[In: Volume 7, Francesco Parisi (ed) Production of Legal Rules]

• p. 418p. 419Abbott, Kenneth W. 323
• Aberbach, Joel 69
• abortion rights 197
• Acemoglu, Daron 156, 159
• adjudication 63
  • precision of the law and accuracy of 22
  • social cost 46–52
• adverse selection 134
• Agbory, Julius A. 155
• agencies
  • political agency problem 58–61
  • production of legal rules by 62–64, 82–83
    • curbing discretion by procedural rules 64–68
    • delegation of rule-making power 77–80
    • econometric approaches to control of discretion 70–72
    • police-patrol control versus fire-alarm control 68–70
    • rule-production process 80–82
    • spatial approaches to control of discretion 72–76
• alcohol prohibition 190–191
• Alesina, A. 367
• Alexander, C. R. 219, 222
• Altree, Lillian R. 35–36
• anarchy 317–318
• Anderlini, Luca 151
• Angeloni, I. 367
• Aranson, Peter H. 94, 98, 125
• Aristotle 44, 342
• Armour, J. 220
• Arrow, Kenneth J. 126
• Arrow theorem 99
• Arruñada, Benito 156
• articulation theories 300–302
• Arvan, Lanny 78
• Ashenfelter, Orley 95
• asymmetric information
  • bias in common law and 139–140
  • criminal law and 217
• attribution theory 211
• Austrian economics
  • critique of efficiency in common law 124–128
• Ayres, Ian 243

• Bailey, Martin J. 97, 117, 133, 134
• Baker, Scott 150
• Balla, Steven J. 70
• bargaining power 7–8, 235
  • Coasian interjurisdictional bargains 357–360
  • settlement bargaining 22
• Baron, David P. 244
• Bartle, Ian 230
• Bawn, Kathleen 69, 78
• Baxter, William F. 35–36
• Beccaria, Cesare 188
• Beck, Nathaniel 71
• Becker, Gary S. 199
• Bederman, David J. 295
• behaviour
  • effects of precision of the law on 19–21, 23
  • effects of rules and standards on 25–27, 28–29
  • evolutionary models of judicial behaviour 86–98
  • focal point theory see focal point theory of expressive law
  • social normssee social norms
• Benabou, R. 210
• Bennedsen, Morten 76
• Benson, Bruce L. 66, 116
• Bentham, Jeremy 44, 341
• Berkowitz, Daniel 154
• Berman, Harold J. 146
• Besanko, David A. 78
• bias 34
  • cognitive biases 217–218
  • in common law 132–133, 142
    • asymmetric information 139–140
    • p. 420feedback effect of civil settlements 140–142
    • judges 118, 134–138
    • long-term interests of tort lawyers 133–134
    • path dependence and 138–139

• Blume, L. 13, 14, 31, 37
• Bosch-Domènech, Antoni 171
• Boudreaux, Donald J. 8
• bounded rationality 217–218
• Bradbury, J. C. 11
• Braithwaite, John 222, 243
• Brennan, Geoffrey 9, 10, 15
• Breton, Albert 81
• Bretton Woods institutions 312
• Breyer, Stephen G. 81
• Brough, Wayne 97
• Buchanan, James M. 3, 4, 5, 11–12, 128, 391
• Buell, S. 223
• Bull, Hedley 318
• bureaucracies
  • international law and 268–269
  • production of legal rules by 62–64, 82–83
    • curbing discretion by procedural rules 64–68
    • delegation of rule-making power 77–80
    • econometric approaches to control of discretion 70–72
    • police-patrol control versus fire-alarm control 68–70
    • rule-production process 80–82
    • spatial approaches to control of discretion 72–76
• Buskens, Vincent 232

• Cannas, G. 220
• Carbonara, Emanuela 192, 194, 195, 368, 369, 370
• Cary, I. W. 370
• change agents 209, 214
• Chile 412
• China 400, 410–411
• choice of law 376
  • forum shopping 378, 380, 383–384
    • moral hazard and 380–381
  • see also conflict of laws
• civil (code) law 144
  • judges 146–147
  • rent-seeking behaviour and 120, 122, 123
• Claessens, S. 408
• Clay, Karen B. 154
• Clement, A. 222
• Coase theorem 231
• Coasian interjurisdictional bargains 357–360
• coercion 275
• cognitive biases 217–218
• Cohen, Mark A. 79, 95
• common law 144, 146, 377
  • bias in 132–133, 142
    • asymmetric information 139–140
    • feedback effect of civil settlements 140–142
    • judges 118, 134–138
    • long-term interests of tort lawyers 133–134
    • path dependence and 138–139
• efficiency of 93–94, 96–98, 107–108
  • Austrian critique 124–128
  • demand-side analysis 109–114
  • public choice critiques 117–119
  • rent-seeking and 119, 120–124
  • supply-side model 114–117
• putative primacy of 158–159
  • adaptability 148–151
  • codification failures and endogenous legal traditions 157–158
  • criticisms 155–158
  • endogenous legal traditions 151–153
  • evidence 153–154
  • historical common law emphasis on private ordering 146–147
  • omitted variables and observational equivalence 155–157
• competition
  • competitive self-regulation 241–243
  • regulatory competition 386–388, 397–398
    • analytical framework 388–394
    • learning from 396–397
    • other structural issues 394–396
• compliance 323–324
• Concert of Europe 310
• Condorcet Jury theorem 99
• p. 421conflict of laws 376
  • approaches to conflicts 377–378
    • multilateral approach 379–380
    • substantive approach 380
    • unilateral approach 378
  • efficiency and evolution of rules 381–383
  • history 376–377
• Congress system 310, 314
• consensus test 5
• constitutional economics 3–4, 15
  • definition of constitutions 3
  • focal power of constitutional law 174–176
  • normative
    • critical evaluation 5–6
    • efficiency and 5
    • methodological foundations 4–5
  • positive
    • direct democracy versus representative institutions 12–14
    • explicit constitutional change 7–8
    • horizontal separation of powers 9–10
    • implicit constitutional change 8–9
    • presidential versus parliamentary systems 10–11
    • procedures for generating constitutional rules 6–7
    • relevance of preferences and restrictions for generating procedural rules 7
    • unicameral versus bicameral systems 11–12
• constructivism 318
• consumer protection 179
• contract law 29, 33, 35
• contractarian approaches 4
• control systems
  • discretion control
    • econometric approaches 70–72
    • spatial approaches 72–76
  • police-patrol control versus fire-alarm control 68–70
• conventions see social norms
• Cooter, Robert D. 9, 78, 97, 113, 151, 189, 207, 209
• co-regulation 244
• corporate law, legal harmonization of 370–372, 373
• corporate social responsibility 244–246
• corporatism 228
• corruption 11, 235
• Cosgel, Metin M. 99
• costssee legal costs
• countervailing norms 185, 197–198
• courts
  • international law and 266–268
  • international tribunals 264–266
  • see also judges
• Crain, W.M. 11
• Crawford, Vincent 172
• Crew, Michael A. 97, 119
• criminal law, social stigma and 205–206, 213
  • belief in stigmatizing effects of criminal law 218
  • bounded rationality and cognitive biases 217–218
  • economic perspective 218–220
  • information asymmetry and high legal standard 217
  • punishment 213–215
  • quantifying stigma 220–221
  • standard of proof 216–217
  • substantive issues 215–216
• Curran, Christopher 119
• Curran, John F. 119
• customary law 54
  • customary international law 258–259, 273, 293–294, 306–307
    • articulation theories 300–302
    • change and stability in 306
    • formation 298–300
    • formative elements 294–295
    • law and economics versus traditional theories 297–298
    • persistent objector doctrine 295–297, 302–304
    • subsequent objector doctrine 297, 304–306
    • treaties and 278–280
• Cutrone, M. 11
• cybersecurity 240

• Dahl, Robert 339
• D’Amato, A. 300
• Dawson, John P. 146
• p. 422De Alessi, Louis 126
• De Marzo, Peter 239
• decentralization see federalism
• delegation
  • agencies and bureaucracies and delegation of rule-making power 77–80
  • self-regulation as delegation of state law-making powers 232–235
• demand-side analysis of common law efficiency 109–114
• DeMesquita, Ethan Bueno 67
• democracy 175
  • direct democracy versus representative institutions 12–14
• Denicolò, Vincenzo 236
• Depoorter, Ben 122, 138, 140, 141
• DeShazo, J. R. 65
• Devries, A. 220
• direct democracy 12–14
• discretion
  • curbing discretion by procedural rules 64–68
  • econometric approaches to control of 70–72
  • spatial approaches to control of discretion 72–76
• Diver, Colin S. 24
• Djankov, Simeon 154
• Dragonetti, Giacomo 199

• Easterbrook, Frank H. 99
• econometric approaches to control of discretion 70–72
• Economic Freedom Index 14
• economic growth and development
  • democracy and 13
  • growth-oriented legal reforms 400–401, 415–416
    • calming disagreements about redistribution 413–415
    • inequality, power and rights protection 407–410
    • logic of reform in China 410–411
    • loser’s dilemma in economic growth 411–413
    • Pareto reform, information and identity 405–406
    • types of reform 401–405
  • individual rights and 14–15
• efficiency
  • common law 93–94, 96–98, 107–108
    • Austrian critique 124–128
    • demand-side analysis 109–114
    • public choice critiques 117–119
    • rent-seeking and 120–124
    • supply-side model 114–117
  • conflict of laws and evolution of rules 381–383
  • federalism and
    • balancing participation and efficiency 361–362
    • Coasian interjurisdictional bargains 357–360
    • critique of Tiebout approach 347–352
    • politics of central government legislative policy 360–361
    • politics of state legislative policy 352–360
    • pros and cons of decentralization 344–346
    • Tiebout approach 346–347
  • normative constitutional economics and 4, 5
• Ehrlich, Isaac 24, 44, 45, 46, 50, 58
• Eisenberg, Theodore 95
• Elhauge, Einer R. 117
• Elkins, Z. 7
• Ellickson, R. 209
• Elliott, E. Donald 98
• Elster, Jon 6, 7, 175
• endogenous legal traditions 151–153, 157–158
• enforcement
  • self-regulation 237–238
  • social norms 187
• environmental law 218
• Eom, Jiyong 76
• Epstein, David 75, 76
• Epstein, Richard A. 126, 393
• Escresa, L. 210
• Etro, F. 367
• European Union (EU) 312–313, 340
  • conflict of laws in 379
  • environmental law 218
  • legal harmonization in 367–368, 372–374
  • regulation in 237
  • subsidiarity principle 366–367
• p. 423evolutionary models of judicial behaviour 86–98
• expressive law 188–190
  • focal point theory see focal point theory of expressive law
• expropriation 34–35
• externalities 276

• Faith, Roger L. 73
• Fedderkez, Johannes W. 155
• federalism 339–341, 366
  • economic efficiency and
    • balancing participation and efficiency 361–362
    • Coasian interjurisdictional bargains 357–360
    • critique of Tiebout approach 347–352
    • politics of central government legislative policy 360–361
    • politics of state legislative policy 352–356
    • pros and cons of decentralization 344–346
    • Tiebout approach 346–347
• Feld. L. P. 13
• Feldman, Sven E. 76
• Feldstein, Martin 37
• Felli, Leonardo 151
• Ferejohn, John A. 73, 74
• Fernandez, Patricio 148, 149, 150
• Figueiredo, Rui J. P. de 69
• Fiorina, Morris P. 77, 79
• fire-alarm control 68–70
• Fischel, William A. 37, 390, 391, 394
• Fitts, Michael 356
• focal point theory of expressive law 167–168, 181–182
  • applications 174
    • focal power of constitutional law 174–176
    • focal power of international law 176–177
    • focal power of law in everyday disputes 177–179
    • focal power to clarify consumer rules 179
  • experimental literature on legal focal points 171–174
  • legal sanctions and 179–181
  • theory 168–171
• Fon, Vincy 44, 45, 48, 49, 51, 55, 119, 122, 134, 135, 138, 282, 284, 286, 287, 298, 299, 301, 302, 304
• forum shopping 378, 380, 383–384
  • moral hazard and 380–381
• Fox, Eleanor M. 80, 81
• France 146–147, 414
• fraud 29
• free riding 244, 245
• Freeman, Jody 65
• Frey, B. 13
• Friedman, Milton 240
• functionalism 315
• Funk, P. 222
• Furlong, Scott R. 62, 72

• Galbiati, Roberto 173, 174
• Gamble, John K. 288
• game theory 167, 168, 258
  • focal point theory see focal point theory of expressive law
  • prisoner’s dilemma 171, 175, 176, 258, 275, 298
• Garrett, Geoffrey 176, 179
• Gely, Rafael 73, 74
• General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 57, 312, 326
• Gennaioli, Nicola 98, 136, 137, 151
• Germany 67, 414
• Gerson, Jacob E. 55, 59, 60
• Ghei, Nita 51, 55
• Ginsburg, Tom 9, 176
• Glaeser, Edward L. 146, 147, 394
• globalization 313, 324–325
• Gneezy, Uri 185, 214
• Goetz, Charles 391
• Goffman, Erving 205
• Goldman, Lee 383
• Goldschmidt, Chanan 155
• Goldsmith, Jack L. 176, 258, 273, 275, 276, 280, 298
• Goldstein, Judith 323
• Goodman, John C. 96, 97, 112
• governments
  • direct democracy versus representative institutions 12–14
  • effects on government behaviour of requiring transition relief 33–36
  • presidential versus parliamentary systems 10–11
  • unicameral versus bicameral systems of government 11–12
• p. 424Graetz, Michael J. 30, 31, 37
• Grajzl, Peter 76
• Greig, D. W. 287
• Greve, Michael 393
• Grossma, Gene 149
• Grotius, Hugo 318
• growth see economic growth and development
• Guerriero, Carmine 148, 151, 153, 157

• Hackett, Steven C. 235
• Hadfield, Gillian K. 94, 125, 179
• Hale, Robert L. 30, 31, 35
• Hamilton, Bruce 391
• Hamilton, James T. 67, 71
• Hamlin, Alan 9, 10, 15
• Hammond, Thomas H. 12, 71, 74
• Hardin, Russell 175
• Harel, A. 222
• harmonizationsee legal harmonization
• Harrington, W. 71
• Hart, H. 213
• Hathaway, Oona A. 113, 281
• Hayek, Friedrich A. 93, 124–125, 126, 147
• Hefeker, Carsten 151
• Heiner, Ronald A. 55, 97
• Helfer, Laurence R. 287, 288, 290
• Helpman, Elhanan 149
• Henry, Peter Blair 156
• Hermalin, Benjamin E. 37
• Higgins, Richard S. 95
• Hirshleifer, Jack 97, 113
• Hobbes, Thomas 4, 317
• Holburn, Guy L. F. 72, 76
• Holmström, Bengt 67, 70
• Hopenhayn, Hugo 68
• Horn, Murray 65, 66
• Huber, John D. 76
• Huber, Ulrich 377
• human rights issues 14–15, 407–410
• Huo, Yuen J. 190
• Hylton, K. 139

• Iceland 415
• implementation of legislation 55
• incentives
  • effects of transitions on private actors’ incentives and risk-bearing costs 31–32
  • effects on government behaviour of requiring transition relief 33–36
  • lawyers’ incentives to formulate legal commands 29
  • social norms and 205
• Index of Economic Freedom 14
• inequality 407–410
• informal rules 71
• information
  • asymmetric 139–140, 217
  • costs 47
  • social stigma and social norms and 208–210
• Inman, Robert 356
• innovation, optimal instruments of 198–200
• institutions see international organizations
• instrumentalism 323–324
• interest groups 76, 77, 110, 118–119, 134, 235
• International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 263
• International Court of Justice (ICJ) 176–177
• international institutions see international organizations
• international law 255–256
  • customary 258–259, 273, 293–294, 306–307
    • articulation theories 300–302
    • change and stability in 306
    • formation 298–300
    • formative elements 294–295
    • law and economics versus traditional theories 297–298
    • persistent objector doctrine 295–297, 302–304
    • subsequent objector doctrine 297, 304–306
    • treaties and 278–280
  • definition 256–261
  • focal power of 176–177
  • treatiessee treaties
  • uses 261
    • ad hoc international tribunals 265–266
    • formal and ongoing international tribunals 264–265
    • international institutions 261–262
    • national bureaucracies 268–269
    • national courts 266–268
    • p. 425nonjudicial bodies with authority to bind states 262
    • nonjudicial bodies with authority to extend or withhold resources 263–264
    • nonjudicial bodies with authority to impose reputational sanctions 262–263
    • private actors 269
  • see also choice of law
• International Monetary Fund (IMF) 263–264, 312
• international organizations 261–262, 277, 326–327
  • ad hoc international tribunals 265–266
  • conceptual approaches 314
    • IOs as formal organizations 314–317
    • IOs as ordering principle 317–319
    • IOs as regimes 319–320
  • contemporary theoretical approaches
    • actors beyond the state 324–325
    • compliance and effectiveness 323–324
    • institutional variation and design 321–323
    • rationalist regime theory 320–321
  • formal and ongoing international tribunals 264–265
  • history
    • post-WWII international organizations 311–313
    • recent trends 313–314
    • rise of intergovernmental organizations 309–311
  • nonjudicial bodies with authority to bind states 262
  • nonjudicial bodies with authority to extend or withhold resources 263–264
  • nonjudicial bodies with authority to impose reputational sanctions 262–263
• Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) 264
• investment, lawmaking compared with 54

• Japan 220–221
• Johnson, Ronald N. 81
• Johnson, Simon 156, 159
• judges 146–147
  • bias 118, 134–138
    • plaintiff case selection and 134–136
    • without plaintiff case selection 136–138
  • efficiency 93–94, 96–98, 107–108
    • Austrian critique 124–128
    • demand-side analysis 109–114
    • public choice critiques 117–119
    • rent-seeking and 120–124
    • supply-side model 114–117
  • efficient rules and 108–109
  • judge-made law 93
    • evolutionary models of judicial
    • behaviour 86–98
    • multi-judge interactions 98–100
    • utility maximization 94–95
  • judicial interpretation 44–46, 54
  • payment of 115
• jurisdiction 114–115
  • see also choice of law

• Kahan, Dan 192, 194
• Kahan, Marcel 28
• Kaplow, Louis 19, 22, 23, 25, 30, 31, 37, 45, 47, 48, 49, 58, 79
• Karpoff, J. 219, 221
• Katz, Avery 96
• Katzmann, Robert A. 73
• Keefer, P. 14
• Kelly, J. M. 295
• Kemp, R. 220
• Keohane, Robert O. 321
• Kerwin, Cornelius M. 62, 80
• Keynes, John Maynard 15
• Kim, Sukkoo 154
• Kirchgässner, G. 13
• Klabbers, Jan 287
• Klein, Benjamin 98, 139, 219
• Kleiner, Morris M. 241
• Klerman, Daniel 116, 147, 155
• Klick, Jonathan 392, 393, 394, 396
• Knack, S. 14
• Knott, Jack H. 71, 74
• Kobayashi, Bruce H. 81, 367
• Kornhauser, Lewis A. 97, 99, 113, 151
• Kötz, Hein 144
• Krupnick, A. 71
• Kuznets, S. 240

• p. 426La Porta, Rafael 144, 145, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158

• Laffont, Jean-Jacques 77
• Lake, David 322
• Landes, William M. 95, 96, 97, 112, 113, 132, 134
• lawmaking
  • obsolescence problem 50–51
  • optimal law-making institution 150–151
  • optimal scale problem 47–50
  • optimal timing
    • basic problem 56–57
    • extensions 57–58
    • political agency problem 58–61
  • self-regulation as delegation of state law-making powers 232–235
  • sequential 57
  • social cost 46–52
  • under uncertainty 51–52
• lawyers, bias and long-term interests of 133–134
• League of Nations 315, 316
• Leffler, K. 219
• legal costs
  • allocation of 139
  • effects of precision of the law on 19–21
  • effects of rules and standards on 25–27
• legal harmonization 177, 366–370
  • corporate law 370–372, 373
  • European Union (EU) 367–368, 372–374
• legal innovation, optimal instruments of 198–200
• legal origins hypothesis 145, 155–156, 158–159
• legal philosophy 29
• legal profession, bias and long-term interests of tort lawyers 133–134
• legal sanctions, focal point theory of expressive law and 179–181
• legal traditions
  • putative primacy of common law 144–146, 158–159
    • adaptability of common law 148–151
    • codification failures and endogenous legal traditions 157–158
    • criticisms 155–158
    • endogenous legal traditions 151–153
    • evidence 153–154
    • historical common law emphasis on private ordering 146–147
    • omitted variables and observational equivalence 155–157
• Lehmann, Markus A. 76
• Lepard, Brian D. 295, 296
• Lessig, L. 212
• Levine, Michael E. 66
• Levmore, Saul 12, 37
• lex fori 378
• liability rules 38
• Libecap, Gary D. 81
• liberal choice regime 369
• Licht, Amir N. 155
• Lindsay, Cotton M. 70
• Link, B. 207
• Logue, Kyle D. 37
• Lohmann, Susanne 68
• Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio 144, 145, 153, 155, 156, 157, 158
• Lott, J. 219, 221
• Lupia, Arthur 69
• Luppi, Barbara 55, 60, 122, 135
• Lyon, Thomas P. 235

• MacDonald, Jason 68
• McAdams, Richard H. 170, 172–173, 176, 177, 179, 189, 209
• McCarty, N. 11
• McCubbins, Matthew D. 64–67, 68, 69, 80
• McGarrity, Thomas O. 80, 81
• McGuire, Robert A. 7
• McKay, Amy 72
• Macey, Jonathan R. 66, 67, 95
• Magat, Wesley A. 71
• Magin, Konstantin 402, 403
• Mahoney, Paul G. 123, 147
• Mailath, George J. 180
• Masala, G. 220
• Mashaw, Jerry L. 78
• Matsusaka, J. 13
• Maurizi, Alex R. 241
• Maxwell, John W. 235, 236
• Mayer, Colin 220, 238
• Mehta, Judith 171
• Merrill, Thomas 117, 118
• Merryman, John H. 144
• Mezzetti, Claudio 150
• p. 427Miceli, Thomas J. 99, 137, 151
• Michelman, Frank I. 35
• Milgrom, Paul R. 67, 70
• Mill, James 341
• Mill, John Stuart 341, 342
• Miller, Conrad 156
• Miller, Gary J. 12
• Mirocci, M. 220
• Mitnick, Barry M. 64
• Mitrany, David 315
• Moe, Terry M. 70
• Money, J. 11
• monopoly 9–10
• moral hazard 210
  • forum shopping and 380–381
• morally motivated self-regulation 244–246
• Moran, Mark J. 73
• Muris, Timothy J. 73
• Musgrave, Richard 391
• Mussachio, Aldo 123
• Myerson, Roger 168

• Nadler, Janice 170, 172–173, 177
• Nakazato, Minoru 37
• negligence 28, 37–38
• neofunctionalism 315
• Netherlands 220, 223
• Neugart, Michael 151
• Neven, David 238
• new economics of organizations (NEO) 322
• new institutional economics 15
• Niblett, Anthony 151
• Nisbett, R. 211
• Niskanen, William A. 77
• Noll, Roger G. 64–67
• non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 314
• non-legal international agreements 281–282
• Norman, George 258
• normative constitutional economics
  • critical evaluation 5–6
  • efficiency and 5
  • methodological foundations 4–5
• normative expectations 187
• normative individualism 4
• North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 316
• Norway 296

• Oates, Wallace 345, 390, 391
• obsolescence problem 50–51
• O’Driscoll, Gerald P. 125
• Ogul, Morris S. 69
• Ogus, Anthony I. 28, 69
• O’Halloran, Sharyn 75, 76
• O’Hara, Erin 100, 383
• Ohsfeldt, Robert L. 7
• Okamoto, M. 220
• Olson, Mary 71
• Oman, Nathan B. 122
• Osborne, Evan 119
• over-inclusion problem 45–46

• pacta sunt servanda doctrine 278–279
• Page, Talbot 80
• Page, William H. 77
• Palestini, A. 210
• Parisi, Francesco 44, 45, 48, 49, 51, 55, 60, 119, 121, 122, 134, 135, 138, 192, 194, 195, 282, 284, 286, 287, 298, 299, 301, 302, 304, 368, 369, 370, 394, 396
• parliaments
  • direct democracy versus representative institutions 12–14
  • presidential versus parliamentary systems of government 10–11
  • unicameral versus bicameral systems 11–12
• Parsons, Wes 97
• participationsee political participation
• path dependence 113–114, 138–139
• persistent objector doctrine 295–297, 302–304
• Persson, T. 10, 11
• Phelan, J. 207
• Pinochet, Augusto 412, 413
• police-patrol control 68–70
• political agency problem 58–61
• political participation
  • balancing participation and efficiency 361–362
  • benefits of 341–342
  • measurement of 343–344
  • metrics of 342–343
• Pollack, Mark A. 323
• Polo, A. 220
• Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M. 148, 149, 150
• p. 428positive constitutional economics
  • direct democracy versus representative institutions 12–14
  • explicit constitutional change 7–8
  • horizontal separation of powers 9–10
  • implicit constitutional change 8–9
  • presidential versus parliamentary systems 10–11
  • procedures for generating constitutional rules 6–7
  • relevance of preferences and restrictions for generating procedural rules 7
  • unicameral versus bicameral systems 11–12
• Posner, Eric A. 55, 58, 59, 60, 76, 176, 258, 273, 275, 276, 280, 298
• Posner, Richard A. 24, 44, 45, 46, 50, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 108, 109, 112, 113, 114, 132, 134, 150, 151
• Postema, Gerald J. 179
• power 407–410
  • separation of see separation of powers
• precedents 27–28, 113, 121–122, 150
  • path dependence and 113–114, 138–139
• precision of the law
  • accuracy of adjudication and 22
  • effects of precision on legal costs and behaviour 19–21
  • problem 19
  • related issues and literature 22–23
• pre-emptive self-regulation 235–237
• presidential versus parliamentary systems of government 10–11
• Priest, George L. 96, 97, 98, 112, 113, 114, 139, 151
• Prisoner’s dilemma 171, 175, 176, 258, 275, 298
• Pritchard, Adam C. 8, 118, 119
• privatization 401–405, 407–408
• product liability 133–134
• productivity, democracy and 13
• prohibition 190–191
• proof, criminal law and 216–217
• property rights 126, 127, 179, 231
• property rules 38
• public choice theories 29, 62, 110, 231, 369
  • critiques of common law 117–119
• public goods 173–174, 277
• punishment
  • criminal law and 213–215
  • enforcement of self-regulation and 238

• Rajan, Raghuram 123, 156
• Ramsmeyer, J. Mark 37
• Rasmusen, Eric 99, 207
• rationality
  • bounded 217–218
  • rational choice theory 274, 277–278
  • rationalist regime theory 320–321
• Rawls, John 5
• Recca, D. 222
• regime theory 319–320
  • rationalist regime theory 320–321
• regulation
  • adaptability of common law and 148–149
  • co-regulation 244
  • harmonizationsee legal harmonization
  • regulatory competition 386–388, 397–398
    • analytical framework 388–394
    • learning from 396–397
    • other structural issues 394–396
  • self-regulation see self-regulation
• rent-seeking, common law and 119, 120–124
• reputation 205
  • loss of see social stigma
• reservations to treaties 284–287
  • reserving versus non-reserving states 287–288
• retroactivity 30
• Riboni, Alessandro 151
• Ribstein, Larry E. 81, 367, 383
• Riker, William 6, 7, 339
• risk, effects of transitions on private actors’ incentives and risk-bearing costs 31–32
• Rizzo, Mario J. 94, 125
• Robinson, Glen O. 67
• Rockmann, Bert A. 69
• Roe, Mark J. 98
• Roman law 377
• Romano, Roberta 371
• Rose-Ackerman, Susan 67, 74
• Ross, L. 211
• Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 341, 342
• Rowley, Charles K. 97 p. 429Rubin, Paul H. 79, 94, 95, 96, 97, 110–111, 114, 117, 119, 133, 134, 151
• Rubinfeld, Daniel L. 31, 37
• rule of law 414
• Russia/Soviet Union 58
• growth-oriented legal reforms 401–405, 407–408
• Rustichini, Aldo 185, 214

• Sager, Lawrence G. 99
• Samuels, Warren J. 30, 31
• Samuelson, Paul 339, 390
• sanctions
  • focal point theory of expressive law and 179–181
  • social 187
  • stigmasee social stigma
• Sanders, Anthony B. 125
• Sandler, Todd 275, 280
• Savioz, M. 13
• scale economies 391–392
• Schäfer, H. 52
• Schelling, Thomas 168, 169–170, 180
• Schroeder, Christopher H. 67, 71
• Schulz, Norbert 394
• Schumpeter, Joseph 339
• Schwab, Stewart J. 95
• Schwartz, Alan 55, 58
• Schwartz, Shalom H. 155
• Schwartz, T. 68, 69
• Scitovsky, Tibor 127
• Scott, Robert E. 55, 58
• self-help 317–318
• self-regulation 228
  • competitive 241–243
  • as delegation of state law-making powers 232–235
  • enforcement 237–238
  • mixed systems 243–244
  • morally motivated self-regulation and corporate social responsibility 244–246
  • nature of 228–230
  • pre-emptive 235–237
  • sector-specific studies 239–241
  • spontaneous private legal ordering 230–232
• self-reporting 23
• separation of powers 14
  • horizontal 9–10
  • presidential versus parliamentary systems of government 10–11
  • unicameral versus bicameral systems 11–12
• sequential lawmaking 57
• settlements
  • bargaining 22
  • feedback effect of civil settlements 140–142
• Ševcenko, Catherine 286
• sexual offences 223
• sexuality 216
• Sgard, Jérôme 157
• Shaffer, Gregory C. 323
• Shapiro, C. 219
• Shapiro, Perry 31, 37
• Shavell, Steven 22, 25, 100, 388, 389
• Shepsle, Kenneth A. 65, 66
• Shipan, Charles 73, 74, 76
• Shleifer, Andrei 98, 136, 137, 144, 145, 146, 147, 151, 153, 155, 156, 157, 158, 394
• Sitkoff, Robert 392
• Sloof, Randolph 76
• Smith, Adam 115
• smoking bans 178, 188, 189
• Snidal, Duncan 322, 323
• social constructivism 318
• social contract theory 4
• social cost of lawmaking and adjudication 46–52
• social norms 185–187
  • choosing optimal instruments of legal innovation 198–200
  • countervailing norms 185, 197–198
  • enforcement 187
  • expressive power of the law and 188–190
  • faster social reaction and social outrage 197–198
  • international society and 318–319
  • legal backlash and 191–197
  • origins and evolution 187–188
  • reasons why laws clash with 190–191
  • social stigma and 206–208
    • stigma, norms and the role of information 208–210
    • stigma and signalling of unobservable attributes 210–213
• p. 430social responsibility 244–246
• social stigma 205–206, 224–225
  • criminal law and 205–206, 213
    • belief in stigmatizing effects of criminal law 218
    • bounded rationality and cognitive biases 217–218
    • economic perspective 218–220
    • information asymmetry and high legal standard 217
    • punishment 213–215
    • quantifying stigma 220–221
    • standard of proof 216–217
    • substantive issues 215–216
  • naming and shaming
    • international organizations 262–263
    • reputational versus formal penalties 222
    • shaming via administrative sanctions 223–224
    • usefulness of shaming sanctions 222–223
  • social norms and 206–208
    • stigma, norms and the role of information 208–210
    • stigma and signalling of unobservable attributes 210–213
• spatial approaches to control of discretion 72–76
• Spier, Kathryn E. 22
• Spiller, Pablo T. 73, 74
• Spitzer, Matthew L. 74, 77, 78
• spontaneous private legal ordering 230–232
• Spulber, Daniel F. 78
• Staaf, Robert J. 126
• standards 177
  • legal rules compared with 43–44
    • information costs 47
    • judicial interpretation problem 44–46
    • policy implications 52
    • precedent, other legal interpretations and evolution of legal commands 27–28
    • problem 23–25
    • related issues and literature 28–29
    • social cost of lawmaking and adjudication 46–52
• Stearns, Maxwell L. 114
• Stefanadis, Christodoulos 239
• Stein, Arthur 322
• Stephenson, Matthew C. 67, 175
• Steunenberg, Bernard 65, 73
• stigmasee social stigma
• Story, Joseph 377
• Strauss, David A. 176
• strict liability 37–38, 126–127
• Stulz, René M. 155
• Stuntz, William J. 186, 190
• subjective value 127–128
• subsequent objector doctrine 297, 304–306
• subsidiarity principle 366–367
• Sugden, Robert 179
• Sunshine, Jason 190
• Sunstein, C. 212
• supply-side model of common law efficiency 114–117
• Swaine, Edward T. 287
• Sweeny, James L. 76
• Switzerland 13
• Sykes, Alan O. 280, 298

• Tabellini, G. 10, 11
• Tanimura, J. 220
• taxation 23
• Terrebonne, R. Peter 96, 112
• terrorism 191
• Tiebout, Charles 346–352, 390
• Tiller, Emerson H. 74
• timing
  • optimal timing of lawmaking 54–55
    • basic problem 56–57
    • extensions 57–58
    • political agency problem 58–61
• Tirole, Jean 77, 210
• Tocqueville, Alexis de 342
• tort law, bias and long-term interests of tort lawyers 133–134
• Trachtman, Joel 258
• trade 179
• traditionssee legal traditions
• traffic situations 177–178
• transaction costs 44–45, 115, 322
• transition rules 29–30
  • additional issues 36
  • effects on private actors’ incentives and risk-bearing costs 31–32
  • literature 36–37
  • related issues 32–33
• p. 431treaties 256–258, 272–273, 289–290
  • customary international law and 278–280
  • formation
    • factors conducive to treaties and other international cooperation 273–278
    • modalities of 282–284
  • non-legal international agreements and 281–282
  • reservations 284–287
    • reserving versus non-reserving states 287–288
• Tsebelis, G. 11
• Tullock, Gordon 5, 11–12, 94, 120, 121, 123
• Twight, Charlotte 97, 119
• Tyler, Tom R. 190

• unanimity: deviations from unanimity rule 4–5
• uncertainty 5, 28, 51–52
• under-inclusion problem 45–46
• United Kingdom 114–115, 139
• United Nations 262, 272, 311–312, 313, 314, 316
• United States of America
  • abortion rights 197
  • allocation of legal costs 139
  • bureaucracies in 67
    • control of bureaucratic discretion 70–71, 73
    • legal rule making process 80–82
  • conflict of laws in 377, 381
  • constitution 7, 8, 256, 414
  • corporate law in 370–371
  • courts in 116
  • direct democracy in 13
  • federalism in 339, 340
  • interest groups 118–119, 134
  • judges in 95, 99
  • prohibition in 190–191
  • regulation in 234–235, 236
  • terrorist attacks 191
  • treaties and 256, 257, 278
• unjust laws 191–192
• utilitarianism 108
• utility maximization by judges 94–95

• Van den Broek, S. 220
• Vanden Bergh, Richard G. 72, 76
• Vass, Peter 230
• Verschoor, W. 220
• Vertova, Pietro 173, 174
• Viegi, Nicola 155
• Vietnam 400
• violence 178
• Vishny, Robert 144, 153, 155, 156, 158
• Voigt, S. 14
• Vriend, Nicolaas J. 171

• Waltz, Kenneth N. 318
• Wangenheim, Georg von 97, 192, 194, 195
• wealth-maximization framework 127
• Weingast, Barry R. 64–67, 69, 72, 73, 175, 176, 179, 238
• Whitman, D. 136
• Wicksell, Knut 4
• Wiley, John Shepard 77, 78
• Williamson, Dean 156
• Williamson, Rohan 155
• Winetrobe, Ronald 81
• Winter, R. 371
• World Bank 263
• World Trade Organization (WTO) 265, 312, 406

• Yackee, Susan Webb 72
• Yarbrough, Beth V. 322
• Yarbrough, Robert M. 322

• Zanarone, Giorgio 156
• Zingales, Luigi 123, 156
• Zweigert, Konrad 144
• Zywicki, Todd J. 109–110, 114, 115, 116, 118, 119, 120–121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 128, 132