–81

• Carstensen, P. 231

• Cascade Health Solutions v. Peace Health 148–149, 203

• Cass, R. 89, 97, 108, 109, 111

• Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc. 30–31, 32, 34

• Caves, R. 275

• p. 283 CDC Techs., Inc. IDEXX Labs, Inc. 207

• Cement Mfrs. Protective Assn. v. United States 41

• Chamberlin, E. 38

• Chen, A. 230

• In re Citric Acid Litig. 42

• City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc. 39, 40

• Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst. 38, 40

• Clark, J. 92

• Coase, R. 60

• Coca-Cola v. Harmar 200

• Commercial Solvents 163

• Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp. 144, 199, 207

• Consten and Grundig v. Commission 231

• Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. 39

• Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. 217

• Cooper, D. 125, 130, 131

• Cooper, J. 111, 205

• Cooper, T. 37

• Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp. 37

• Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Maleng 41

• Cotter, Thomas F. 109, 157–182

• Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atlantic Corp. 109

• Cowling, K. 252

• Crane, Daniel A. 1–22, 130

• Dansby, R. 252

• Darcy v. Allen 84

• DeBow, M. 18

• Deesen v. Professional Golfers’ Association (PGA) 50, 61

• DeGraba, P. 204

• Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp. 202

• Demsetz, H. 253

• Deneckere, R. 221

• Deng, F. 107

• Denger, M. 141

• DeSanti, S. 38

• Devlin, A. 38

• Dick, A. 38, 255

• Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, Co. 216–217, 218, 220, 222, 225

• Duplan Corp. v. Deering Miliken, Inc. 275

• E. Bement & Sons v. National Harrow Co. 230

• Eagles, I. 167, 177

• Easley, D. 122

• Easterbrook, F. 19, 89, 102, 117, 118–119, 125, 126, 129, 130, 134, 139

• Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Association v. United States 32–33, 60

• Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services 79, 108

• Eckhard, W. 20

• Edlin, A. 133

• E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC (Ethyl) 33

• El Aguila Food Products v. Gruma 200

• Elhauge, E. 90, 98, 133, 145, 146

• Elzinga, K. 40, 119, 125, 141

• Encaoua, D. 252

• England, Darcy v. Allen 84

• Epstein, R. 9, 18, 108

• essential facilities doctrine 157–182

  • AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd 163–164

  • Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc. 162, 175–176

  • Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. 160, 161, 162

  • Associated Press v. United States 159, 160, 175

  • Attheraces Ltd v. British Horseracing Board Ltd. 167, 179

  • Commercial Solvents 163

  • competitive price, courts ability to determine 169

  • and dominant position abuse

  • 166–167

  • and duplication of facility 169–170

  • and EC law 162–168

  • and ‘exceptional circumstances’ 168, 172

  • expansion beyond two markets 172–173

  • p. 284false positives, false negatives and administrative costs, minimizing 171–172

  • Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz 178

  • and forced access 171

  • Gamco, Inc. v .Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., Inc. 161

  • Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc. 174, 176

  • IMS Health GmbH v. NDC Health GmbH 165–166, 168, 173–174

  • and intellectual property rights (IPRs) 163–167, 168, 169–170, 173–174

  • Intergraphic Corp. v. Intel Corp. 162

  • International Audiotext Network, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. 174

  • Jamsports & Enter. LLC v. Paradama Prods., Inc. 176

  • Lorain Journal Co. v. United States 175

  • low marginal cost undertaking 170–171

  • lower court decisions 161–162

  • and market power 159

  • MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T 161–162

  • Microsoft v. Commission 167–168

  • monopoly and refusal to deal 159–161, 172

  • Oskar Bronner GmbH v. Mediaprint 165, 166–167

  • Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States 159–160, 161, 170

  • overview 158–168

  • and price fixing 158–159

  • refusal to grant access to indispensible product 166–167, 172–173

  • role of 157–158

  • RTE and ITP v. Commission (Magill II) 164–165, 166, 168, 173–174

  • scholarly commentary 169–174

  • as second-best solution 170–171

  • shared access rule 170–171

  • and Sherman Act, Section 2 159–160, 161, 172, 176

  • and social welfare increase 169, 170, 171–172

  • software and refusal to license ‘interoperability information’ 167–168

  • symmetric duopoly with two vertically integrated firms 165

  • Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher 174

  • Trinko (Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko) 160–161, 169

  • Twin Labs., Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness 175–176

  • United States v. Griffith 175

  • United States v. Terminal Railroad Association 158–159, 160

  • upstream monopolist eliminating downstream competition 162, 172–173

  • and US Supreme Court decisions 158–161

• Europe

  • AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd 163–164

  • Attheraces Ltd v. British Horseracing Board Ltd. 167, 179

  • Commercial Solvents 163

  • competition and free trade agreement 229

  • competition policy 228–229

  • Consten and Grundig v. Commission 231

  • EC Treaty, Article 81 227, 228–229

  • EC Treaty, Article 82 82, 162–163, 166, 167, 168

  • and essential facilities doctrine 157–158

  • IMS Health GmbH v. NDC Health GmbH 165–166, 168, 173–174

  • Microsoft v. Commission 167–168

  • and minimum resale price maintenance 229

  • Oskar Bronner GmbH v. Mediaprint 165, 166–167

  • RTE and ITP v. Commission (Magill II) 164–165, 166, 168, 173–174

  • vertical agreement exemptions 227–228

  • vertical restraints 216, 227–229

• Evans, D. 111, 129, 204, 205

• Evans, W. 253, 255

• exclusive dealing and tying arrangements, antitrust analysis of 183–212

  • p. 2853M Co. v. LePage’s Inc. 203

  • Barry Wright v. ITT Grinnell 199

  • Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. 199

  • bundling and loyalty discounts 185–186

  • Cascade Health Solutions v. Peace Health 203

  • category management contracts and exclusive dealing 198

  • CDC Techs., Inc. IDEXX Labs, Inc. 207

  • choice provision costs 190

  • and Clayton Act, Section 3 192

  • Coca-Cola Co. v. Harmar Bottling Co. 200

  • competitive harm theories and exclusive dealing 194–196

  • competitive harm theories and tying and bundling 187–189

  • Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp. 199, 207

  • and consumer welfare 187–189, 191, 194, 198, 200

  • contract duration effects and exclusive dealing 193–194

  • coordination problems between buyers and anti-competitive exclusion 195–196

  • dealer free-riding and exclusive dealing 197, 198

  • dealer loyalty and exclusive dealing 197

  • Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp. 202

  • downstream competition and exclusive dealing 195–196

  • economic analysis of exclusive dealing 194–200

  • economic analysis of tying and bundling 186–191

  • economies of scale and exclusive dealing 196

  • El Aguila Food Products v. Gruma 200

  • empirical evidence and exclusive dealing 198–200

  • empirical evidence and tying and bundling 190–191

  • exclusive dealing 191–200

  • Fox Motors, Inc. v. Mazda Distribs. (Gulf), Inc. 202

  • FTC v. McCormick 199, 200, 208

  • Hendricks Music Co. v. Steinway, Inc. 208

  • Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink 202

  • International Salt Co. v. United States 184, 203

  • Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde 184, 185, 192

  • Joyce Beverages v. Royal Crown Co. 197

  • Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. 203

  • legal analyses of tying and bundling 184–186

  • legal analysis of exclusive dealing 191–194

  • LePage’s v. 3M 185, 195, 203

  • Lorain Journal Co. v. United States 192

  • loyalty discounts and exclusive dealing 198–200

  • and market power 184, 187, 193

  • Menasha Corp. v. News Am. Mktg. In-Store, Inc. 206

  • monopolist capturing producer’s profits 188

  • Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc. 202

  • N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States 201

  • Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents 202

  • Omega Envtl. Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc. 207

  • ‘one monopoly profit argument’ and tying and bundling 187–188

  • Ortho Diagnostic Systems v. Abbott Labs 203

  • Paddock Publ’ns., Inc. v. Chicago Tribune Co. 206, 207

  • and per se rules 184–185, 186

  • and preservation of insecure monopoly 188

  • procompetitive efficiencies and exclusive dealing 196–198

  • procompetitive efficiencies and tying and bundling 189–190

  • p. 286production costs and tying in single bundle 189–190

  • retail conspiracy, distribution access denied 195

  • R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Philip Morris Inc. 193–194, 199, 200

  • Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus. 197, 207

  • rule of reason analysis and exclusive dealing 193

  • rule of reason analysis and tying and bundling 186

  • Ryko Manufacturing Co. v. Eden Services 197

  • and Sherman Act 185, 192, 194

  • Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co. 192

  • Standard Oil Co. v. United States 184, 192

  • supplier access to the retailer’s loyal customer base and exclusive dealing 198

  • Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co. 192

  • technology exception to per se rule 185

  • Thompson Everett, Inc. v. Nat’l Cable Adver. 207

  • tying and bundling arrangements 183–191

  • United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States 192

  • United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises (Fortner II) 184

  • United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc. 197

  • United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp. 202

  • United States v. Loew’s, Inc. 185, 201

  • United States v. Microsoft Corp. 185, 202, 204

  • United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. 203

  • US Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc. 207

  • US Philips Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n 202

  • and vertical restraints 191

  • Wells Real Estate, Inc. v. Greater Lowell Bd. of Realtors 202

• F. Hoffman–La Roche Ltd. v. Empagram S.A. 108

• Farrell, J. 255, 256, 275

• Fashion Originators’ Guild v. Federal Trade Commission 56–57, 58, 61

• Faull, J. 108

• Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute 33, 36, 40

• Federal Trade Commission v. H.J. Heinz Co. 236

• Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana Federation of Dentists 51–52, 61

• Federal Trade Commission v. McCormick 199, 200, 208

• Fisher, F. 80

• Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz 178

• In re Flat Glass 39

• Fortner II (United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises) 184

• Fox Motors, Inc. v. Mazda Distribs. (Gulf), Inc. 202

• Friedman, J. 278

• Frischmann, B. 172

• Froeb, L. 255

• Fudenberg, D. 121

• Fumagalli, C. 196, 207

• Gallini, N. 262, 275

• Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., Inc. 161

• Gandhi, A. 256

• Gavil, A. 111

• GE/Agfa example, horizontal mergers 248–249

• Genesove, D. 40, 127, 255

• Ghosh, Shubha 213–233

• Gilbert, R. 261

• Glazer, K. 206

• Goldfarb et al. v. Virginia State Bar 61

• Goldman, L. 37

• Gomez, R. 128

• Graham v. John Deere Co. 272

• Granitz, E. 150, 207

• Green, E. 252

• Green, J. 261, 276

• Greve, M. 18

• Griffin, C. 91

• Grimes, W. 202, 230

• group boycotts law 46–63

  • p. 287and access denial to suppliers or customers 46–47

  • and ancillary restraints doctrine 49

  • Associated Press v. United States 53, 61–62

  • Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Association 50

  • Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System 49

  • Business Electronics v. Sharp 57–58

  • clothing design protection 56–57

  • and competition regulation among participating firms 46

  • and consumer welfare 47–49, 50, 51–53

  • Deesen v. Professional Golfers’ Association (PGA) 50, 61

  • Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Association v. United States 55–56

  • economic perspectives on 47–49

  • Fashion Originators’ Guild v. Federal Trade Commission 56–57, 58, 61

  • Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana Federation of Dentists 51–52, 61

  • ‘forbidden category’ and reasonable argument 57–58

  • Goldfarb et al. v. Virginia State Bar 61

  • horizontal agreement injuring competitor 54, 57–58, 59

  • intellectual property and increase in consumer welfare 48–49

  • Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde 61

  • Klor’s Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc. 57–58

  • member expulsion due to ownership change 53–55

  • Molinas v. National Basketball Association 61

  • Neeld v. National Hockey League 47–48

  • non-regulatory boycotts 55–59

  • Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationery and Printing Co. 51, 53–55, 58, 59, 61, 62

  • Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States 60

  • Powell v. National Football League 61

  • product necessity boycotts 51

  • and product quality 49

  • and professional qualifications 52

  • and profits 49

  • regulatory boycotts 49–55

  • and rule of reason 54

  • and Sherman Act, Section 2 46

  • Silver v. New York Stock Exchange 52–53

  • Smith v. Pro Football, Inc. 51

  • and sports teams 50–51

  • Toys ‘R’ Us v. Federal Trade Commission 58–59

  • United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. 37, 49

  • and vertical agreements 58–59

• Gurrea, S. 37

• Haddock, D. 37

• Hahn, R. 18

• Hanover Shoe Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. 13–14

• Hanssen, F.A. 201

• Hanssens, D. 231

• Harrison, Jeffrey L. 46–63, 128

• Hart, D. 231

• Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. 18

• Hay, G. 37, 40, 130, 139

• Hazlett, T. 127

• Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc. 174, 176

• Heide, J. 198

• Heidt, R. 61

• Hemphill, C. 117, 141

• Hendricks Music Co. v. Steinway, Inc. 208

• Herfort, J. 141

• In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig. 38

• Holiday Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Philip Morris Inc. 40, 41, 42

• Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corporation 19

• Holt, C. 37

• horizontal agreements

  • facilitating practices and concerted action 27, 32–34

  • injuring competitor, group boycotts law 54, 57–58, 59

• horizontal mergers, analysis of market concentration in 234–260

  • p. 288Brown Shoe Co. v. United States 251

  • cartels and cheating, deterrence of 240–243, 244

  • cartels and consensus 239–240

  • cartels and market concentration, benefits of 240, 242–243

  • cartels and price-fixing 239, 243

  • and Clayton Act, Section 7 235, 236

  • competitive effects 238–249

  • coordinated competitive effects 238–245

  • differentiated product industry, competitive effects of 245–249

  • Federal Trade Commission v. H.J. Heinz Co. 236

  • GE/Agfa example 248–249

  • Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) as market concentration measure 238

  • market concentration in legal framework for merger analysis 235–236

  • market concentration measurement 238

  • market definition role and market concentration 237, 249

  • maverick firms and merger analysis 243–245

  • and Sherman Act, Section 1 239

  • unilateral competitive effects 245–249

  • unilateral competitive effects and consumer choice 248

  • unilateral competitive effects and price constraint removal 246–247, 249

  • United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc. 235–236

  • United States v. General Dynamics Corp. 235

  • United States v. Pabst Brewing Co. 251

  • United States v. Philadelphia National Bank 235, 236

  • United States v. Von’s Grocery Co. 251

  • Whirlpool/Maytag example 248

• Hovenkamp, H. 17, 18–19, 139, 141–151 passim, 162, 169, 171–179 passim, 193, 202, 206

• Hurwicz, J. 139

• Hylton, Keith 17, 20, 37, 82–115, 161, 169, 174–175, 178, 179, 230

• Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois 13–14

• Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink 80, 202

• IMS Health GmbH v. NDC Health GmbH 165–166, 168, 173–174

• In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig. 39

• In re Citric Acid Litig. 42

• In re Flat Glass 39

• In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig. 38

• In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig. 42

• Information Resources, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp 152

• intellectual property law

  • and essential facilities doctrine 163–167, 168, 169–170, 173–174

  • and increase in consumer welfare 48–49

  • and vertical restraints, parallels between 215, 220, 226

  • see also patent litigation

• International Audiotext Network, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. 174

• International Salt Co. v. United States 184, 203

• Ippolito, P. 231

• Isaac, R. 128

• Jacobson, J. 202, 206

• Jacquemin, A. 38, 40, 252

• Jamsports & Enter. LLC v. Paradama Prods., Inc. 176

• Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde 61, 184, 185, 192

• Joskow, P. 129, 131

• Joyce Beverages v. Royal Crown Co. 197

• JTC Petroleum Co. v. Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc. 35–36, 38

• Jung, Y. 128–129

• Kahai, S. 79

• Kahn, A. 88–89, 90, 111

• Kalven, H. 17

• Kaplow, L. 206, 229, 253, 276

• Kaserman, D. 78

• Kattan, J. 37

• p. 289Katz, M. 262

• Kauper, T. 19

• Kay, J. 231

• Kellogg 80

• Kenney, R. 201

• Kessides, I. 255

• Kessler, D. 205, 214

• Kestenbaum, L. 37

• Kitch, E. 276

• Kitti, C. 276

• Klein, B. 126, 150, 197, 200, 201, 206, 207, 208, 221

• Klemperer, P. 261

• Klevorick, A. 117, 129, 131

• Klor’s Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc. 57–58

• Kobayashi, Bruce H. 80, 116–156, 202, 204, 208

• Kolasky, W. 202

• Koller, R. 119, 125, 138, 139

• Kovacic, W. 17, 39, 40, 139

• Krattenmaker, T. 78, 110, 207

• Kreps, D. 39, 122, 128–129

• Kuhn, K.-U. 253, 254

• Lambert, T. 143, 149, 208

• Lande, R. 40

• Landes, W. 17, 61, 79

• Lao, M. 108

• Layne-Farrar, A. 18

• LeBlanc, G. 121

• Leddy, M. 162, 173, 179

• Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. 33–34, 64, 203, 213, 214–215, 216–227

• LePage’s v. 3M 147–148, 149, 185, 195, 203

• Lerner, A. 68–70, 73, 74, 197, 208

• Lerner, J. 126

• Leslie, C. 37, 40

• Letwin, W. 108

• Levenstein, M. 254

• Levin, R. 126–127

• Lipsky, A. 109, 173, 174, 206

• Longdin, L. 167, 177

• Lopatka, J. 40, 144, 175, 179

• Lorain Journal Co. v. United States 175, 192

• Lott, J. 126, 127–128

• Lyon, T. 37

• McAfee, P. 19

• McChesney, F. 17

• McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas Co. 151

• McGee, J. 118, 119, 130, 139, 150, 151

• McGowan, D. 175, 179

• McGowan, J. 80

• McKenzie-Willamette Hospital v. Peace Health 152

• Magill II (RTE and ITP v. Commission) 164–165, 166, 168, 173–174

• Maple Flooring Mfg. Assn. v. United States 41

• Marquardt, P. 162, 173, 179

• Marvel, H. 40, 208, 221

• Marx, L. 124

• Mason, E. 91, 92, 110–111

• Mathewson, F. 221

• Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 17, 27, 30, 33, 34, 108, 117, 139–140, 144, 151

• MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T 161–162

• Meese, A. 224

• Melamed, A. 90–91, 97, 109

• Menasha Corp. v. News Am. Mktg. In‑Store, Inc. 206

• mergers, horizontal see horizontal mergers, analysis of market concentration in

• Merges, R. 276

• Meurer, Michael J. 261–277

• Microsoft v. Commission 167–168

• Milgrom, P. 121, 122, 123–124

• Miller, J. 127

• Miller v. Hedlund 41

• Mills, D. 125, 141

• Milne, R. 39

• MindGames, Inc. v. Western Publ’g Co. 20

• Molinas v. National Basketball Association 61

• monopolization standards, law and economics of 82–115

  • ‘abuse standard’ 84

  • Alcoa (United States v. Alum. Co. of America) 85–86, 87, 88, 105

  • American Federation of Tobacco Growers v. Neal 106

  • p. 290anticompetitive act, defining 98

  • Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. 86–87, 108, 109

  • assessment in light of error 100–107

  • Associated Press v. United States 99

  • balancing test approach 85–87

  • baseline probabilities and ex post error rates 104–105

  • Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. 86, 90, 105, 109

  • common law background 84

  • consumer harm test 93, 94–95, 98, 100–101, 105, 106

  • Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atlantic Corp. 109

  • Darcy v. Allen 84

  • and distribution of error costs 83

  • dominant firm changing product design to enhance competition 98, 102–103

  • Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services 108

  • efficiency measurement 11, 90, 95–96, 97–98, 99–100, 104, 106

  • equally-efficient-competitor test 89, 99–100

  • error costs and market constraints 102–103, 105–106

  • and error probabilities in antitrust 89

  • errors and biases, types of 100–102

  • ‘essential facilities’ 86–87, 106

  • and European Community Treaty, Article 82 82

  • exclusionary act and efficiency 90

  • exclusivity contract example 93–94, 96–97, 101, 103

  • and expected cost of errors 102–103, 105–107

  • F. Hoffman–La Roche Ltd. v. Empagram S.A. 108

  • false acquittal versus false conviction costs 102–105, 106, 107

  • future of 105–107

  • history of 83–87

  • incompatible design change example 98, 101

  • market performance test 91–92

  • Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 108

  • modeling 92–100

  • new entrants, encouragement of 102, 103, 106

  • ‘no-economic-sense’ test and unlawful monopolization 91, 99

  • and predatory pricing 86

  • profit decomposition analysis 98–99, 102–103

  • and profit-sacrifice test 87, 90–91, 97–98, 99

  • proposed monopolization standards 87–92

  • and rent seeking 89, 102, 103–104

  • sacrifice-plus-recoupment test 91

  • and Sherman Act, Section 2 82,

  • 83–87

  • and specific intent approach 82, 83, 84–85, 88–89, 91, 101, 105, 106

  • and specific intent approach, modeling 96–100

  • Standard Oil Co. v. United States 84–85

  • Trinko (Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of V. Trinko) 86–87, 105, 106

  • United States v. Alum. Co. of America 108

  • United States v. American Tobacco Co. 108

  • United States v. Microsoft Corp. 87, 108, 111

  • United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. 109

  • United States v. US Steel Corp. 108

  • welfare balancing approach 82–83, 86, 87, 88–89, 90, 91–92, 100, 101–102, 104, 105

  • welfare balancing approach, modeling 93–96, 114–115

  • welfare tradeoff considerations 83, 94, 103

• monopoly power in antitrust, economics of 64–81

  • Alcoa (United States v. Alum. Co. of America) 74

  • American Tobacco Co. v. United States 79

  • capital costs as entry barrier 76

  • circumstantial evidence of monopoly power 74

  • p. 291consumer preference and entry barriers 76

  • consumer surplus and perfect competition 65

  • direct evidence of monopoly power 73–74

  • and dominant firms 71–73

  • Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services 79

  • entry barriers, importance of 75–76

  • exclusion of rivals as evidence of monopoly power 73–74

  • Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink 80

  • Kellogg 80

  • Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. 33–34, 64

  • Lerner Index and measurement of monopoly power 68–70, 73, 74

  • market definition, importance of 76–77

  • and market equilibrium 65–66, 74

  • monopoly power in antitrust law 73–77

  • monopoly power in economics 65–70

  • and patents 80

  • and perfect competition 65

  • product differentiation problems 75

  • and profit maximizing firm 65, 66–68, 75

  • and Sherman Act, Section 2 64

  • social welfare maximization and perfect competition 65–66, 75

  • Spectrum Sports v. McQuillian 77

  • United States v. Aluminum Company of America 79

  • United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (Cellophane) 73, 74, 79

  • United States v. Grinnell Corp. 64, 74, 77

  • Walker Process Equip. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp. 77

• Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. 39, 217

• Motta, M. 196, 207, 253

• Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc. 202

• Mullin, W. 40, 127, 255

• Mumford, M. 125, 141

• Murphy, K. 200, 208, 221

• N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States 201

• Nagata, E. 38

• Nalebuff, B. 204–205

• Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents 202

• Neeld v. National Hockey League 47–48

• Nikpay, A. 108

• Nordhaus, W. 261

• Norfolk Monument Co. v. Woodlawn Mem’l Gardens, Inc. 39

• Normann, H. 128

• Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationery and Printing Co. 51, 53–55, 58, 59, 61, 62

• Ocean Shipping Cartel study 125

• O’Connell, S. 60

• Opler, T. 127–128

• Oppenheim, S.C. 91

• Ordover, J. 19, 119, 121, 130, 132, 133, 135, 146

• Ornstein, S. 231

• O’Rourke, M. 180

• Ortho Diagnostic Systems v. Abbott Labs 152, 203

• Oskar Bronner GmbH v. Mediaprint 165, 166–167

• Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States 159–160, 161, 170

• Overstreet, T. 231

• Owen, B. 37

• Pace, J. 39

• Paddock Publ’ns., Inc. v. Chicago Tribune Co. 206, 207

• Padilla, A. 111, 129

• Page, William H. 19, 23–45, 175, 179

• Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States 60

• Parkin, M. 78, 79

• patent litigation 261–276

  • and antitrust 270–272, 278–279

  • Duplan Corp. v. Deering Miliken, Inc. 275

  • Graham v. John Deere Co. 272

  • investment in research model 267, 268–270, 278–279

  • p. 292licensing and litigation model 262, 263–267, 268–270

  • and monopoly power 80

  • nonobviousness standard and optimal validity probability 263, 272–274

  • optimal patent policy 267–270, 278–279

  • and patent validity probability 261–263, 270–272

  • profits and licensing 262

  • settlement of patent litigation model 264–266

  • and social welfare 268–270, 279

  • US patent law, Section 103 272

  • see also intellectual property law

• Pautler, P. 127

• Pearlstein, D. 41

• Perloff, J. 79, 201, 205

• In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig. 42

• Piraino, T. 38

• Pitofsky, R. 17, 162, 172

• Plott, C. 128

• Podolny, J. 126

• Poitevin, M. 121

• Porter, R. 252

• Posner, R. 6, 17, 18, 25, 30, 37, 38, 61, 78, 79, 89, 99, 129, 204

• Powell v. National Football League 61

• predatory pricing, law and economics of 116–156

  • above-cost safe harbor rule 117, 125, 130, 132, 140–141, 143, 144–149

  • airline cases and opportunity cost 145–146

  • antitrust law 129–138

  • antitrust law and predation 138–149

  • Areeda–Turner test and cost-based rules 130–132, 139, 141

  • Barry Wright v. ITT Grinnell 151

  • below-cost dumping and state-run firms 127

  • Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. 38, 117, 125, 130, 132, 140–142, 143, 144–149

  • Brooke Group rule, challenges to 142, 145–149

  • cartel, inducing rival to join 125

  • Cascade Health Solutions v. Peace Health 148–149

  • ‘chain store paradox’ 119, 122

  • complete information model in intermediate goods markets 124

  • Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp. 144

  • and cost thresholds 140

  • courts and predation 138–141

  • and direct calculation of marginal cost 127

  • ‘dynamic’ predation rules, harmful effects of 132–133, 145

  • economic analysis of legal rules 129–130

  • economics of 117–129

  • and error costs 129–130

  • and exclusionary pricing behavior 140–142, 143–144

  • experimental evidence 128–129

  • false positives, high costs of 140

  • financial constraints based on asymmetric information 121

  • financial predation and the long purse 120–121, 126

  • financially constrained entrant 120–121

  • and firms’ attempts to control agency costs 121

  • and horizontal price fixing 130

  • Information Resources, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp 152

  • learning curve model of equilibrium predation 124, 135, 136

  • LePage’s v. 3M 147–148, 149

  • litigated cases, empirical studies of 124–129

  • litigated cases, measurement of success of 125

  • lowered prices to deter competitor 123–124, 125

  • lowered prices to deter entry 123, 128–129

  • loyalty discounts, market share discounts 144–145

  • McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas Co. 151

  • McKenzie-Willamette Hospital v. Peace Health 152

  • and managers’ compensation 127–128

  • p. 293and market power 118, 131, 134–135, 139

  • Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 117, 139–140, 144, 151

  • models supporting credible commitment 119

  • and monopolization standards 86

  • as monopolizing method 118, 142–144

  • multi-product firms and bundling 146–149

  • and multi-product price discounts 148–149

  • multiple markets and reputation 121–122, 127–129, 132

  • and optimal antitrust rules 130–138

  • Ortho Diagnostic Systems v. Abbott Labs 152

  • and price fixing 118

  • price theory and predation 118–119

  • price-cost comparisons as presumptive test 139–140

  • as profit sacrifice 133–138

  • profitable predation, lack of evidence for 119

  • and recouping investment in below-cost prices 140–141

  • regression analysis to test models 126–127

  • regulation and public ownership effects 127

  • and Robinson-Patman Act, Section 13 138, 139, 140

  • and Sherman Act, Section 2 138, 140–141, 147–148

  • ‘signal jamming’ model 121

  • signaling models 122–124

  • SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co. 147, 148

  • and social characteristics of entrants 126

  • Spirit Airlines v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. 145–146

  • Standard Oil Co. v. United States 118, 119

  • and strategic theory 119–124, 132–133

  • sub-markets and joint and common costs 146

  • uncertainty of 119, 122–124, 129–130

  • US v. AMR Corp. 145–146

  • Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co. 139

  • Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd. v. British Airways plc 152

  • welfare effects 117, 124, 129, 130, 134, 135–138, 143–144

  • Weyerhaeuser v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co. and predatory buying 142–144

  • William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co 151

• Priest, G. 126, 275, 276

• Qureshi, A. 202

• Rasmussen, E. 195–196

• Reinganum, J. 276

• Rey, P. 204

• Riordan, M. 124

• Ritter, C. 180

• R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Philip Morris Inc. 193–194, 199, 200

• Roberts, J. 121, 122, 123–124

• Robinson, G. 109

• Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus. 197, 207

• Romaine, R. 92, 109

• Rosch, J. 232

• RTE and ITP v. Commission (Magill II) 164–165, 166, 168, 173–174

• rule of reason

  • and exclusive dealing 193

  • and group boycotts law 54

  • and tying and bundling 186

  • and vertical restraints see vertical restraints, competition and the rule of reason

• Ryko Manufacturing Co. v. Eden Services 197

• Sá, N. 252

• Salinger, M. 111, 204, 205

• Saloner, G. 119, 121, 122, 123, 130, 133, 135

• Salop, S. 37, 92, 93, 98, 101, 108, 109, 110, 122, 124, 144, 179, 207, 258

• Sappington, D. 128

• Sass, T. 198

• Saving, T. 79

• Scharfstein, D. 121, 124

• p. 294Scheffman, D. 37, 110, 116, 134, 207

• Scherer, F. 130, 180

• Schmalensee, R. 253

• Schoen, D. 17

• Schwartz, M. 134, 205

• Scotchmer, S. 261, 276

• Scott Morton, F. 126

• Segal, I. 195–196

• Selten, R. 119

• Shaffer, G. 42, 124

• Shapiro, C. 37, 122, 124, 206, 229, 244, 247, 253, 255, 256, 257, 261, 262

• Shepard, A. 275

• Sherman Act, Section 1, facilitating practices and concerted action under 23–45

  • 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy 41

  • agreement, definition and proof of 26–29

  • Am. Column & Lumber Co. v. United States 41

  • Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States 39

  • Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Goodman 41

  • background 23–26

  • basing-point pricing 36

  • Battipaglia v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth. 41

  • Beer & Pop Warehouse v. Jones 41

  • Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 26, 28, 38

  • Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Sask. 39

  • Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. 38

  • California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. 41

  • Canterbury Liquors & Pantry v. Sullivan 41

  • and cartels 24, 29, 31, 34

  • Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc. 30–31, 32, 34

  • category restraints of trade, limitation of 24

  • Cement Mfrs. Protective Assn. v. United States 41

  • City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc. 39, 40

  • Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst. 38, 40

  • Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. 39

  • Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp. 37

  • Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Maleng 41

  • Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Association v. United States 32–33

  • E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC (Ethyl) 33

  • and exclusive dealing and tying arrangements 185, 192, 194

  • facilitating practices 29–36

  • FTC v. Cement Institute 33, 36, 40

  • Holiday Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Philip Morris Inc. 40, 41, 42

  • and horizontal agreements 27, 32–34

  • In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig. 39

  • In re Citric Acid Litig. 42

  • In re Flat Glass 39

  • In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig. 38

  • In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig. 42

  • and independent action 27–28

  • and individual self-interest 28

  • information exchange agreements 32–33

  • JTC Petroleum Co. v. Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc. 35–36, 38

  • Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. 33–34

  • Maple Flooring Mfg. Assn. v. United States 41

  • Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 27, 30, 33, 34

  • Miller v. Hedlund 41

  • Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. 39

  • Norfolk Monument Co. v. Woodlawn Mem’l Gardens, Inc. 39

  • oligopoly and collusion 24–25, 30, 34

  • and parallel conduct 27–29, 30, 33–36

  • ‘plus factor’ evidence and exclusion of independent evidence 27, 28

  • and price fixing 24–25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 32–33, 35–36

  • price lists, liquor ‘post and hold’ 32

  • pricing transparency, dealing agreements to increase 30–32

  • p. 295and private communication 29

  • and public price posting 35

  • and resale price maintenance 31, 33–35

  • search or transaction costs, reducing 26

  • Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United States 31, 32

  • TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer 41

  • Theater Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp. 27–28, 35, 40

  • Todd v. Exxon Corp. 39, 41

  • trade restrictions and unenforceability of Act 27

  • United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. 37

  • United States v. Am. Linseed Oil Co. 41

  • United States v. Citizen & S. Nat’l Bank 41

  • United States v. Container Corp. of Am. 32, 35

  • United States v. Gen. Motors Corp. 38

  • United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. 38

  • United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n 37, 38

  • and vertical agreements 31, 34

  • Virginia Vermiculite, Ltd. v. Historic Green Springs, Inc. 39

  • and wholesale price publishing 35–36

  • Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA 40, 42

• Sherman Act, Section 2

  • early development, and monopolization standards

  • 84–85

  • and essential facilities doctrine 159–160, 161, 172, 176

  • and exclusive dealing and tying arrangements, antitrust analysis of 192, 194

  • and group boycotts law 46

  • modern, and monopolization standards 85–87

  • and monopolization standards 82, 83–87

  • and monopoly power in antitrust 64

  • and predatory pricing 138, 140–141, 147–148

• Shughart, W. 17

• Sidak, J. 109, 128, 173, 174

• Silver v. New York Stock Exchange 52–53

• Simpson, J. 196, 207

• Six West Retail Acquisition, Inc. v. Sony Theatre Management Corp. 19

• Slade, M. 38, 40

• Small, J. 172, 180

• Smith, V. 128

• Smith, A. 65

• Smith v. Pro Football, Inc. 51

• SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co. 147, 148

• Snyder, C. 121

• Snyder, E. 19

• Southern Bell Company case 127

• Spectrum Sports v. McQuillian 77

• Spence, A. 111

• Spirit Airlines v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. 145–146

• Spratling, G. 18

• Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co. 192

• Standard Oil Co. v. United States 84–85, 118, 119, 184, 192

• State Oil v. Khan 217, 220

• Stein, A. 17

• Stempel, S. 37

• Stigler, G. 17, 36–37, 38, 39, 79, 92, 201, 252

• Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United States 31, 32

• Sullivan, E. 19

• Sullivan, L. 230

• Suslow, V. 253, 254

• Sutton, J. 252

• Swift & Co. v. United States 19

• Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co. 192

• Telser, L. 120, 121

• Temple Lang, J. 173, 177, 180

• Tesler, L. 231

• Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher 174

• TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer 41

• Theater Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp. 27–28, 35, 40

• p. 296 Thompson Everett, Inc. v. Nat’l Cable Adver. 207

• Thorelli, H. 232

• Tirole, J. 121

• Todd v. Exxon Corp. 39, 41

• Tom, W. 206, 208

• Toys ‘R’ Us v. Federal Trade Commission 58–59, 214

• Trinko (Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko) 86–87, 105, 106, 160–161, 169

• Tullock, G. 89, 94–95, 103

• Turner, D. 25, 30, 34, 38, 42, 86, 108, 130–132, 139, 141

• Turney, J. 177

• Twin Labs., Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness 175–176

• Twombly (Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly) 16, 17, 26, 27, 28, 38

• tying arrangements see exclusive dealing and tying arrangements, antitrust analysis of

• United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States 192

• United States

  • antitrust enforcement, economics of see antitrust enforcement, economics of

  • Antitrust Modernization Commission 14, 185–186

  • Clayton Act 6, 7, 18, 23, 64, 192, 235, 236

  • decentralization of antitrust enforcement 1, 5–11

  • essential facilities doctrine see essential facilities doctrine

  • exclusive dealing and tying arrangements see exclusive dealing and tying arrangements, antitrust analysis of

  • FTC Act 18

  • Georgetown Study of Private Antitrust Litigation 11

  • group boycotts law see group boycotts law

  • Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act 3, 10–11

  • monopolization standards, law and economics of see monopolization standards, law and economics of

  • monopoly power in antitrust, economics of see monopoly power in antitrust, economics of

  • National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) 6–7

  • patent litigation see patent litigation

  • predatory pricing law see predatory pricing, law and economics of

  • Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) 19

  • Robinson-Patman Act 7, 18, 138, 139, 140

  • Sherman Act see Sherman Act, Section 1; Sherman Act, Section 2

  • vertical restraints see vertical restraints, competition and the rule of reason

• United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises (Fortner II) 184

• United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. 37, 49

• United States v. Alum. Co. of America (Alcoa) 74, 79, 85–86, 87, 88, 105, 108

• United States v. Am. Linseed Oil Co. 41

• United States v. American Tobacco Co. 108

• United States v. AMR Corp. 145–146

• United States v. Arnold, Schwinn, & Co. 217

• United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc. 235–236

• United States v. Broadcast Music, Inc. 19

• United States v. Citizen & S. Nat’l Bank 41

• United States v. Colgate 217

• United States v. Container Corp. of Am. 32, 35

• United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc. 197

• United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (Cellophane) 73, 74, 79

• United States v. Gen. Motors Corp. 38

• United States v. General Dynamics Corp. 235

• United States v. Griffith 175

• p. 297United States v. Grinnell Corp. 64, 74, 77

• United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp. 202

• United States v. Loew’s, Inc. 185, 201

• United States v. Microsoft Corp. 87, 108, 111, 185, 202, 204

• United States v. Pabst Brewing Co. 251

• United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. 38, 203

• United States v. Philadephia National Bank 235, 236

• United States v. Terminal Railroad Association 158–159, 160

• United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n 37, 38

• United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. 109

• United States v. US Steel Corp. 108

• United States v. Von’s Grocery Co. 251

• US Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc. 207

• US Philips Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n 202

• Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co. 139

• Vakkur, N. 19

• Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko 86–87, 105, 106, 160–161, 169

• vertical restraints, competition and the rule of reason 213–233

  • Albrecht v. Herald Tribune 217

  • Business Electronics v. Sharp 217

  • competitive norms 224–227

  • Consten and Grundig v. Commission 231

  • and consumer welfare 219, 224

  • Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. 217

  • contracts and territorial restrictions 222, 224–225

  • and distribution channel control 226

  • Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, Co. 216–217, 218, 220, 222, 225

  • E. Bement & Sons v. National Harrow Co. 230

  • economic theory 221–224

  • EU comparison 227–229

  • and exclusive dealing and tying arrangements 191

  • and free-riding 222, 223, 226

  • future after the rule of reason 229–230

  • horizontal and vertical arrangements, distinction between 214

  • and intellectual property law, parallels between 215, 220, 226

  • Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc. 213, 214–215, 216–227

  • and market forces 224–225

  • minimum resale price maintenance 214–227

  • minimum resale price maintenance, anti-competitive uses 218, 219, 220, 222–223

  • minimum resale price maintenance, pro-competitive benefits 218, 219, 220–221, 222–223

  • minimum resale price maintenance, quality and service, effects on 224–225

  • Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. 217

  • and per se rule 217, 218–221, 222, 225, 226

  • and rivalry in production and distribution chain 215

  • rule of reason versus per se rules 219–221

  • and Sherman Act, Section 1 217

  • State Oil v. Khan 217, 220

  • Toys ‘R’ Us v. Federal Trade Commission 214

  • United States v. Arnold, Schwinn, & Co. 217

  • United States v. Colgate 217

  • vertical restraints as a possible misnomer 213–216

• Vickers, J. 90, 109

• Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd. v. British Airways plc 152

• Virginia Vermiculite, Ltd. v. Historic Green Springs, Inc. 39

• Vistnes, G. 204

• Vita, M. 37, 205

• Vives, X. 40

• p. 298Waldman, M. 149, 204, 205, 207

• Walker Process Equip. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp. 77

• Waller, S. 172

• Waterson, M. 252

• Weiman, D. 126–127

• Weiss, L. 253

• Wells Real Estate, Inc. v. Greater Lowell Bd. of Realtors 202

• Werden, G. 39, 40, 91, 97, 144, 146, 175, 205, 251, 255

• Weyerhaeuser v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co. 142–144

• Whinston, M. 39, 40, 195, 204, 207, 255

• White, L. 19

• Wickelgren, A. 196, 207

• William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co 151

• Williamson, O. 92, 93–94, 103, 111, 132–133, 145

• Williamson, E. 17

• Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA 40, 42

• Willig, R. 132, 133, 146, 252, 256

• Wilson, R. 122, 128–129

• Winter, R. 221, 262

• Wright, Joshua D. 183–212

• Yamey, B. 125

• Yde, P. 205

• Zerbe, R. 125, 130, 131, 141